The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate in many nations. Large international financial institutions are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How does this affect the banking s...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561491/ability-banks-lend-informationally-opaque-small-businesses http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19567 |
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okr-10986-195672021-04-23T14:03:43Z The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses Berger, Allen N. Klapper, Leora Udell, Gregory F. AGRICULTURE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BALANCE SHEET BANK ASSETS BANK CAPITAL BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK LENDING BANK MERGERS BANK PORTFOLIOS BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK SIZE BANK STRUCTURE BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING RELATIONSHIPS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BASLE ACCORD BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COSTS CAPITAL STANDARDS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPETITORS CONSOLIDATION CONTAGION COSTS OF BORROWING CREDIT POLICIES DEBT DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DISECONOMIES DISTRESSED BANKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN ENTRY GDP INCOME STATEMENTS INFLATION INFORMATION ACQUISITION INSOLVENCY INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LENDER LENDERS LENDING BEHAVIOR LENDING SERVICES LENDING TERMS LOAN LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN PORTFOLIOS LOW INTEREST RATES MARKET DISCIPLINE NONPERFORMING LOANS PATENTS PREDICTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION RELATIONSHIP LENDING RISK TAKING SMALL BANKS SMALL BUSINESS SUBSIDIARY SUPPLIERS TRADE BARRIERS TRANSACTIONS COSTS WEALTH Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate in many nations. Large international financial institutions are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How does this affect the banking system's ability to lend to informationally opaque small businesses? The authors test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms, using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. They also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus borrowing from several banks. Their results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms, especially if small businesses are delinquent in repaying their loans. Bank distress resulting from lax prudential supervision and regulation appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, despite raising borrowing costs and destroying some of the benefits of exclusive lending relationships. 2014-08-21T17:37:19Z 2014-08-21T17:37:19Z 2001-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561491/ability-banks-lend-informationally-opaque-small-businesses http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19567 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2656 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
AGRICULTURE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BALANCE SHEET BANK ASSETS BANK CAPITAL BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK LENDING BANK MERGERS BANK PORTFOLIOS BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK SIZE BANK STRUCTURE BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING RELATIONSHIPS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BASLE ACCORD BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COSTS CAPITAL STANDARDS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPETITORS CONSOLIDATION CONTAGION COSTS OF BORROWING CREDIT POLICIES DEBT DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DISECONOMIES DISTRESSED BANKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN ENTRY GDP INCOME STATEMENTS INFLATION INFORMATION ACQUISITION INSOLVENCY INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LENDER LENDERS LENDING BEHAVIOR LENDING SERVICES LENDING TERMS LOAN LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN PORTFOLIOS LOW INTEREST RATES MARKET DISCIPLINE NONPERFORMING LOANS PATENTS PREDICTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION RELATIONSHIP LENDING RISK TAKING SMALL BANKS SMALL BUSINESS SUBSIDIARY SUPPLIERS TRADE BARRIERS TRANSACTIONS COSTS WEALTH |
spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BALANCE SHEET BANK ASSETS BANK CAPITAL BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK LENDING BANK MERGERS BANK PORTFOLIOS BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK SIZE BANK STRUCTURE BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING RELATIONSHIPS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BASLE ACCORD BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COSTS CAPITAL STANDARDS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPETITORS CONSOLIDATION CONTAGION COSTS OF BORROWING CREDIT POLICIES DEBT DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DISECONOMIES DISTRESSED BANKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN ENTRY GDP INCOME STATEMENTS INFLATION INFORMATION ACQUISITION INSOLVENCY INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LENDER LENDERS LENDING BEHAVIOR LENDING SERVICES LENDING TERMS LOAN LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN PORTFOLIOS LOW INTEREST RATES MARKET DISCIPLINE NONPERFORMING LOANS PATENTS PREDICTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION RELATIONSHIP LENDING RISK TAKING SMALL BANKS SMALL BUSINESS SUBSIDIARY SUPPLIERS TRADE BARRIERS TRANSACTIONS COSTS WEALTH Berger, Allen N. Klapper, Leora Udell, Gregory F. The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2656 |
description |
Consolidation of the banking industry is
shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate
in many nations. Large international financial institutions
are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How
does this affect the banking system's ability to lend
to informationally opaque small businesses? The authors test
hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign
ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque
small firms, using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks,
firms, and loans. They also test hypotheses about borrowing
from a single bank versus borrowing from several banks.
Their results suggest that large and foreign-owned
institutions may have difficulty extending relationship
loans to opaque small firms, especially if small businesses
are delinquent in repaying their loans. Bank distress
resulting from lax prudential supervision and regulation
appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on
large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank
distress by borrowing from multiple banks, despite raising
borrowing costs and destroying some of the benefits of
exclusive lending relationships. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Berger, Allen N. Klapper, Leora Udell, Gregory F. |
author_facet |
Berger, Allen N. Klapper, Leora Udell, Gregory F. |
author_sort |
Berger, Allen N. |
title |
The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses |
title_short |
The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses |
title_full |
The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses |
title_fullStr |
The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses |
title_sort |
ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561491/ability-banks-lend-informationally-opaque-small-businesses http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19567 |
_version_ |
1764440029971611648 |