Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by p...
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/05/1121293/rent-sharing-hold-up-manufacturing-wages-cote-divoire http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19662 |
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okr-10986-196622021-04-23T14:03:43Z Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire Azam, Jean-Paul Ris, Catherine DEMAND CURVE DEVALUATION DISCRIMINATION DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HETEROSCEDASTICITY HUMAN CAPITAL IMMIGRATION INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR ISOLATION LABOR COSTS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MIGRANTS MIGRATION MISSING DATA MONITORING TECHNOLOGY NUMERICAL VALUE NUTRITION POLICY RESEARCH PREDICTION PROBABILITY PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE VALIDITY VOCATIONAL TRAINING WAGE RATES WAGES WORKERS Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions, or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? The authors empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing, and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing, and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power, and that in Cote d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts, in response to new investments. 2014-08-26T14:51:39Z 2014-08-26T14:51:39Z 2001-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/05/1121293/rent-sharing-hold-up-manufacturing-wages-cote-divoire http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19662 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2600 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Cote d'Ivoire |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
DEMAND CURVE DEVALUATION DISCRIMINATION DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HETEROSCEDASTICITY HUMAN CAPITAL IMMIGRATION INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR ISOLATION LABOR COSTS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MIGRANTS MIGRATION MISSING DATA MONITORING TECHNOLOGY NUMERICAL VALUE NUTRITION POLICY RESEARCH PREDICTION PROBABILITY PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE VALIDITY VOCATIONAL TRAINING WAGE RATES WAGES WORKERS |
spellingShingle |
DEMAND CURVE DEVALUATION DISCRIMINATION DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HETEROSCEDASTICITY HUMAN CAPITAL IMMIGRATION INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR ISOLATION LABOR COSTS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MIGRANTS MIGRATION MISSING DATA MONITORING TECHNOLOGY NUMERICAL VALUE NUTRITION POLICY RESEARCH PREDICTION PROBABILITY PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE VALIDITY VOCATIONAL TRAINING WAGE RATES WAGES WORKERS Azam, Jean-Paul Ris, Catherine Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire |
geographic_facet |
Africa Cote d'Ivoire |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2600 |
description |
Labor costs in Francophone Africa are
considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at
least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on
industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise
development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions,
or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm
performance? The authors empirically analyze what determines
manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using an
unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to
control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the
rent-sharing, and hold-up theories of wage determination, as
well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their
results lean in favor of both rent-sharing, and hold-up,
suggesting that workers have some bargaining power, and that
in Cote d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of
labor contracts, in response to new investments. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Azam, Jean-Paul Ris, Catherine |
author_facet |
Azam, Jean-Paul Ris, Catherine |
author_sort |
Azam, Jean-Paul |
title |
Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire |
title_short |
Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire |
title_full |
Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire |
title_fullStr |
Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire |
title_full_unstemmed |
Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire |
title_sort |
rent-sharing, hold-up, and manufacturing wages in cote d'ivoire |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/05/1121293/rent-sharing-hold-up-manufacturing-wages-cote-divoire http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19662 |
_version_ |
1764440262825738240 |