The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships
This paper explores the determinants of government environmental performance at the local level. Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the hierarchical government structure, were selected for this exercise. The performance indicators us...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2109778/determinants-government-environmental-performance-empirical-analysis-chinese-townships http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19197 |
| id |
okr-10986-19197 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABATEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET AIR POLLUTION AIR QUALITY BUDGET DEFICITS BUREAUCRACY CAPITALS CASH BUDGETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CLEANER ENVIRONMENT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS EQUILIBRIUM FEDERALISM FILE COMPLAINTS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL REFORM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE INCOME INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL WATER INFORMATION INFORMATION DISCLOSURE INFORMATION SERVICES INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE LABOR MARKET LOBBYING LOCAL ADMINISTRATION LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAX MARKET INSTRUMENTS MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL POLICY PENALTIES POINT OF VIEW POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SERVICES REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY APPROACHES REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS REGULATORY SYSTEM SOCIAL STABILITY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SULFUR DIOXIDE TOWNSHIPS TRADE ASSOCIATION WAGES |
| spellingShingle |
ABATEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET AIR POLLUTION AIR QUALITY BUDGET DEFICITS BUREAUCRACY CAPITALS CASH BUDGETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CLEANER ENVIRONMENT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS EQUILIBRIUM FEDERALISM FILE COMPLAINTS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL REFORM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE INCOME INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL WATER INFORMATION INFORMATION DISCLOSURE INFORMATION SERVICES INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE LABOR MARKET LOBBYING LOCAL ADMINISTRATION LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAX MARKET INSTRUMENTS MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL POLICY PENALTIES POINT OF VIEW POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SERVICES REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY APPROACHES REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS REGULATORY SYSTEM SOCIAL STABILITY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SULFUR DIOXIDE TOWNSHIPS TRADE ASSOCIATION WAGES Wang, Hua Di, Wenhua The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific China |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2937 |
| description |
This paper explores the determinants of
government environmental performance at the local level.
Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the
hierarchical government structure, were selected for this
exercise. The performance indicators used in the analyses
include the efforts of enforcing government environmental
regulations and of providing environmental services to
polluting enterprises. The performance determinants
identified include environmental performance of upper-level
governments, local development status, industrial
employment, income of workers in polluting enterprises,
local environmental quality, and public pressure for
environmental quality improvement. A survey of 85 townships
and interviews of 151 township government leaders were
conducted in three provinces of China. The statistical
results show that: a) The environmental performance of
upper-level governments in China strongly and positively
influences the environmental efforts of the township
governments. b) Public pressure has created incentives for
the township governments to improve their efforts in both
enforcing environmental regulations and providing
environmental services, while the environmental quality did
not show significant impacts. c) Higher employment in
industries tends to have a negative influence on the
regulatory enforcement, but a positive influence on
environmental service provision. d) A higher enforcement
effort and a lower service provision are associated with
higher wages the workers received from industries. This
implies that the industries offering higher wages to the
workers are subject to more stringent environmental
enforcement but receive less environmental services. 5)
Richer townships tend to have less regulatory enforcement
but better environmental services. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Wang, Hua Di, Wenhua |
| author_facet |
Wang, Hua Di, Wenhua |
| author_sort |
Wang, Hua |
| title |
The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships |
| title_short |
The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships |
| title_full |
The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships |
| title_fullStr |
The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships |
| title_sort |
determinants of government environmental performance : an empirical analysis of chinese townships |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2109778/determinants-government-environmental-performance-empirical-analysis-chinese-townships http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19197 |
| _version_ |
1764439733959655424 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-191972021-04-23T14:03:43Z The Determinants of Government Environmental Performance : An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Townships Wang, Hua Di, Wenhua ABATEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET AIR POLLUTION AIR QUALITY BUDGET DEFICITS BUREAUCRACY CAPITALS CASH BUDGETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CLEANER ENVIRONMENT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS EQUILIBRIUM FEDERALISM FILE COMPLAINTS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL REFORM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE INCOME INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL WATER INFORMATION INFORMATION DISCLOSURE INFORMATION SERVICES INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE LABOR MARKET LOBBYING LOCAL ADMINISTRATION LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAX MARKET INSTRUMENTS MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL POLICY PENALTIES POINT OF VIEW POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SERVICES REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY APPROACHES REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS REGULATORY SYSTEM SOCIAL STABILITY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SULFUR DIOXIDE TOWNSHIPS TRADE ASSOCIATION WAGES This paper explores the determinants of government environmental performance at the local level. Chinese township governments, the lowest level in the hierarchical government structure, were selected for this exercise. The performance indicators used in the analyses include the efforts of enforcing government environmental regulations and of providing environmental services to polluting enterprises. The performance determinants identified include environmental performance of upper-level governments, local development status, industrial employment, income of workers in polluting enterprises, local environmental quality, and public pressure for environmental quality improvement. A survey of 85 townships and interviews of 151 township government leaders were conducted in three provinces of China. The statistical results show that: a) The environmental performance of upper-level governments in China strongly and positively influences the environmental efforts of the township governments. b) Public pressure has created incentives for the township governments to improve their efforts in both enforcing environmental regulations and providing environmental services, while the environmental quality did not show significant impacts. c) Higher employment in industries tends to have a negative influence on the regulatory enforcement, but a positive influence on environmental service provision. d) A higher enforcement effort and a lower service provision are associated with higher wages the workers received from industries. This implies that the industries offering higher wages to the workers are subject to more stringent environmental enforcement but receive less environmental services. 5) Richer townships tend to have less regulatory enforcement but better environmental services. 2014-08-01T17:30:40Z 2014-08-01T17:30:40Z 2002-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2109778/determinants-government-environmental-performance-empirical-analysis-chinese-townships http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19197 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2937 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific China |