New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of is...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850 |
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okr-10986-198502021-04-23T14:03:47Z New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions Beck, Thorsten Clarke, George Groff, Alberto Keefer, Philip Walsh, Patrick BUDGET DEFICITS CABINET CABINETS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS CODING COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPETITION POLICY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROSS COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVE POWERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOWER HOUSE MILITARY INFLUENCE MINISTERS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATIONS OPPOSITION PARTIES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY ISSUES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRESIDENTIAL POWERS PRESIDENTS PRIMARIES PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES REVOLUTION SENATE SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL POLICY STATE CONTROL STATE RESOURCES SUBJECTIVE DATA TAXATION TOTALITARIANISM UPPER HOUSE UPPER HOUSES VETO VETO POWER VOTING VOTING RECORDS This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: 1) Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances. 2) Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition. 3) Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs, find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics, that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy. 2014-08-28T19:33:31Z 2014-08-28T19:33:31Z 2000-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2283 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
BUDGET DEFICITS CABINET CABINETS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS CODING COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPETITION POLICY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROSS COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVE POWERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOWER HOUSE MILITARY INFLUENCE MINISTERS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATIONS OPPOSITION PARTIES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY ISSUES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRESIDENTIAL POWERS PRESIDENTS PRIMARIES PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES REVOLUTION SENATE SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL POLICY STATE CONTROL STATE RESOURCES SUBJECTIVE DATA TAXATION TOTALITARIANISM UPPER HOUSE UPPER HOUSES VETO VETO POWER VOTING VOTING RECORDS |
spellingShingle |
BUDGET DEFICITS CABINET CABINETS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS CODING COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPETITION POLICY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROSS COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVE POWERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOWER HOUSE MILITARY INFLUENCE MINISTERS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATIONS OPPOSITION PARTIES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY ISSUES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRESIDENTIAL POWERS PRESIDENTS PRIMARIES PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES REVOLUTION SENATE SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL POLICY STATE CONTROL STATE RESOURCES SUBJECTIVE DATA TAXATION TOTALITARIANISM UPPER HOUSE UPPER HOUSES VETO VETO POWER VOTING VOTING RECORDS Beck, Thorsten Clarke, George Groff, Alberto Keefer, Philip Walsh, Patrick New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2283 |
description |
This paper introduces a large new
cross-country database on political institutions: the
Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors
summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this
data set with others, and explore the range of issues for
which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel
variables they introduce: 1) Several measures of tenure,
stability, and checks and balances. 2) Identification of
parties with the government coalition or the opposition. 3)
Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in
legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI
variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan
and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely
to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential
systems. But this result is not robust to the use of
different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for
future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs, find that
divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits
after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI
indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again
suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in
political science and economics, that this database may
illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation,
the political conditions for economic reform, the political
and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of
appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Beck, Thorsten Clarke, George Groff, Alberto Keefer, Philip Walsh, Patrick |
author_facet |
Beck, Thorsten Clarke, George Groff, Alberto Keefer, Philip Walsh, Patrick |
author_sort |
Beck, Thorsten |
title |
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions |
title_short |
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions |
title_full |
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions |
title_fullStr |
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions |
title_full_unstemmed |
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions |
title_sort |
new tools and new tests in comparative political economy : the database of political institutions |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850 |
_version_ |
1764441676419432448 |