id okr-10986-19662
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-196622021-04-23T14:03:43Z Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire Azam, Jean-Paul Ris, Catherine DEMAND CURVE DEVALUATION DISCRIMINATION DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HETEROSCEDASTICITY HUMAN CAPITAL IMMIGRATION INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR ISOLATION LABOR COSTS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MIGRANTS MIGRATION MISSING DATA MONITORING TECHNOLOGY NUMERICAL VALUE NUTRITION POLICY RESEARCH PREDICTION PROBABILITY PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE VALIDITY VOCATIONAL TRAINING WAGE RATES WAGES WORKERS Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions, or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? The authors empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing, and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing, and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power, and that in Cote d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts, in response to new investments. 2014-08-26T14:51:39Z 2014-08-26T14:51:39Z 2001-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/05/1121293/rent-sharing-hold-up-manufacturing-wages-cote-divoire http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19662 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2600 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Cote d'Ivoire
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic DEMAND CURVE
DEVALUATION
DISCRIMINATION
DUMMY VARIABLES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ECONOMICS
ECONOMISTS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EQUATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
HETEROSCEDASTICITY
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMMIGRATION
INCOME
INDUSTRIALIZATION
INEFFICIENCY
INFLATION
INFORMAL SECTOR
ISOLATION
LABOR COSTS
LABOR FORCE
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
MIGRANTS
MIGRATION
MISSING DATA
MONITORING TECHNOLOGY
NUMERICAL VALUE
NUTRITION
POLICY RESEARCH
PREDICTION
PROBABILITY
PRODUCT MARKETS
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTIVITY
PUBLIC SECTOR
SERVICE DELIVERY
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
VALIDITY
VOCATIONAL TRAINING
WAGE RATES
WAGES
WORKERS
spellingShingle DEMAND CURVE
DEVALUATION
DISCRIMINATION
DUMMY VARIABLES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ECONOMICS
ECONOMISTS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EQUATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
HETEROSCEDASTICITY
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMMIGRATION
INCOME
INDUSTRIALIZATION
INEFFICIENCY
INFLATION
INFORMAL SECTOR
ISOLATION
LABOR COSTS
LABOR FORCE
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
MIGRANTS
MIGRATION
MISSING DATA
MONITORING TECHNOLOGY
NUMERICAL VALUE
NUTRITION
POLICY RESEARCH
PREDICTION
PROBABILITY
PRODUCT MARKETS
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTIVITY
PUBLIC SECTOR
SERVICE DELIVERY
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
VALIDITY
VOCATIONAL TRAINING
WAGE RATES
WAGES
WORKERS
Azam, Jean-Paul
Ris, Catherine
Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
geographic_facet Africa
Cote d'Ivoire
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2600
description Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions, or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? The authors empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing, and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing, and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power, and that in Cote d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts, in response to new investments.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Azam, Jean-Paul
Ris, Catherine
author_facet Azam, Jean-Paul
Ris, Catherine
author_sort Azam, Jean-Paul
title Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
title_short Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
title_full Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
title_fullStr Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
title_full_unstemmed Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire
title_sort rent-sharing, hold-up, and manufacturing wages in cote d'ivoire
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/05/1121293/rent-sharing-hold-up-manufacturing-wages-cote-divoire
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19662
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