On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth
Social cohesion - that is, the inclusiveness of a country's communities - is essential for generating the trust needed to implement reforms. Citizens have to trust that the short-term losses that inevitably arise from reform, will be more than...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/09/693293/good-politicians-bad-policies-social-cohesion-institutions-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19790 |
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okr-10986-19790 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AVAILABLE DATA AVERAGE GROWTH BAD POLICIES BUREAUCRACY CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNITIES CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CORRUPTION CRISES CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPED WORLD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING WORLD DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT POLICIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY EDUCATION SYSTEM EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL SCRUTINY ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXTERNAL SHOCKS FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FINANCIAL CRISIS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GINI COEFFICIENT GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL MARKETS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GROWTH COLLAPSE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME COUNTRIES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INDEX INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEREST GROUP KEY DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES LABOR FORCE LIVING STANDARDS LOCAL SOCIAL CAPITAL LONG TERM LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT LOW- INCOME COUNTRIES MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MACROECONOMICS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS CONSENSUS MIDDLE CLASS SHARE NATURAL RESOURCE PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA INCOME PHYSICAL CAPITAL POLICY REFORM POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL TENSIONS POLITICIANS POOR COUNTRIES POOR GROWTH PREDICTED GROWTH PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS RANDOM SAMPLE REGULATORY BURDEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS RULE OF LAW RULE OF LAW QUALITY RURAL AREAS SAFETY NET SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CHANGE SOCIAL COHESION SOCIAL CONDITIONS SOCIAL DIVISIONS SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOCIAL INDICATORS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS SOCIAL SAFETY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURAL FACTORS TRANSITION ECONOMIES |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AVAILABLE DATA AVERAGE GROWTH BAD POLICIES BUREAUCRACY CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNITIES CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CORRUPTION CRISES CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPED WORLD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING WORLD DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT POLICIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY EDUCATION SYSTEM EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL SCRUTINY ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXTERNAL SHOCKS FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FINANCIAL CRISIS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GINI COEFFICIENT GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL MARKETS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GROWTH COLLAPSE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME COUNTRIES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INDEX INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEREST GROUP KEY DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES LABOR FORCE LIVING STANDARDS LOCAL SOCIAL CAPITAL LONG TERM LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT LOW- INCOME COUNTRIES MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MACROECONOMICS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS CONSENSUS MIDDLE CLASS SHARE NATURAL RESOURCE PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA INCOME PHYSICAL CAPITAL POLICY REFORM POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL TENSIONS POLITICIANS POOR COUNTRIES POOR GROWTH PREDICTED GROWTH PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS RANDOM SAMPLE REGULATORY BURDEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS RULE OF LAW RULE OF LAW QUALITY RURAL AREAS SAFETY NET SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CHANGE SOCIAL COHESION SOCIAL CONDITIONS SOCIAL DIVISIONS SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOCIAL INDICATORS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS SOCIAL SAFETY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURAL FACTORS TRANSITION ECONOMIES Ritzen, Jo Easterly, William Woolcock, Michael On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2448 |
| description |
Social cohesion - that is, the
inclusiveness of a country's communities - is essential
for generating the trust needed to implement reforms.
