Making Federalism Work : The 18th Constitutional Amendment

Making Federalism Work : The 18th Constitutional Amendment

The almost unanimous passage of a landmark consensus constitutional amendment "the 18th Constitutional Amendment" restored Pakistan's constitution to its original intent of a decentralized federation of four provinces as envisaged in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Shah, Anwar
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ABUSE ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY ASSETS AUTHORITY BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM CENTRAL CONTROL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CENTRAL POLICIES CENTRALIZATION CITIES CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CITIZENSHIP CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS COLLUSION COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS CONSTITUTIONS CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC CONTROL DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIALS DISCRETION DISCRIMINATION DISTRIBUTION ACROSS PROVINCES DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME DIVISION OF POWERS DUE PROCESS ELECTED OFFICIALS EMERGENCY POWERS ENACTMENT ETHIC EXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATION EXPENDITURES FEDERAL BUDGET FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FEDERAL COUNTRIES FEDERAL DEFICIT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES FEDERAL FINANCES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL GUARANTEES FEDERAL INTERVENTION FEDERAL LEGISLATION FEDERAL POLICIES FEDERAL REVENUE FEDERAL SYSTEMS FEDERAL TRANSFERS FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SECTOR FISCAL CRISIS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DISCIPLINE FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL GAP FISCAL TRANSFERS FOREIGN LOANS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT ENTITIES GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES GOVERNMENT ROLE GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT SPENDING POWERS GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES GOVERNORS HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS INTEGRITY LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LACK OF SECURITY LARGE PROVINCES LAWS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL COUNCILS LOCAL DECISION MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC POLICY MAYORS MEDIA MEMBER STATES METROPOLITAN AREAS MILITARY REGIME MILITARY REGIMES MINISTER MINISTERS MINISTRY OF EDUCATION MINISTRY OF HEALTH MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL CONSENSUS NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL OBJECTIVES NATIONAL PLANNING NATIONS PATRONAGE PENALTIES PENALTY POLICE POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL CONSENSUS POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICIANS PORK BARREL PRIVATIZATION PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL BORROWING PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES PROVINCIAL CAPITALS PROVINCIAL FINANCES PROVINCIAL FINANCING PROVINCIAL FUNCTIONS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVINCIAL LEVELS PROVINCIAL OWNERSHIP PROVINCIAL ROLES PUBLIC AFFAIRS PUBLIC DEBT PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC MONIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SPENDING RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY REGIMES REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SHARING SYSTEM REVOLUTION RISK MANAGEMENT ROLE OF STATES RULE OF LAW SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL EXPENDITURES SUBNATIONAL TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION TAX DECENTRALIZATION TAX EFFORT TAX EVASION TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX SYSTEM TAXATION TAXES ON PROPERTY TAXPAYERS TRANSPARENCY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/11/19407055/making-federalism-work-18th-constitutional-amendment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18703

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Summary:	The almost unanimous passage of a landmark consensus constitutional amendment "the 18th Constitutional Amendment" restored Pakistan's constitution to its original intent of a decentralized federation of four provinces as envisaged in the 1956 and 1973 constitutions. This amendment was hailed by policy makers and academics alike as a major step forward in reforming the multi-order governance in Pakistan. This paper takes a closer look at the provisions of this amendment and highlights both the potentials and pitfalls of the new constitutional order for good governance in Pakistan. The paper concludes that the amendment must be seen as a first yet small and incomplete step in reforming multi-order governance in Pakistan. A large unfinished reform agenda remains to be charted.