Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach
The author calculates gross safety net subsidies for a large sample of banks in 12 countries, to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks, and certain ban characteristics. He finds that gross safety net subsidies are higher...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717436/banking-risks-around-world-implicit-safety-net-subsidy-approach http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19744 |
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okr-10986-197442021-04-23T14:03:44Z Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach Laeven, Luc ACCOUNTING BANK ASSETS BANK FAILURE BANK MONITORING BANK OF KOREA BANK RESTRUCTURING BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK RUNS BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING RISKS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITALIZATION COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMON STOCK CONTAGION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE PRICING DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DIVIDEND YIELD DIVIDENDS EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ECONOMICS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES FACE VALUE FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FOREIGN EXCHANGE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INFLATION INFLATION RATES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE PREMIUMS INSURED DEPOSITS LAWS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIQUIDITY MARKET DISCIPLINE MARKET VALUE MORAL HAZARD REGIONAL BANKS REGRESSION MODELS REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RETURN ON ASSETS RISK TAKING SAFETY SHAREHOLDING SMALL BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP SUBSIDIARY TRADING VOLATILITY The author calculates gross safety net subsidies for a large sample of banks in 12 countries, to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks, and certain ban characteristics. He finds that gross safety net subsidies are higher for banks that have concentrated ownership, that are affiliated with a business group, that are small, or that have high credit growth, and for banks in countries with low GDP per capita, high inflation, or poor quality, and enforcement of the legal system. These findings suggest that the moral hazard behavior of a bank depends on its institutional environment, and its corporate governance structure. The author also presents a matrix that shows estimates of safety net subsidies for a range of given combinations of equity volatilities, and equity-to-deposit ratios. These figures could be used as input to an early warning system, for both individual, and systemic banking problems. 2014-08-26T22:10:42Z 2014-08-26T22:10:42Z 2000-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717436/banking-risks-around-world-implicit-safety-net-subsidy-approach http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19744 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2473 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING BANK ASSETS BANK FAILURE BANK MONITORING BANK OF KOREA BANK RESTRUCTURING BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK RUNS BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING RISKS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITALIZATION COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMON STOCK CONTAGION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE PRICING DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DIVIDEND YIELD DIVIDENDS EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ECONOMICS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES FACE VALUE FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FOREIGN EXCHANGE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INFLATION INFLATION RATES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE PREMIUMS INSURED DEPOSITS LAWS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIQUIDITY MARKET DISCIPLINE MARKET VALUE MORAL HAZARD REGIONAL BANKS REGRESSION MODELS REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RETURN ON ASSETS RISK TAKING SAFETY SHAREHOLDING SMALL BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP SUBSIDIARY TRADING VOLATILITY |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING BANK ASSETS BANK FAILURE BANK MONITORING BANK OF KOREA BANK RESTRUCTURING BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK RUNS BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING RISKS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS CAPITALIZATION COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMON STOCK CONTAGION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE PRICING DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DIVIDEND YIELD DIVIDENDS EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ECONOMICS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES FACE VALUE FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FOREIGN EXCHANGE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INFLATION INFLATION RATES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE PREMIUMS INSURED DEPOSITS LAWS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIQUIDITY MARKET DISCIPLINE MARKET VALUE MORAL HAZARD REGIONAL BANKS REGRESSION MODELS REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RETURN ON ASSETS RISK TAKING SAFETY SHAREHOLDING SMALL BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP SUBSIDIARY TRADING VOLATILITY Laeven, Luc Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2473 |
| description |
The author calculates gross safety net
subsidies for a large sample of banks in 12 countries, to
assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of
banks, and certain ban characteristics. He finds that gross
safety net subsidies are higher for banks that have
concentrated ownership, that are affiliated with a business
group, that are small, or that have high credit growth, and
for banks in countries with low GDP per capita, high
inflation, or poor quality, and enforcement of the legal
system. These findings suggest that the moral hazard
behavior of a bank depends on its institutional environment,
and its corporate governance structure. The author also
presents a matrix that shows estimates of safety net
subsidies for a range of given combinations of equity
volatilities, and equity-to-deposit ratios. These figures
could be used as input to an early warning system, for both
individual, and systemic banking problems. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Laeven, Luc |
| author_facet |
Laeven, Luc |
| author_sort |
Laeven, Luc |
| title |
Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach |
| title_short |
Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach |
| title_full |
Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach |
| title_fullStr |
Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach |
| title_sort |
banking risks around the world : the implicit safety net subsidy approach |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717436/banking-risks-around-world-implicit-safety-net-subsidy-approach http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19744 |
| _version_ |
1764440519982710784 |