International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty?
Bringing the United States and major developing countries to control their greenhouse gas emissions will be the key challenge for the international climate regime beyond the Kyoto Protocol. But in the current quantity-based coordination, large unce...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2185252/international-climate-regime-beyond-2012-quota-allocation-rules-robust-uncertainty http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18274 |
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okr-10986-18274 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST ABATEMENT COSTS ABATEMENT POTENTIAL ALLOWANCE TRADING ANTHROPOGENIC INTERFERENCE ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERIC CARBON AVERAGE COSTS BASELINE EMISSIONS CAPITA EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON CONTENT CARBON CYCLE CARBON INTENSITY CARBON TECHNOLOGIES CARBON TRADING CERTAIN EXTENT CLEAN DEVELOPMENT CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY CLIMATE SYSTEM CO2 CO2 EMISSIONS COAL COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES CONSUMPTION PATTERNS CONVERGENCE DEFORESTATION DIFFUSION DOMESTIC ABATEMENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC GROWTH EMISSION EMISSION LEVEL EMISSION QUOTA EMISSION QUOTAS EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSION TARGET EMISSION TARGETS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS ABATEMENT EMISSIONS GROWTH EMISSIONS SCENARIOS END-USE ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENTITLEMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES EQUILIBRIUM EXCESS EMISSIONS FISHERIES FOSSIL FUEL FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUELS GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS CONCENTRATIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEAVY INDUSTRY HOT AIR INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE IPCC KYOTO PROTOCOL LAND USE MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL COSTS MARKET POWER METHANE MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE NATIONAL EMISSIONS NEGOTIATIONS NITROUS OXIDE PER CAPITA EMISSION PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL ECONOMY POPULATION GROWTH POWER GENERATION PRIMARY ENERGY QUOTAS REDUCING EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE ENERGY SO2 STABILIZATION SURFACE TEMPERATURE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TEMPERATURE WASTE WORLD EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT CLIMATIC CHANGE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT CLIMATE SYSTEM MODELS MARKET ACCESS ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY QUOTA DISTRIBUTION ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS COST ESTIMATES PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS ABATEMENT RANGES WORLD EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS |
| spellingShingle |
ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST ABATEMENT COSTS ABATEMENT POTENTIAL ALLOWANCE TRADING ANTHROPOGENIC INTERFERENCE ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERIC CARBON AVERAGE COSTS BASELINE EMISSIONS CAPITA EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON CONTENT CARBON CYCLE CARBON INTENSITY CARBON TECHNOLOGIES CARBON TRADING CERTAIN EXTENT CLEAN DEVELOPMENT CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY CLIMATE SYSTEM CO2 CO2 EMISSIONS COAL COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES CONSUMPTION PATTERNS CONVERGENCE DEFORESTATION DIFFUSION DOMESTIC ABATEMENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC GROWTH EMISSION EMISSION LEVEL EMISSION QUOTA EMISSION QUOTAS EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSION TARGET EMISSION TARGETS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS ABATEMENT EMISSIONS GROWTH EMISSIONS SCENARIOS END-USE ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENTITLEMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES EQUILIBRIUM EXCESS EMISSIONS FISHERIES FOSSIL FUEL FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUELS GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS CONCENTRATIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEAVY INDUSTRY HOT AIR INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE IPCC KYOTO PROTOCOL LAND USE MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL COSTS MARKET POWER METHANE MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE NATIONAL EMISSIONS NEGOTIATIONS NITROUS OXIDE PER CAPITA EMISSION PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL ECONOMY POPULATION GROWTH POWER GENERATION PRIMARY ENERGY QUOTAS REDUCING EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE ENERGY SO2 STABILIZATION SURFACE TEMPERATURE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TEMPERATURE WASTE WORLD EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT CLIMATIC CHANGE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT CLIMATE SYSTEM MODELS MARKET ACCESS ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY QUOTA DISTRIBUTION ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS COST ESTIMATES PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS ABATEMENT RANGES WORLD EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS Lecocq, Franck Crassous, Renaud International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3000 |
| description |
Bringing the United States and major
developing countries to control their greenhouse gas
emissions will be the key challenge for the international
climate regime beyond the Kyoto Protocol. But in the current
quantity-based coordination, large uncertainties surrounding
future emissions and future abatement opportunities make the
costs of any commitment very difficult to assess ex ante,
hence a strong risk that the negotiation will be stalled.
