Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America
The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a con...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2210557/renegotiation-concession-contracts-latin-america http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18224 |
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okr-10986-182242021-04-23T14:03:42Z Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America Guasch, J. Luis Laffont, Jean-Jacques Straub, Stephane ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ARBITRATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BOT CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DEBT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DIVESTITURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS JUDGES MARGINAL COST MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY DECISIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICIANS PORTS POTENTIAL INVESTORS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS ROADS SECTOR RESTRUCTURING SOCIAL COST SOCIAL SECTORS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX SYSTEM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITIES CONCESSIONS; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; CONTRACT NEGOTIATION; INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY; ECONOMIC SHOCKS; DATA ANALYSIS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; ENERGY SECTOR; WATER SECTOR; TRANSPORT SECTOR; POLICY FORMATION UTILITIES CONCESSIONS The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work. 2014-05-09T19:28:48Z 2014-05-09T19:28:48Z 2003-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2210557/renegotiation-concession-contracts-latin-america http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18224 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3011 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Caribbean Latin America |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ARBITRATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BOT CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DEBT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DIVESTITURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS JUDGES MARGINAL COST MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY DECISIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICIANS PORTS POTENTIAL INVESTORS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS ROADS SECTOR RESTRUCTURING SOCIAL COST SOCIAL SECTORS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX SYSTEM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITIES CONCESSIONS; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; CONTRACT NEGOTIATION; INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY; ECONOMIC SHOCKS; DATA ANALYSIS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; ENERGY SECTOR; WATER SECTOR; TRANSPORT SECTOR; POLICY FORMATION UTILITIES CONCESSIONS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ARBITRATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BOT CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DEBT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DIVESTITURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS JUDGES MARGINAL COST MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY DECISIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICIANS PORTS POTENTIAL INVESTORS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS ROADS SECTOR RESTRUCTURING SOCIAL COST SOCIAL SECTORS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX SYSTEM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITIES CONCESSIONS; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; CONTRACT NEGOTIATION; INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY; ECONOMIC SHOCKS; DATA ANALYSIS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; ENERGY SECTOR; WATER SECTOR; TRANSPORT SECTOR; POLICY FORMATION UTILITIES CONCESSIONS Guasch, J. Luis Laffont, Jean-Jacques Straub, Stephane Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Caribbean Latin America |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3011 |
| description |
The authors construct a regulation model
in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect
enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the
authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on
the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory
institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and
the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they
use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin
America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000
covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy,
transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the
authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical
and empirical work. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Guasch, J. Luis Laffont, Jean-Jacques Straub, Stephane |
| author_facet |
Guasch, J. Luis Laffont, Jean-Jacques Straub, Stephane |
| author_sort |
Guasch, J. Luis |
| title |
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America |
| title_short |
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America |
| title_full |
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America |
| title_fullStr |
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America |
| title_sort |
renegotiation of concession contracts in latin america |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2210557/renegotiation-concession-contracts-latin-america http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18224 |
| _version_ |
1764439460899979264 |