Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter
Using a cross-country panel, Lederman, Loayza, and Soares examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase political accountability. Previous empirical studies have not analyzed the role of...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1631800/accountability-corruption-political-institutions-matter http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19420 |
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okr-10986-194202021-04-23T14:03:43Z Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter Lederman, Daniel Loayza, Norman Reis Soares, Rodrigo ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITY BAD POLICIES BRIBERY BURGLARY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CENTRALIZATION CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION COLONIZATION CONSPIRACIES CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CONTROL CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION VARIABLE COUNTRY AVERAGE COUNTRY AVERAGES CRIME CRIME RATES CRIME VICTIMIZATION CRIMES DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIC STABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL COMPETITION EXECUTIVE POWER EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GROWTH RATE IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME LEVEL JUDICIARY LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT MEDIA MURDER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL DETERMINANTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUNISHMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS STATE AUTONOMY STATE GOVERNMENT SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS TRANSPARENCY POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY CORRUPTION IN POLITICS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTS POLITICAL STABILITY FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TRANSPARENCY Using a cross-country panel, Lederman, Loayza, and Soares examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase political accountability. Previous empirical studies have not analyzed the role of political institutions, even though both the political science and the theoretical economics literature have indicated their importance in determining corruption. The main theoretical hypothesis guiding the authors' empirical investigation is that political institutions affect corruption through two channels: political accountability and the structure of the provision of public goods. The results suggest that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption: democracy, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption. In addition, the authors show that common findings of the earlier empirical literature on the determinants of corruption related to openness and legal tradition to not hold once political variables are taken into account. 2014-08-19T16:42:45Z 2014-08-19T16:42:45Z 2001-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1631800/accountability-corruption-political-institutions-matter http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19420 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2708 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITY BAD POLICIES BRIBERY BURGLARY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CENTRALIZATION CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION COLONIZATION CONSPIRACIES CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CONTROL CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION VARIABLE COUNTRY AVERAGE COUNTRY AVERAGES CRIME CRIME RATES CRIME VICTIMIZATION CRIMES DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIC STABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL COMPETITION EXECUTIVE POWER EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GROWTH RATE IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME LEVEL JUDICIARY LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT MEDIA MURDER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL DETERMINANTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUNISHMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS STATE AUTONOMY STATE GOVERNMENT SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS TRANSPARENCY POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY CORRUPTION IN POLITICS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTS POLITICAL STABILITY FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TRANSPARENCY |
| spellingShingle |
ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITY BAD POLICIES BRIBERY BURGLARY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CENTRALIZATION CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION COLONIZATION CONSPIRACIES CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CONTROL CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION VARIABLE COUNTRY AVERAGE COUNTRY AVERAGES CRIME CRIME RATES CRIME VICTIMIZATION CRIMES DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIC STABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL COMPETITION EXECUTIVE POWER EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FOREIGN INVESTMENT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GROWTH RATE IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME LEVEL JUDICIARY LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT MEDIA MURDER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL DETERMINANTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUNISHMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS STATE AUTONOMY STATE GOVERNMENT SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS TRANSPARENCY POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY CORRUPTION IN POLITICS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTS POLITICAL STABILITY FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TRANSPARENCY Lederman, Daniel Loayza, Norman Reis Soares, Rodrigo Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2708 |
| description |
Using a cross-country panel, Lederman,
Loayza, and Soares examine the determinants of corruption,
paying particular attention to political institutions that
increase political accountability. Previous empirical
studies have not analyzed the role of political
institutions, even though both the political science and the
theoretical economics literature have indicated their
importance in determining corruption. The main theoretical
hypothesis guiding the authors' empirical investigation is
that political institutions affect corruption through two
channels: political accountability and the structure of the
provision of public goods. The results suggest that
political institutions are extremely important in
determining the prevalence of corruption: democracy,
parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of
the press are all associated with lower corruption. In
addition, the authors show that common findings of the
earlier empirical literature on the determinants of
corruption related to openness and legal tradition to not hold
once political variables are taken into account. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Lederman, Daniel Loayza, Norman Reis Soares, Rodrigo |
| author_facet |
Lederman, Daniel Loayza, Norman Reis Soares, Rodrigo |
| author_sort |
Lederman, Daniel |
| title |
Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter |
| title_short |
Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter |
| title_full |
Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter |
| title_fullStr |
Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Accountability and Corruption : Political Institutions Matter |
| title_sort |
accountability and corruption : political institutions matter |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1631800/accountability-corruption-political-institutions-matter http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19420 |
| _version_ |
1764439818100539392 |