Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries
The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions abo...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438331/decentralization-corruption-evidence-across-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19852 |
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okr-10986-198522021-04-23T14:03:47Z Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries Fisman, Raymond Gatti, Roberta ACCOUNTABILITY ASSET MANAGEMENT BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAPITAL MARKET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL LAW CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION COUNTRY ESTIMATES CRISES CROSS COUNTRY DATA DATA AVAILABILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS LITERATURE ECONOMIES OF SCALE EXPENDITURE FEDERALISM FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FREE PRESS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT FINANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCOME INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES LDCS LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATORS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LIQUIDITY LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS OVERVALUATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SPENDING REAL GDP REVENUE COLLECTION SIZE OF GOVERNMENT TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists. The authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically, by looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices. Their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption. Moreover, they find that the origin of a country's legal system - for example, civil versus common legal code - performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization. The estimated relationship between decentralization, when so instrumented, and corruption is even stronger. The evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work, including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction, and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check. 2014-08-28T19:38:36Z 2014-08-28T19:38:36Z 2000-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438331/decentralization-corruption-evidence-across-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19852 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2290 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ASSET MANAGEMENT BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAPITAL MARKET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL LAW CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION COUNTRY ESTIMATES CRISES CROSS COUNTRY DATA DATA AVAILABILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS LITERATURE ECONOMIES OF SCALE EXPENDITURE FEDERALISM FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FREE PRESS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT FINANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCOME INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES LDCS LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATORS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LIQUIDITY LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS OVERVALUATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SPENDING REAL GDP REVENUE COLLECTION SIZE OF GOVERNMENT TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ASSET MANAGEMENT BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAPITAL MARKET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL LAW CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION COUNTRY ESTIMATES CRISES CROSS COUNTRY DATA DATA AVAILABILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS LITERATURE ECONOMIES OF SCALE EXPENDITURE FEDERALISM FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FREE PRESS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT FINANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCOME INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES LDCS LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATORS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LIQUIDITY LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS OVERVALUATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SPENDING REAL GDP REVENUE COLLECTION SIZE OF GOVERNMENT TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY Fisman, Raymond Gatti, Roberta Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2290 |
| description |
The relationship between
decentralization of government activities and the extent of
rent extraction by private parties is an important element
in the recent debate on institutional design. The
theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about
this relationship, and it has remained virtually unexamined
by empiricists. The authors make a first attempt at
examining the issue empirically, by looking at the
cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization
and corruption as measured by a number of different indices.
Their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in
government spending is significantly associated with lower
corruption. Moreover, they find that the origin of a
country's legal system - for example, civil versus
common legal code - performs extremely well as an instrument
for decentralization. The estimated relationship between
decentralization, when so instrumented, and corruption is
even stronger. The evidence suggests a number of interesting
areas for future work, including investigating whether there
are specific services for which decentralized provision has
a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction,
and understanding the channels through which
decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Fisman, Raymond Gatti, Roberta |
| author_facet |
Fisman, Raymond Gatti, Roberta |
| author_sort |
Fisman, Raymond |
| title |
Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries |
| title_short |
Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries |
| title_full |
Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries |
| title_fullStr |
Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Decentralization and Corruption : Evidence across Countries |
| title_sort |
decentralization and corruption : evidence across countries |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438331/decentralization-corruption-evidence-across-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19852 |
| _version_ |
1764441682041896960 |