Antidumping as Safeguard Policy

Antidumping is by far the most prevalent instrument applied by countries to impose new import restrictions. In the 1980s antidumping was used mainly by a handful of industrial countries. More recently developing countries have used it increasingly...

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Main Authors:	Finger, J. Michael, Ng, Francis, Wangchuk, Sonam
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DETERMINATIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING LAWS ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS ANTIDUMPING RULES APPAREL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COMPETITION LAW COMPETITIVE POSITION CONSUMERS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POWER EMPLOYMENT EXPORT PRICE EXPORT RESTRAINTS EXPORTERS EXPORTS FOREIGN TARIFF IMPACT OF TRADE IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT SALES IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION MARKET DISTORTIONS MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OPENNESS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION RECIPROCITY SAFEGUARD CLAUSE TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE TRADE LAWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES URUGUAY ROUND URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS VER WELFARE LOSS WORLD TRADE WTO ANTIDUMPING POLICY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION EXPORT RESTRICTIONS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS URUGUAY ROUND ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/12/1660255/antidumping-safeguard-policy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19405

id	okr-10986-19405
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-194052021-04-23T14:03:42Z Antidumping as Safeguard Policy Finger, J. Michael Ng, Francis Wangchuk, Sonam ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DETERMINATIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING LAWS ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS ANTIDUMPING RULES APPAREL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COMPETITION LAW COMPETITIVE POSITION CONSUMERS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POWER EMPLOYMENT EXPORT PRICE EXPORT RESTRAINTS EXPORTERS EXPORTS FOREIGN TARIFF IMPACT OF TRADE IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT SALES IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION MARKET DISTORTIONS MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OPENNESS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION RECIPROCITY SAFEGUARD CLAUSE TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE TRADE LAWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES URUGUAY ROUND URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS VER WELFARE LOSS WORLD TRADE WTO ANTIDUMPING POLICY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM TRADE LIBERALIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION EXPORT RESTRICTIONS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS URUGUAY ROUND ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS Antidumping is by far the most prevalent instrument applied by countries to impose new import restrictions. In the 1980s antidumping was used mainly by a handful of industrial countries. More recently developing countries have used it increasingly often. Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements went into effect in 1995, developing countries have initiated 559 antidumping cases, developed countries 463 (through June 2000). Per dollar of imports ten developing countries have initiated at least five times as many antidumping cases as the United States. Even so, the WTO community continues to take up antidumping as if it were a specialized instrument. In reality, present WTO rules allow it to be applied in any instance of politically troubling imports. The authors argue that, as a "pressure valve" to help maintain an open trade policy, antidumping has serious weaknesses: Its technical strictures do not distinguish between instances that advance rather than harm the national economic interest. And its politics of branding foreigners as unfair strengthens rather than mutes pressures against liberalization. 2014-08-15T20:04:15Z 2014-08-15T20:04:15Z 2001-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/12/1660255/antidumping-safeguard-policy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19405 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2730 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research UNITED STATES
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DETERMINATIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING LAWS ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS ANTIDUMPING RULES APPAREL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COMPETITION LAW COMPETITIVE POSITION CONSUMERS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POWER EMPLOYMENT EXPORT PRICE EXPORT RESTRAINTS EXPORTERS EXPORTS FOREIGN TARIFF IMPACT OF TRADE IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT SALES IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION MARKET DISTORTIONS MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OPENNESS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION RECIPROCITY SAFEGUARD CLAUSE TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE TRADE LAWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES URUGUAY ROUND URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS VER WELFARE LOSS WORLD TRADE WTO ANTIDUMPING POLICY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM TRADE LIBERALIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION EXPORT RESTRICTIONS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS URUGUAY ROUND ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS
spellingShingle	ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DETERMINATIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING LAWS ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS ANTIDUMPING RULES APPAREL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COMPETITION LAW COMPETITIVE POSITION CONSUMERS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POWER EMPLOYMENT EXPORT PRICE EXPORT RESTRAINTS EXPORTERS EXPORTS FOREIGN TARIFF IMPACT OF TRADE IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT SALES IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION MARKET DISTORTIONS MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OPENNESS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION RECIPROCITY SAFEGUARD CLAUSE TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REDUCTIONS TRADE TRADE LAWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES URUGUAY ROUND URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS VER WELFARE LOSS WORLD TRADE WTO ANTIDUMPING POLICY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM TRADE LIBERALIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION EXPORT RESTRICTIONS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS URUGUAY ROUND ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS Finger, J. Michael Ng, Francis Wangchuk, Sonam Antidumping as Safeguard Policy
geographic_facet	UNITED STATES
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2730
description	Antidumping is by far the most prevalent instrument applied by countries to impose new import restrictions. In the 1980s antidumping was used mainly by a handful of industrial countries. More recently developing countries have used it increasingly often. Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements went into effect in 1995, developing countries have initiated 559 antidumping cases, developed countries 463 (through June 2000). Per dollar of imports ten developing countries have initiated at least five times as many antidumping cases as the United States. Even so, the WTO community continues to take up antidumping as if it were a specialized instrument. In reality, present WTO rules allow it to be applied in any instance of politically troubling imports. The authors argue that, as a "pressure valve" to help maintain an open trade policy, antidumping has serious weaknesses: Its technical strictures do not distinguish between instances that advance rather than harm the national economic interest. And its politics of branding foreigners as unfair strengthens rather than mutes pressures against liberalization.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Finger, J. Michael Ng, Francis Wangchuk, Sonam
author_facet	Finger, J. Michael Ng, Francis Wangchuk, Sonam
author_sort	Finger, J. Michael
title	Antidumping as Safeguard Policy
title_short	Antidumping as Safeguard Policy
title_full	Antidumping as Safeguard Policy
title_fullStr	Antidumping as Safeguard Policy
title_full_unstemmed	Antidumping as Safeguard Policy
title_sort	antidumping as safeguard policy
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/12/1660255/antidumping-safeguard-policy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19405
_version_	1764439782541230080

Antidumping as Safeguard Policy

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