The authors use a partial equilibrium model of the
international allowance market to quantify the economic
consequences of the main post-Kyoto quota allocation rules
proposed in the literature and to assess how robust these
consequences are to uncertainty on future population,
economic, and emissions growth. They confirm that,
regardless of the rule selected, the prices of allowances
and the net costs of climate mitigation for all parties are
very sensitive to uncertainty, and in some scenarios very
large. This constitutes a strong barrier against adopting
any of these schemes if no additional mechanism is
introduced to limit the uncertainty on costs. On the other
hand, parties' preferred (least-cost) rules are
essentially robust to uncertainty. And although these
preferences differ across countries, the authors'
analysis suggest some bargaining is possible if developing
countries make a commitment and join the allowance market
earlier in exchange for tighter quotas in the North. This
underscores the importance of the rules governing the entry
of new parties into the coordination. But the magnitude of
the win-win potential strongly depends on how different
abatement costs are assumed to be between industrial and
developing countries, and on how long that gap is assumed to persist. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Lecocq, Franck Crassous, Renaud |
| author_facet |
Lecocq, Franck Crassous, Renaud |
| author_sort |
Lecocq, Franck |
| title |
International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? |
| title_short |
International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? |
| title_full |
International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? |
| title_fullStr |
International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? |
| title_sort |
international climate regime beyond 2012 : are quota allocation rules robust to uncertainty? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2185252/international-climate-regime-beyond-2012-quota-allocation-rules-robust-uncertainty http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18274 |
| _version_ |
1764439516974678016 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-182742021-04-23T14:03:42Z International Climate Regime beyond 2012 : Are Quota Allocation Rules Robust to Uncertainty? Lecocq, Franck Crassous, Renaud ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST ABATEMENT COSTS ABATEMENT POTENTIAL ALLOWANCE TRADING ANTHROPOGENIC INTERFERENCE ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERIC CARBON AVERAGE COSTS BASELINE EMISSIONS CAPITA EMISSIONS CARBON CARBON CONTENT CARBON CYCLE CARBON INTENSITY CARBON TECHNOLOGIES CARBON TRADING CERTAIN EXTENT CLEAN DEVELOPMENT CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY CLIMATE SYSTEM CO2 CO2 EMISSIONS COAL COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES CONSUMPTION PATTERNS CONVERGENCE DEFORESTATION DIFFUSION DOMESTIC ABATEMENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC GROWTH EMISSION EMISSION LEVEL EMISSION QUOTA EMISSION QUOTAS EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSION TARGET EMISSION TARGETS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS ABATEMENT EMISSIONS GROWTH EMISSIONS SCENARIOS END-USE ENERGY DEMAND ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENTITLEMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES EQUILIBRIUM EXCESS EMISSIONS FISHERIES FOSSIL FUEL FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUELS GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS CONCENTRATIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GASES HEAVY INDUSTRY HOT AIR INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE IPCC KYOTO PROTOCOL LAND USE MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL COSTS MARKET POWER METHANE MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE NATIONAL EMISSIONS NEGOTIATIONS NITROUS OXIDE PER CAPITA EMISSION PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL ECONOMY POPULATION GROWTH POWER GENERATION PRIMARY ENERGY QUOTAS REDUCING EMISSIONS RENEWABLE ENERGIES RENEWABLE ENERGY SO2 STABILIZATION SURFACE TEMPERATURE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TEMPERATURE WASTE WORLD EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT CLIMATIC CHANGE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT CLIMATE SYSTEM MODELS MARKET ACCESS ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY QUOTA DISTRIBUTION ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS COST ESTIMATES PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS ABATEMENT RANGES WORLD EMISSIONS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS Bringing the United States and major developing countries to control their greenhouse gas emissions will be the key challenge for the international climate regime beyond the Kyoto Protocol. But in the current quantity-based coordination, large uncertainties surrounding future emissions and future abatement opportunities make the costs of any commitment very difficult to assess ex ante, hence a strong risk that the negotiation will be stalled. The authors use a partial equilibrium model of the international allowance market to quantify the economic consequences of the main post-Kyoto quota allocation rules proposed in the literature and to assess how robust these consequences are to uncertainty on future population, economic, and emissions growth. They confirm that, regardless of the rule selected, the prices of allowances and the net costs of climate mitigation for all parties are very sensitive to uncertainty, and in some scenarios very large. This constitutes a strong barrier against adopting any of these schemes if no additional mechanism is introduced to limit the uncertainty on costs. On the other hand, parties' preferred (least-cost) rules are essentially robust to uncertainty. And although these preferences differ across countries, the authors' analysis suggest some bargaining is possible if developing countries make a commitment and join the allowance market earlier in exchange for tighter quotas in the North. This underscores the importance of the rules governing the entry of new parties into the coordination. But the magnitude of the win-win potential strongly depends on how different abatement costs are assumed to be between industrial and developing countries, and on how long that gap is assumed to persist. 2014-05-12T20:50:30Z 2014-05-12T20:50:30Z 2003-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2185252/international-climate-regime-beyond-2012-quota-allocation-rules-robust-uncertainty http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18274 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3000 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |