Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services
The new round of negotiations has begun with a mechanical sense of "since we said we would, therefore we must," says the author. To make the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) more effective ay liberalization, the author sugges...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/04/1121245/shaping-future-gats-rules-trade-services http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19667 |
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okr-10986-19667 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English en_US |
| topic |
AGREEMENT ON TRADE ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS ANTI- COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTITRUST LAW ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BARRIERS TO ENTRY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CAPITAL CONSTRAINT COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMERCIAL PRESENCE COMMUNICATION SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION RULES COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE PRACTICES COMPLETE LIBERALIZATION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS CROSS-BORDER DELIVERY CROSS-BORDER TRADE DIRECT INVESTMENT DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS DOMESTIC FIRMS DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC LAW DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC MARKET STRUCTURE DOMESTIC MEASURES DOMESTIC REGULATIONS DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCIES ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CASE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ENERGY SERVICES ENHANCED COMPETITION ENTRY BARRIERS ENTRY RESTRICTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITIES TRANSPORT FAVOURABLE ACCESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN CAPITAL FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN COSTS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN ENTRY FOREIGN EQUITY FOREIGN EQUITY PARTICIPATION FOREIGN EXPORTERS FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN PROVIDERS FOREIGN SERVICE PROVIDERS FOREIGN SERVICE SUPPLIERS FOREIGN SERVICES FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FOREIGN TRADE GATS GATS RULES GLOBAL WELFARE HEALTH SERVICES IMMUNITY INCUMBENT SUPPLIERS INFANT INDUSTRY POLICIES INFANT INDUSTRY TYPE INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL CARTELS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT PESSIMISM LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMMES LIBERALIZING INTENT LIBERALIZING TRADE MARKET ACCESS MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET STRUCTURE MAXIMUM EQUITY PARTICIPATION MFN MFN EXEMPTIONS MONOPOLISTIC SUPPLIERS MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL APPROACH MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL RULES MUTUAL RECOGNITION NATIONAL COMPETITION NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY NATIONAL PRODUCERS NATIONAL PRODUCTION NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY NATIONAL SUPPLIERS NATIONAL TREATMENT NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATION NATURAL MONOPOLY NATURAL PERSONS NEGOTIATIONS NON-DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OLIGOPOLISTIC RENTS OLIGOPOLY OLIGOPOLY RENTS OLIGOPOLY RIGHTS OPENNESS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE STABILITY PRIVATE COSTS PROFIT TAXATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS QUOTAS RECIPROCITY RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS REGULATORY BARRIERS REGULATORY CHALLENGES REGULATORY FAILURE REGULATORY FREEDOM REGULATORY PRINCIPLES REGULATORY REFORM RELEVANT GATS PROVISION RENT APPROPRIATION SAVINGS SERVICE-PROVIDING PERSONNEL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS SERVICES OPERATIONS SERVICES SECTORS SERVICES TRADE SERVICES TRANSACTIONS SOCIAL OBJECTIVES SOCIAL PROBLEMS SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY STATE ENTERPRISES STATE MONOPOLIES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF-LIKE EFFECT TECHNICAL STANDARDS TELECOM MONOPOLIES TELECOM NEGOTIATIONS TELECOM SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TRADE TRADE IN SERVICES TRADE POLICIES TRADE PROBLEMS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE-INHIBITING EFFECT TRADE-RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS TRADING PARTNERS TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TRANSPORT COSTS TRANSPORT SERVICES UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS URUGUAY ROUND WELFARE GAINS |
| spellingShingle |
AGREEMENT ON TRADE ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS ANTI- COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTITRUST LAW ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BARRIERS TO ENTRY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CAPITAL CONSTRAINT COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMERCIAL PRESENCE COMMUNICATION SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION RULES COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE PRACTICES COMPLETE LIBERALIZATION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS CROSS-BORDER DELIVERY CROSS-BORDER TRADE DIRECT INVESTMENT DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS DOMESTIC FIRMS DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC LAW DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC MARKET STRUCTURE DOMESTIC MEASURES DOMESTIC REGULATIONS DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCIES ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CASE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ENERGY SERVICES ENHANCED COMPETITION ENTRY BARRIERS ENTRY RESTRICTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITIES TRANSPORT FAVOURABLE ACCESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN CAPITAL FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN COSTS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN ENTRY FOREIGN EQUITY FOREIGN EQUITY PARTICIPATION FOREIGN EXPORTERS FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN PROVIDERS FOREIGN SERVICE PROVIDERS FOREIGN SERVICE SUPPLIERS FOREIGN SERVICES FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FOREIGN TRADE GATS GATS RULES