On the Duration of Civil War
The authors model the duration of large-scale, violent civil conflicts, applying hazard functions to a comprehensive data set on such conflicts for the period 1960-99. They find that the duration of conflicts is determined by a substantially differ...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614731/duration-civil-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19534 |
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okr-10986-195342021-04-23T14:03:43Z On the Duration of Civil War Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke Soderbom, Mans ARMAMENTS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL CONFLICTS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WAR DATA CIVIL WARS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT RISK CRIMINAL ACTIVITY DEFENSE DIASPORA DIASPORA VARIABLE DIASPORAS DURATION OF WAR ECONOMIC GROWTH ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HATREDS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY HAZARD FUNCTION HAZARD MODEL HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL WAR JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MILITARY EQUIPMENT MODEL OF CONFLICT PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL REPRESSION POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POST- CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES PROBABILITY OF WAR REBEL ORGANIZATION REBEL ORGANIZATIONS REBEL VICTORY REBELLION REBELLIONS REFUGEES RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RISK OF CONFLICT SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WAR ECONOMIES WAR PROJECT The authors model the duration of large-scale, violent civil conflicts, applying hazard functions to a comprehensive data set on such conflicts for the period 1960-99. They find that the duration of conflicts is determined by a substantially different set of variables than those that determine their initiation. The duration of conflict increases substantially if the society is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if the conflict has commenced since 1980. None of these factors affects the initiation of conflict. The authors also find that neither the duration nor the initiation of conflict is affected by initial inequality or political repression. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that rebellions are initiated where they are viable during conflict, regardless of the prospects of attaining post-conflict goals, and that they persist unless circumstances change. 2014-08-20T21:06:54Z 2014-08-20T21:06:54Z 2001-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614731/duration-civil-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19534 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2681 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ARMAMENTS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL CONFLICTS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WAR DATA CIVIL WARS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT RISK CRIMINAL ACTIVITY DEFENSE DIASPORA DIASPORA VARIABLE DIASPORAS DURATION OF WAR ECONOMIC GROWTH ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HATREDS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY HAZARD FUNCTION HAZARD MODEL HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL WAR JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MILITARY EQUIPMENT MODEL OF CONFLICT PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL REPRESSION POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POST- CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES PROBABILITY OF WAR REBEL ORGANIZATION REBEL ORGANIZATIONS REBEL VICTORY REBELLION REBELLIONS REFUGEES RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RISK OF CONFLICT SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WAR ECONOMIES WAR PROJECT |
spellingShingle |
ARMAMENTS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL CONFLICTS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WAR DATA CIVIL WARS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT RISK CRIMINAL ACTIVITY DEFENSE DIASPORA DIASPORA VARIABLE DIASPORAS DURATION OF WAR ECONOMIC GROWTH ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HATREDS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY HAZARD FUNCTION HAZARD MODEL HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL WAR JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MILITARY EQUIPMENT MODEL OF CONFLICT PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL REPRESSION POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POST- CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES PROBABILITY OF WAR REBEL ORGANIZATION REBEL ORGANIZATIONS REBEL VICTORY REBELLION REBELLIONS REFUGEES RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RISK OF CONFLICT SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WAR ECONOMIES WAR PROJECT Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke Soderbom, Mans On the Duration of Civil War |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2681 |
description |
The authors model the duration of
large-scale, violent civil conflicts, applying hazard
functions to a comprehensive data set on such conflicts for
the period 1960-99. They find that the duration of conflicts
is determined by a substantially different set of variables
than those that determine their initiation. The duration of
conflict increases substantially if the society is composed
of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest
cover, and if the conflict has commenced since 1980. None of
these factors affects the initiation of conflict. The
authors also find that neither the duration nor the
initiation of conflict is affected by initial inequality or
political repression. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that rebellions are initiated where they are
viable during conflict, regardless of the prospects of
attaining post-conflict goals, and that they persist unless
circumstances change. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke Soderbom, Mans |
author_facet |
Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke Soderbom, Mans |
author_sort |
Collier, Paul |
title |
On the Duration of Civil War |
title_short |
On the Duration of Civil War |
title_full |
On the Duration of Civil War |
title_fullStr |
On the Duration of Civil War |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the Duration of Civil War |
title_sort |
on the duration of civil war |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614731/duration-civil-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19534 |
_version_ |
1764439954582142976 |