Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India
Recently there has been a surge in international empirical evidence that national policymakers allocate resources across regions based on political considerations, in addition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency. In order to mi...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2280438/partisan-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18257 |
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okr-10986-182572021-04-23T14:03:42Z Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India Khemani, Stuti POLITICS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES POLITICAL DECISION MAKING REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES REGIONAL DISPARITY CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONALISM POLITICAL PARTIES FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY CENTRAL AGENCIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL TRANSFERS CITIZENS COALITIONS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECREE DEMOCRACY DEVOLUTION DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS DISTRICTS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL POLITICS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FISCAL FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL RESOURCES FISCAL YEAR FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GRANT ALLOCATION INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MINISTERS NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARTY AFFILIATION PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICIANS PROVINCES PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING RESERVE BANK OF INDIA RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVENUE MOBILIZATION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE TRANSFERS SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE BUDGETS STATE BUREAUCRACY STATE ELECTIONS STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE INCOME STATE REVENUES TAX EFFORTS TAX SYSTEM TAXATION VOTERS VOTING FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY Recently there has been a surge in international empirical evidence that national policymakers allocate resources across regions based on political considerations, in addition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigate these political compulsions, several federations around the world have attempted to create independent constitutional bodies that are responsible for determining federal transfers to subnational jurisdictions. The author tests whether constitutional rules indeed make a difference in curbing political influence by contrasting the impact of political variables on two types of intergovernmental transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972-95. The pattern of evidence shows that transfers, whose regional distribution is determined by political agents, usually provide greater resources to state governments that are politically affiliated with the national ruling party and are important in maximizing the party's representation in the national legislature. But the political effect on statutory transfers, determined by an independent agency with constitutional authority, is strikingly contrary, with greater resources going to unaffiliated state governments. The author argues that this contrasting evidence indicates that constitutional rules indeed restrict the extent to which partisan politics can affect resources available to subnational governments. 2014-05-12T18:24:27Z 2014-05-12T18:24:27Z 2003-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2280438/partisan-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18257 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3016 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia India |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
POLITICS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES POLITICAL DECISION MAKING REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES REGIONAL DISPARITY CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONALISM POLITICAL PARTIES FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY CENTRAL AGENCIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL TRANSFERS CITIZENS COALITIONS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECREE DEMOCRACY DEVOLUTION DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS DISTRICTS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL POLITICS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FISCAL FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL RESOURCES FISCAL YEAR FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GRANT ALLOCATION INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MINISTERS NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARTY AFFILIATION PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICIANS PROVINCES PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING RESERVE BANK OF INDIA RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVENUE MOBILIZATION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE TRANSFERS SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE BUDGETS STATE BUREAUCRACY STATE ELECTIONS STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE INCOME STATE REVENUES TAX EFFORTS TAX SYSTEM TAXATION VOTERS VOTING FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY |
| spellingShingle |
POLITICS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES POLITICAL DECISION MAKING REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES REGIONAL DISPARITY CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONALISM POLITICAL PARTIES FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY CENTRAL AGENCIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL TRANSFERS CITIZENS COALITIONS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECREE DEMOCRACY DEVOLUTION DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS DISTRICTS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL POLITICS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FISCAL FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL RESOURCES FISCAL YEAR FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GRANT ALLOCATION INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MINISTERS NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARTY AFFILIATION PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICIANS PROVINCES PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING RESERVE BANK OF INDIA RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVENUE MOBILIZATION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE TRANSFERS SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE BUDGETS STATE BUREAUCRACY STATE ELECTIONS STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE INCOME STATE REVENUES TAX EFFORTS TAX SYSTEM TAXATION VOTERS VOTING FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY Khemani, Stuti Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia India |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3016 |
| description |
Recently there has been a surge in
international empirical evidence that national policymakers
allocate resources across regions based on political
considerations, in addition to any normative considerations
of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigate these
political compulsions, several federations around the world
have attempted to create independent constitutional bodies
that are responsible for determining federal transfers to
subnational jurisdictions. The author tests whether
constitutional rules indeed make a difference in curbing
political influence by contrasting the impact of political
variables on two types of intergovernmental transfers to
states in the Indian federation over a period of time,
1972-95. The pattern of evidence shows that transfers, whose
regional distribution is determined by political agents,
usually provide greater resources to state governments that
are politically affiliated with the national ruling party
and are important in maximizing the party's
representation in the national legislature. But the
political effect on statutory transfers, determined by an
independent agency with constitutional authority, is
strikingly contrary, with greater resources going to
unaffiliated state governments. The author argues that this
contrasting evidence indicates that constitutional rules
indeed restrict the extent to which partisan politics can
affect resources available to subnational governments. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Khemani, Stuti |
| title |
Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India |
| title_short |
Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India |
| title_full |
Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India |
| title_fullStr |
Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India |
| title_sort |
partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in india |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2280438/partisan-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18257 |
| _version_ |
1764439488933658624 |