GLOBAL WELFARE HEALTH SERVICES IMMUNITY INCUMBENT SUPPLIERS INFANT INDUSTRY POLICIES INFANT INDUSTRY TYPE INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL CARTELS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT PESSIMISM LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMMES LIBERALIZING INTENT LIBERALIZING TRADE MARKET ACCESS MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET STRUCTURE MAXIMUM EQUITY PARTICIPATION MFN MFN EXEMPTIONS MONOPOLISTIC SUPPLIERS MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL APPROACH MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL RULES MUTUAL RECOGNITION NATIONAL COMPETITION NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY NATIONAL PRODUCERS NATIONAL PRODUCTION NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY NATIONAL SUPPLIERS NATIONAL TREATMENT NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATION NATURAL MONOPOLY NATURAL PERSONS NEGOTIATIONS NON-DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OLIGOPOLISTIC RENTS OLIGOPOLY OLIGOPOLY RENTS OLIGOPOLY RIGHTS OPENNESS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE STABILITY PRIVATE COSTS PROFIT TAXATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS QUOTAS RECIPROCITY RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS REGULATORY BARRIERS REGULATORY CHALLENGES REGULATORY FAILURE REGULATORY FREEDOM REGULATORY PRINCIPLES REGULATORY REFORM RELEVANT GATS PROVISION RENT APPROPRIATION SAVINGS SERVICE-PROVIDING PERSONNEL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS SERVICES OPERATIONS SERVICES SECTORS SERVICES TRADE SERVICES TRANSACTIONS SOCIAL OBJECTIVES SOCIAL PROBLEMS SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY STATE ENTERPRISES STATE MONOPOLIES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF-LIKE EFFECT TECHNICAL STANDARDS TELECOM MONOPOLIES TELECOM NEGOTIATIONS TELECOM SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TRADE TRADE IN SERVICES TRADE POLICIES TRADE PROBLEMS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE-INHIBITING EFFECT TRADE-RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS TRADING PARTNERS TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TRANSPORT COSTS TRANSPORT SERVICES UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS URUGUAY ROUND WELFARE GAINS Mattoo, Aaditya Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2596 |
| description |
The new round of negotiations has begun
with a mechanical sense of "since we said we would,
therefore we must," says the author. To make the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) more effective
ay liberalization, the author suggests improving the
agreement's rules, countries' specific
commitments, and the negotiating methodology: 1) Wasteful
regulations, and entry restrictions pervade trade in
services. Unlike the GATT, the GATS has created no hierarchy
of instruments of protection. It may be possible to create a
legal presumption in favor of instruments (such as fiscal
measures) that provide protection more efficiently. 2) Many
countries have taken advantage of the GATS to create a more
secure trading environment, by making legally binding
commitments to market access. The credibility of reform
would increase with wider commitments to maintain current
levels of openness, or to increase access in the future. 3)
Multilateral rules on domestic regulations can help promote,
and consolidate domestic regulatory reform, even when the
rules are designed primarily to prevent the erosion of
market access for foreign providers. The pro-competitive
principles developed for basic communications, could be
extended to other network-based services sectors, such as
transport (terminals and infrastructure), and energy
services (distribution networks). The "necessity
test" instituted for accounting services, could be
applied to instruments in other sectors (so that doctors
judged competent in one jurisdiction, wouldn't have to
be retrained for another, for example). 4) Anticompetitive
practices that fall outside the jurisdiction of national
competition law, may be important in such sectors as
maritime, air transport, and communications services.
Strengthened multilateral rules are needed to reassure small
countries with weak enforcement capacity, that the gains
from liberalization will not be appropriated by
international cartels. 5) Explicit departures from the
most-favored-nation rule matter most in such sectors as
maritime transport, audiovisual services, and air transport
services - which have been excluded from key GATS
disciplines. Implicit discrimination can be prevented by
developing rules to ensure the non-discriminatory allocation
of quotas, and maintaining the desirable openness of the
GATS provision on mutual recognition agreements. 6)
Reciprocity must play a greater role in negotiations, if the
GATS is to advance liberalization beyond measures taken independently. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Mattoo, Aaditya |
| author_facet |
Mattoo, Aaditya |
| author_sort |
Mattoo, Aaditya |
| title |
Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services |
| title_short |
Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services |
| title_full |
Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services |
| title_fullStr |
Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services |
| title_sort |
shaping future gats rules for trade in services |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/04/1121245/shaping-future-gats-rules-trade-services http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19667 |
| _version_ |
1764440274650529792 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-196672021-04-23T14:03:43Z Shaping Future GATS Rules for Trade in Services Mattoo, Aaditya AGREEMENT ON TRADE ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS ANTI- COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTITRUST LAW ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BARRIERS TO ENTRY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CAPITAL CONSTRAINT COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMERCIAL PRESENCE COMMUNICATION SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION RULES COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE PRACTICES COMPLETE LIBERALIZATION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS CROSS-BORDER DELIVERY CROSS-BORDER TRADE DIRECT INVESTMENT DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS DOMESTIC FIRMS DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC LAW DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC MARKET STRUCTURE DOMESTIC MEASURES DOMESTIC REGULATIONS DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCIES ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CASE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ENERGY SERVICES ENHANCED COMPETITION ENTRY BARRIERS ENTRY RESTRICTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITIES TRANSPORT FAVOURABLE ACCESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN CAPITAL FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN COSTS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN ENTRY FOREIGN EQUITY FOREIGN EQUITY PARTICIPATION FOREIGN EXPORTERS FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN PROVIDERS FOREIGN SERVICE PROVIDERS FOREIGN SERVICE SUPPLIERS FOREIGN SERVICES FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FOREIGN TRADE GATS GATS RULES GLOBAL WELFARE HEALTH SERVICES IMMUNITY INCUMBENT SUPPLIERS INFANT INDUSTRY POLICIES INFANT INDUSTRY TYPE INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL CARTELS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT PESSIMISM LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMMES LIBERALIZING INTENT LIBERALIZING TRADE MARKET ACCESS MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET STRUCTURE MAXIMUM EQUITY PARTICIPATION MFN MFN EXEMPTIONS MONOPOLISTIC SUPPLIERS MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL APPROACH MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL RULES MUTUAL RECOGNITION NATIONAL COMPETITION NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY NATIONAL PRODUCERS NATIONAL PRODUCTION NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY NATIONAL SUPPLIERS NATIONAL TREATMENT NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATION NATURAL MONOPOLY NATURAL PERSONS NEGOTIATIONS NON-DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OLIGOPOLISTIC RENTS OLIGOPOLY OLIGOPOLY RENTS OLIGOPOLY RIGHTS OPENNESS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE STABILITY PRIVATE COSTS PROFIT TAXATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS QUOTAS RECIPROCITY RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS REGULATORY BARRIERS REGULATORY CHALLENGES REGULATORY FAILURE REGULATORY FREEDOM REGULATORY PRINCIPLES REGULATORY REFORM RELEVANT GATS PROVISION RENT APPROPRIATION SAVINGS SERVICE-PROVIDING PERSONNEL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS SERVICES OPERATIONS SERVICES SECTORS SERVICES TRADE SERVICES TRANSACTIONS SOCIAL OBJECTIVES SOCIAL PROBLEMS SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY STATE ENTERPRISES STATE MONOPOLIES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF-LIKE EFFECT TECHNICAL STANDARDS TELECOM MONOPOLIES TELECOM NEGOTIATIONS TELECOM SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TRADE TRADE IN SERVICES TRADE POLICIES TRADE PROBLEMS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE-INHIBITING EFFECT TRADE-RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS TRADING PARTNERS TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TRANSPORT COSTS TRANSPORT SERVICES UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS URUGUAY ROUND WELFARE GAINS The new round of negotiations has begun with a mechanical sense of "since we said we would, therefore we must," says the author. To make the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) more effective ay liberalization, the author suggests improving the agreement's rules, countries' specific commitments, and the negotiating methodology: 1) Wasteful regulations, and entry restrictions pervade trade in services. Unlike the GATT, the GATS has created no hierarchy of instruments of protection. It may be possible to create a legal presumption in favor of instruments (such as fiscal measures) that provide protection more efficiently. 2) Many countries have taken advantage of the GATS to create a more secure trading environment, by making legally binding commitments to market access. The credibility of reform would increase with wider commitments to maintain current levels of openness, or to increase access in the future. 3) Multilateral rules on domestic regulations can help promote, and consolidate domestic regulatory reform, even when the rules are designed primarily to prevent the erosion of market access for foreign providers. The pro-competitive principles developed for basic communications, could be extended to other network-based services sectors, such as transport (terminals and infrastructure), and energy services (distribution networks). The "necessity test" instituted for accounting services, could be applied to instruments in other sectors (so that doctors judged competent in one jurisdiction, wouldn't have to be retrained for another, for example). 4) Anticompetitive practices that fall outside the jurisdiction of national competition law, may be important in such sectors as maritime, air transport, and communications services. Strengthened multilateral rules are needed to reassure small countries with weak enforcement capacity, that the gains from liberalization will not be appropriated by international cartels. 5) Explicit departures from the most-favored-nation rule matter most in such sectors as maritime transport, audiovisual services, and air transport services - which have been excluded from key GATS disciplines. Implicit discrimination can be prevented by developing rules to ensure the non-discriminatory allocation of quotas, and maintaining the desirable openness of the GATS provision on mutual recognition agreements. 6) Reciprocity must play a greater role in negotiations, if the GATS is to advance liberalization beyond measures taken independently. 2014-08-26T15:05:52Z 2014-08-26T15:05:52Z 2001-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/04/1121245/shaping-future-gats-rules-trade-services http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19667 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2596 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |