Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control

The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle-blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a s...

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Main Authors:	Basu, Karna, Basu, Kaushik, Cordella, Tito
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ANTI CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACT CRIME CRIMES CRIMINAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CRIMINAL CODES ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS EXTORTION FIGURES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN_CORRUPT_PRACTICES JUDICIAL SYSTEM LAW ENFORCEMENT MEDIA NEGOTIATIONS ORGANIZED CRIME PENALTIES PENALTY PROSECUTORS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION SOCIAL SCIENCE VICTIMS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHISTLE-BLOWING
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19705390/asymmetric-punishment-instrument-corruption-control http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18821

id	okr-10986-18821
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-188212021-04-23T14:03:49Z Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control Basu, Karna Basu, Kaushik Cordella, Tito ANTI CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACT CRIME CRIMES CRIMINAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CRIMINAL CODES ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS EXTORTION FIGURES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN_CORRUPT_PRACTICES JUDICIAL SYSTEM LAW ENFORCEMENT MEDIA NEGOTIATIONS ORGANIZED CRIME PENALTIES PENALTY PROSECUTORS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION SOCIAL SCIENCE VICTIMS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHISTLE-BLOWING The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle-blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash bargaining, detection is costly, and detection rates are set endogenously. First, when detection rates are fixed, the symmetry properties of punishment are irrelevant to bribery. Bribery disappears if expected penalties are sufficiently high; otherwise, bribe sizes rise as expected penalties rise. Second, when detection rates are determined by the bribe-giver, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either eliminates bribery or allows it to persist with larger bribe sizes. Furthermore, when bribery persists, multiple bribe sizes could survive in equilibrium. The paper derives parameter values under which each of these outcomes occurs and discusses how these could be interpreted in the context of existing institutions. 2014-06-30T16:29:22Z 2014-06-30T16:29:22Z 2014-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19705390/asymmetric-punishment-instrument-corruption-control http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18821 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6933 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ANTI CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACT CRIME CRIMES CRIMINAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CRIMINAL CODES ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS EXTORTION FIGURES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN_CORRUPT_PRACTICES JUDICIAL SYSTEM LAW ENFORCEMENT MEDIA NEGOTIATIONS ORGANIZED CRIME PENALTIES PENALTY PROSECUTORS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION SOCIAL SCIENCE VICTIMS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHISTLE-BLOWING
spellingShingle	ANTI CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACT CRIME CRIMES CRIMINAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CRIMINAL CODES ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS EXTORTION FIGURES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN_CORRUPT_PRACTICES JUDICIAL SYSTEM LAW ENFORCEMENT MEDIA NEGOTIATIONS ORGANIZED CRIME PENALTIES PENALTY PROSECUTORS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION SOCIAL SCIENCE VICTIMS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHISTLE-BLOWING Basu, Karna Basu, Kaushik Cordella, Tito Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6933
description	The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle-blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash bargaining, detection is costly, and detection rates are set endogenously. First, when detection rates are fixed, the symmetry properties of punishment are irrelevant to bribery. Bribery disappears if expected penalties are sufficiently high; otherwise, bribe sizes rise as expected penalties rise. Second, when detection rates are determined by the bribe-giver, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either eliminates bribery or allows it to persist with larger bribe sizes. Furthermore, when bribery persists, multiple bribe sizes could survive in equilibrium. The paper derives parameter values under which each of these outcomes occurs and discusses how these could be interpreted in the context of existing institutions.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Basu, Karna Basu, Kaushik Cordella, Tito
author_facet	Basu, Karna Basu, Kaushik Cordella, Tito
author_sort	Basu, Karna
title	Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control
title_short	Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control
title_full	Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control
title_fullStr	Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control
title_full_unstemmed	Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control
title_sort	asymmetric punishment as an instrument of corruption control
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19705390/asymmetric-punishment-instrument-corruption-control http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18821
_version_	1764442782460542976

Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control

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