Citizens have to trust that the short-term losses that
inevitably arise from reform, will be more than offset by
long-term gains. However, in countries divided along class
and ethnic lines, and with weak institutions, even the
boldest, most civic-minded and well-informed politician (or
interest group) will face severe constraints in bringing
about policy reform. The authors hypothesize that key
development outcomes (particularly economic growth) are most
likely to be associated with countries that are both
socially cohesive and governed by effective public
institutions. They test this hypothesis for the sample of
countries with available data. The authors develop a
conceptual framework based on the idea of social cohesion,
then review the evidence on which it is based. While several
earlier studies have shown that differences in growth rates
among developing countries are a result of weak rule of law,
lack of democracy, and other institutional deficiencies, the
authors focus on the social conditions that give rise to
these deficiencies. They also seek to establish empirically
a causal sequence from social divisions to weak institutions
to slow growth. The essence of their argument, supported by
new econometric evidence, is that pro-development policies
are comparatively rare in the developing world less because
of the moral fiber of politicians (though that surely
matters) than because good politicians typically lack the
room for maneuver needed to make desired reforms. This lack
of maneuverability is a product of insufficient social
cohesion and weak institutions. The authors also explore the
determinants of social cohesion, focusing on historical
accidents, initial conditions, and natural resource
endowments. Social cohesion should not be seen as a concern
primarily of developing and transition economies. Indeed, it
is important in the United Kingdom as in Ukraine, in Canada
as in Colombia, in the Netherlands as in Australia. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Ritzen, Jo Easterly, William Woolcock, Michael |
| author_facet |
Ritzen, Jo Easterly, William Woolcock, Michael |
| author_sort |
Ritzen, Jo |
| title |
On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth |
| title_short |
On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth |
| title_full |
On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth |
| title_fullStr |
On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth |
| title_full_unstemmed |
On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth |
| title_sort |
on "good" politicians and "bad" policies : social cohesion, institutions, and growth |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/09/693293/good-politicians-bad-policies-social-cohesion-institutions-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19790 |
| _version_ |
1764440728619974656 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-197902021-04-23T14:03:44Z On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" Policies : Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth Ritzen, Jo Easterly, William Woolcock, Michael AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AVAILABLE DATA AVERAGE GROWTH BAD POLICIES BUREAUCRACY CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNITIES CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CORRUPTION CRISES CROSS COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPED WORLD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING WORLD DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT POLICIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY EDUCATION SYSTEM EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL SCRUTINY ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXTERNAL SHOCKS FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FINANCIAL CRISIS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GINI COEFFICIENT GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL MARKETS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS GROWTH COLLAPSE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME COUNTRIES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INDEX INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEREST GROUP KEY DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES LABOR FORCE LIVING STANDARDS LOCAL SOCIAL CAPITAL LONG TERM LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT LOW- INCOME COUNTRIES MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MACROECONOMICS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS CONSENSUS MIDDLE CLASS SHARE NATURAL RESOURCE PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA INCOME PHYSICAL CAPITAL POLICY REFORM POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL TENSIONS POLITICIANS POOR COUNTRIES POOR GROWTH PREDICTED GROWTH PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS RANDOM SAMPLE REGULATORY BURDEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS RULE OF LAW RULE OF LAW QUALITY RURAL AREAS SAFETY NET SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CHANGE SOCIAL COHESION SOCIAL CONDITIONS SOCIAL DIVISIONS SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOCIAL INDICATORS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS SOCIAL SAFETY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURAL FACTORS TRANSITION ECONOMIES Social cohesion - that is, the inclusiveness of a country's communities - is essential for generating the trust needed to implement reforms. Citizens have to trust that the short-term losses that inevitably arise from reform, will be more than offset by long-term gains. However, in countries divided along class and ethnic lines, and with weak institutions, even the boldest, most civic-minded and well-informed politician (or interest group) will face severe constraints in bringing about policy reform. The authors hypothesize that key development outcomes (particularly economic growth) are most likely to be associated with countries that are both socially cohesive and governed by effective public institutions. They test this hypothesis for the sample of countries with available data. The authors develop a conceptual framework based on the idea of social cohesion, then review the evidence on which it is based. While several earlier studies have shown that differences in growth rates among developing countries are a result of weak rule of law, lack of democracy, and other institutional deficiencies, the authors focus on the social conditions that give rise to these deficiencies. They also seek to establish empirically a causal sequence from social divisions to weak institutions to slow growth. The essence of their argument, supported by new econometric evidence, is that pro-development policies are comparatively rare in the developing world less because of the moral fiber of politicians (though that surely matters) than because good politicians typically lack the room for maneuver needed to make desired reforms. This lack of maneuverability is a product of insufficient social cohesion and weak institutions. The authors also explore the determinants of social cohesion, focusing on historical accidents, initial conditions, and natural resource endowments. Social cohesion should not be seen as a concern primarily of developing and transition economies. Indeed, it is important in the United Kingdom as in Ukraine, in Canada as in Colombia, in the Netherlands as in Australia. 2014-08-27T20:50:48Z 2014-08-27T20:50:48Z 2000-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/09/693293/good-politicians-bad-policies-social-cohesion-institutions-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19790 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2448 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |