Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work?
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with count...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614729/deposit-insurance-around-globe-work-vol-1-4 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19549 |
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okr-10986-195492021-04-23T14:03:43Z Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AUDITS BANK CAPITAL BANK DEPOSITS BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK PERFORMANCE BANK RISK BANK RUNS BANK SOLVENCY BANKING CRISIS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SECTOR BANKING STABILITY BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BLANKET DEPOSIT GUARANTEES BLANKET DEPOSIT INSURANCE CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL STANDARDS CDS CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COVERAGE CREDIT UNIONS CROSS- COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEBT DEFAULT RISK DEPOSIT GUARANTEES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COSTS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCING MECHANISMS FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS GAMBLING GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INDIRECT COST INSOLVENCY INSOLVENT BANKS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS INSURANCE SYSTEM INSURED DEPOSITS INTEREST RATES INTEREST SENSITIVITY LIQUIDITY LOOTING MARKET DISCIPLINE MITIGATION MORAL HAZARD NET LOSS PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROGRAMS PRUDENTIAL REGULATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RESERVES RISK FACTORS RISK PREMIUMS SAFETY NET POLICIES SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STABILIZATION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STOCK PRICES SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES THRIFT INSTITUTIONS TRANSPARENCY Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. The authors document the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design and review empirical evidence on how design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first addresing weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments. 2014-08-21T15:21:33Z 2014-08-21T15:21:33Z 2001-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614729/deposit-insurance-around-globe-work-vol-1-4 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19549 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2679 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AUDITS BANK CAPITAL BANK DEPOSITS BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK PERFORMANCE BANK RISK BANK RUNS BANK SOLVENCY BANKING CRISIS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SECTOR BANKING STABILITY BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BLANKET DEPOSIT GUARANTEES BLANKET DEPOSIT INSURANCE CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL STANDARDS CDS CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COVERAGE CREDIT UNIONS CROSS- COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEBT DEFAULT RISK DEPOSIT GUARANTEES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COSTS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCING MECHANISMS FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS GAMBLING GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INDIRECT COST INSOLVENCY INSOLVENT BANKS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS INSURANCE SYSTEM INSURED DEPOSITS INTEREST RATES INTEREST SENSITIVITY LIQUIDITY LOOTING MARKET DISCIPLINE MITIGATION MORAL HAZARD NET LOSS PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROGRAMS PRUDENTIAL REGULATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RESERVES RISK FACTORS RISK PREMIUMS SAFETY NET POLICIES SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STABILIZATION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STOCK PRICES SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES THRIFT INSTITUTIONS TRANSPARENCY |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AUDITS BANK CAPITAL BANK DEPOSITS BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK PERFORMANCE BANK RISK BANK RUNS BANK SOLVENCY BANKING CRISIS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SECTOR BANKING STABILITY BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BLANKET DEPOSIT GUARANTEES BLANKET DEPOSIT INSURANCE CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL STANDARDS CDS CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COVERAGE CREDIT UNIONS CROSS- COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEBT DEFAULT RISK DEPOSIT GUARANTEES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COSTS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCING MECHANISMS FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS GAMBLING GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INDIRECT COST INSOLVENCY INSOLVENT BANKS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS INSURANCE SYSTEM INSURED DEPOSITS INTEREST RATES INTEREST SENSITIVITY LIQUIDITY LOOTING MARKET DISCIPLINE MITIGATION MORAL HAZARD NET LOSS PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROGRAMS PRUDENTIAL REGULATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RESERVES RISK FACTORS RISK PREMIUMS SAFETY NET POLICIES SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STABILIZATION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STOCK PRICES SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES THRIFT INSTITUTIONS TRANSPARENCY Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2679 |
description |
Explicit deposit insurance has been
spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not
advanced in financial and institutional development.
Economic theory indicates that deposit insurance design
features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific
elements of the financial and governmental contracting
environment. The authors document the extent of
cross-country differences in deposit insurance design and
review empirical evidence on how design features affect
private market discipline, banking stability, financial
development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution.
This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries
to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first addresing
weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. |
author_facet |
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. |
author_sort |
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli |
title |
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? |
title_short |
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? |
title_full |
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? |
title_fullStr |
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work? |
title_sort |
deposit insurance around the globe : where does it work? |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614729/deposit-insurance-around-globe-work-vol-1-4 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19549 |
_version_ |
1764439969460387840 |