New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions

This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of is...

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Main Authors: Beck, Thorsten, Clarke, George, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip, Walsh, Patrick
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850
id okr-10986-19850
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-198502021-04-23T14:03:47Z New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions Beck, Thorsten Clarke, George Groff, Alberto Keefer, Philip Walsh, Patrick BUDGET DEFICITS CABINET CABINETS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS CODING COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPETITION POLICY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROSS COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVE POWERS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LOWER HOUSE MILITARY INFLUENCE MINISTERS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATIONS OPPOSITION PARTIES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY ISSUES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRESIDENTIAL POWERS PRESIDENTS PRIMARIES PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES REVOLUTION SENATE SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL POLICY STATE CONTROL STATE RESOURCES SUBJECTIVE DATA TAXATION TOTALITARIANISM UPPER HOUSE UPPER HOUSES VETO VETO POWER VOTING VOTING RECORDS This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: 1) Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances. 2) Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition. 3) Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs, find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics, that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy. 2014-08-28T19:33:31Z 2014-08-28T19:33:31Z 2000-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2283 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic BUDGET DEFICITS
CABINET
CABINETS
CITIZENS
CIVIL WAR
COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COALITIONS
CODING
COMMUNIST
COMMUNIST PARTY
COMPETITION POLICY
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUENTS
CONSTITUTION
CORRUPTION
COUNTRY DATA
CROSS COUNTRY DATA
DECISION MAKERS
DECISION MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTION
ELECTION DATA
ELECTORAL RULES
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
FEDERALISM
FISCAL
FISCAL POLICY
GOVERNMENT ACTION
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT POLICY
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGISLATURES
LOWER HOUSE
MILITARY INFLUENCE
MINISTERS
NATIONAL LEGISLATORS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALISM
NATIONS
OPPOSITION PARTIES
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
POLICY ISSUES
POLICY MAKERS
POLICY MAKING
POLICY OUTCOMES
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL LEADERS
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL PROCESS
POLITICAL STABILITY
POLITICAL SYSTEM
POLITICAL SYSTEMS
POLITICIANS
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
PRESIDENTS
PRIMARIES
PRIME MINISTER
PRIME MINISTERS
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC DEBT
REGULATORY POLICY
REPRESENTATIVES
REVOLUTION
SENATE
SOCIAL CONFLICT
SOCIAL POLICY
STATE CONTROL
STATE RESOURCES
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAXATION
TOTALITARIANISM
UPPER HOUSE
UPPER HOUSES
VETO
VETO POWER
VOTING
VOTING RECORDS
spellingShingle BUDGET DEFICITS
CABINET
CABINETS
CITIZENS
CIVIL WAR
COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COALITIONS
CODING
COMMUNIST
COMMUNIST PARTY
COMPETITION POLICY
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUENTS
CONSTITUTION
CORRUPTION
COUNTRY DATA
CROSS COUNTRY DATA
DECISION MAKERS
DECISION MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTION
ELECTION DATA
ELECTORAL RULES
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
FEDERALISM
FISCAL
FISCAL POLICY
GOVERNMENT ACTION
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT POLICY
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGISLATURES
LOWER HOUSE
MILITARY INFLUENCE
MINISTERS
NATIONAL LEGISLATORS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALISM
NATIONS
OPPOSITION PARTIES
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
POLICY ISSUES
POLICY MAKERS
POLICY MAKING
POLICY OUTCOMES
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL LEADERS
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL PROCESS
POLITICAL STABILITY
POLITICAL SYSTEM
POLITICAL SYSTEMS
POLITICIANS
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
PRESIDENTS
PRIMARIES
PRIME MINISTER
PRIME MINISTERS
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC DEBT
REGULATORY POLICY
REPRESENTATIVES
REVOLUTION
SENATE
SOCIAL CONFLICT
SOCIAL POLICY
STATE CONTROL
STATE RESOURCES
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAXATION
TOTALITARIANISM
UPPER HOUSE
UPPER HOUSES
VETO
VETO POWER
VOTING
VOTING RECORDS
Beck, Thorsten
Clarke, George
Groff, Alberto
Keefer, Philip
Walsh, Patrick
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2283
description This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: 1) Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances. 2) Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition. 3) Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs, find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics, that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Beck, Thorsten
Clarke, George
Groff, Alberto
Keefer, Philip
Walsh, Patrick
author_facet Beck, Thorsten
Clarke, George
Groff, Alberto
Keefer, Philip
Walsh, Patrick
author_sort Beck, Thorsten
title New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
title_short New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
title_full New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
title_fullStr New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
title_full_unstemmed New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions
title_sort new tools and new tests in comparative political economy : the database of political institutions
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850
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