The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses

Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate in many nations. Large international financial institutions are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How does this affect the banking s...

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Main Authors: Berger, Allen N., Klapper, Leora, Udell, Gregory F.
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561491/ability-banks-lend-informationally-opaque-small-businesses
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19567
id okr-10986-19567
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-195672021-04-23T14:03:43Z The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses Berger, Allen N. Klapper, Leora Udell, Gregory F. AGRICULTURE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BALANCE SHEET BANK ASSETS BANK CAPITAL BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BANK LENDING BANK MERGERS BANK PORTFOLIOS BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK SIZE BANK STRUCTURE BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING RELATIONSHIPS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BASLE ACCORD BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COSTS CAPITAL STANDARDS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPETITORS CONSOLIDATION CONTAGION COSTS OF BORROWING CREDIT POLICIES DEBT DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DISECONOMIES DISTRESSED BANKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN ENTRY GDP INCOME STATEMENTS INFLATION INFORMATION ACQUISITION INSOLVENCY INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LENDER LENDERS LENDING BEHAVIOR LENDING SERVICES LENDING TERMS LOAN LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN PORTFOLIOS LOW INTEREST RATES MARKET DISCIPLINE NONPERFORMING LOANS PATENTS PREDICTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION RELATIONSHIP LENDING RISK TAKING SMALL BANKS SMALL BUSINESS SUBSIDIARY SUPPLIERS TRADE BARRIERS TRANSACTIONS COSTS WEALTH Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate in many nations. Large international financial institutions are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How does this affect the banking system's ability to lend to informationally opaque small businesses? The authors test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms, using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. They also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus borrowing from several banks. Their results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms, especially if small businesses are delinquent in repaying their loans. Bank distress resulting from lax prudential supervision and regulation appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, despite raising borrowing costs and destroying some of the benefits of exclusive lending relationships. 2014-08-21T17:37:19Z 2014-08-21T17:37:19Z 2001-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561491/ability-banks-lend-informationally-opaque-small-businesses http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19567 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2656 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic AGRICULTURE
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
BALANCE SHEET
BANK ASSETS
BANK CAPITAL
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
BANK LENDING
BANK MERGERS
BANK PORTFOLIOS
BANK RISK
BANK RISK TAKING
BANK SIZE
BANK STRUCTURE
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BASLE ACCORD
BORROWER
BORROWING
BORROWING COSTS
CAPITAL STANDARDS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES
COMPETITORS
CONSOLIDATION
CONTAGION
COSTS OF BORROWING
CREDIT POLICIES
DEBT
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
DISECONOMIES
DISTRESSED BANKS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EMPLOYMENT
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL DISTRESS
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL RATIOS
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
FOREIGN ENTRY
GDP
INCOME STATEMENTS
INFLATION
INFORMATION ACQUISITION
INSOLVENCY
INSURANCE
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
LENDER
LENDERS
LENDING BEHAVIOR
LENDING SERVICES
LENDING TERMS
LOAN
LOAN APPLICATIONS
LOAN PORTFOLIOS
LOW INTEREST RATES
MARKET DISCIPLINE
NONPERFORMING LOANS
PATENTS
PREDICTIONS
PRESENT VALUE
PRIVATIZATION
PROFITABILITY
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
RELATIONSHIP LENDING
RISK TAKING
SMALL BANKS
SMALL BUSINESS
SUBSIDIARY
SUPPLIERS
TRADE BARRIERS
TRANSACTIONS COSTS
WEALTH
spellingShingle AGRICULTURE
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
BALANCE SHEET
BANK ASSETS
BANK CAPITAL
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
BANK LENDING
BANK MERGERS
BANK PORTFOLIOS
BANK RISK
BANK RISK TAKING
BANK SIZE
BANK STRUCTURE
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEMS
BANKS
BASLE ACCORD
BORROWER
BORROWING
BORROWING COSTS
CAPITAL STANDARDS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES
COMPETITORS
CONSOLIDATION
CONTAGION
COSTS OF BORROWING
CREDIT POLICIES
DEBT
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
DISECONOMIES
DISTRESSED BANKS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EMPLOYMENT
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
FINANCIAL CRISES
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL DISTRESS
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
FINANCIAL RATIOS
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
FOREIGN ENTRY
GDP
INCOME STATEMENTS
INFLATION
INFORMATION ACQUISITION
INSOLVENCY
INSURANCE
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
LENDER
LENDERS
LENDING BEHAVIOR
LENDING SERVICES
LENDING TERMS
LOAN
LOAN APPLICATIONS
LOAN PORTFOLIOS
LOW INTEREST RATES
MARKET DISCIPLINE
NONPERFORMING LOANS
PATENTS
PREDICTIONS
PRESENT VALUE
PRIVATIZATION
PROFITABILITY
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
RELATIONSHIP LENDING
RISK TAKING
SMALL BANKS
SMALL BUSINESS
SUBSIDIARY
SUPPLIERS
TRADE BARRIERS
TRANSACTIONS COSTS
WEALTH
Berger, Allen N.
Klapper, Leora
Udell, Gregory F.
The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2656
description Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate in many nations. Large international financial institutions are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How does this affect the banking system's ability to lend to informationally opaque small businesses? The authors test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms, using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. They also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus borrowing from several banks. Their results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms, especially if small businesses are delinquent in repaying their loans. Bank distress resulting from lax prudential supervision and regulation appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, despite raising borrowing costs and destroying some of the benefits of exclusive lending relationships.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Berger, Allen N.
Klapper, Leora
Udell, Gregory F.
author_facet Berger, Allen N.
Klapper, Leora
Udell, Gregory F.
author_sort Berger, Allen N.
title The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
title_short The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
title_full The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
title_fullStr The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
title_full_unstemmed The Ability of Banks to Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses
title_sort ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561491/ability-banks-lend-informationally-opaque-small-businesses
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19567
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