Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality

This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but s...

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Main Authors:	Keefer, Philip, Milanovic, Branko
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	AGGREGATE INEQUALITY AVERAGE INCOME BARRIERS TO ENTRY CASH PROPERTY INCOME CASH TRANSFERS COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION COMMODITY COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS DATA SET DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPOSABLE INCOME DISPOSABLE INCOMES DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMY LITERATURE EMPIRICAL TEST EXPORTS FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROSS INCOME GROSS INCOMES HIGH INEQUALITY HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME = GROSS INCOME DATA INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME FLUCTUATIONS INCOME GROUP INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME QUINTILES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCOME SHARE INCOME SHARES INCOME STUDY INCOME TAX INCOME TAXATION INCOME TAXES INCOME TRANSFERS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY MEASURES INSURANCE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP JOB CREATION LABOR MARKETS LABOUR MARKET LACK OF INFORMATION LOW INCOME MACROECONOMICS MARKET INCOME MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY MARKET INCOMES MARKET SHARE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MEDIAN VOTER HYPOTHESIS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS INCOME SHARE MIDDLE QUINTILES NEGATIVE EFFECT NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLD AGE OLIGARCHY OPEN ECONOMIES PAYROLL TAXES PENSION PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS PENSION INCOME PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERSONAL INCOME POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL UNREST POOR POSITIVE EFFECT POWER PARITY PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE TRANSFERS PROGRAMS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC PENSIONS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PURCHASING POWER RANDOM EFFECTS REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES REDISTRIBUTION POLICY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL INHABITANTS SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES SIGNIFICANT EFFECT SOCIAL TRANSFERS STATE PENSIONS TAX TAX REVENUES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TRANSFER PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20464333/party-age-party-color-new-results-political-economy-redistribution-inequality http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20701

id	okr-10986-20701
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-207012021-04-23T14:03:59Z Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality Keefer, Philip Milanovic, Branko AGGREGATE INEQUALITY AVERAGE INCOME BARRIERS TO ENTRY CASH PROPERTY INCOME CASH TRANSFERS COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION COMMODITY COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS DATA SET DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPOSABLE INCOME DISPOSABLE INCOMES DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMY LITERATURE EMPIRICAL TEST EXPORTS FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROSS INCOME GROSS INCOMES HIGH INEQUALITY HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME = GROSS INCOME DATA INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME FLUCTUATIONS INCOME GROUP INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME QUINTILES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCOME SHARE INCOME SHARES INCOME STUDY INCOME TAX INCOME TAXATION INCOME TAXES INCOME TRANSFERS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY MEASURES INSURANCE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP JOB CREATION LABOR MARKETS LABOUR MARKET LACK OF INFORMATION LOW INCOME MACROECONOMICS MARKET INCOME MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY MARKET INCOMES MARKET SHARE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MEDIAN VOTER HYPOTHESIS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS INCOME SHARE MIDDLE QUINTILES NEGATIVE EFFECT NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLD AGE OLIGARCHY OPEN ECONOMIES PAYROLL TAXES PENSION PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS PENSION INCOME PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERSONAL INCOME POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL UNREST POOR POSITIVE EFFECT POWER PARITY PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE TRANSFERS PROGRAMS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC PENSIONS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PURCHASING POWER RANDOM EFFECTS REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES REDISTRIBUTION POLICY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL INHABITANTS SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES SIGNIFICANT EFFECT SOCIAL TRANSFERS STATE PENSIONS TAX TAX REVENUES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TRANSFER PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but still contested -- assumption of the political economy literature, left-wing governments redistribute more. In addition, consistent with recent research on the importance of party organization and the organizational differences between younger and older parties, older left-wing parties are more likely to internalize the long-run costs of redistribution and to be more credible in their commitment to redistribution, leading them to redistribute less. With entirely different data, the paper also provides evidence on mechanisms: left-wing governments not only redistribute more, they tax more; older left-wing parties, though, tax less than younger ones. 2014-12-12T21:42:35Z 2014-12-12T21:42:35Z 2014-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20464333/party-age-party-color-new-results-political-economy-redistribution-inequality http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20701 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7129 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	AGGREGATE INEQUALITY AVERAGE INCOME BARRIERS TO ENTRY CASH PROPERTY INCOME CASH TRANSFERS COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION COMMODITY COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS DATA SET DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPOSABLE INCOME DISPOSABLE INCOMES DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMY LITERATURE EMPIRICAL TEST EXPORTS FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROSS INCOME GROSS INCOMES HIGH INEQUALITY HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME = GROSS INCOME DATA INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME FLUCTUATIONS INCOME GROUP INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME QUINTILES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCOME SHARE INCOME SHARES INCOME STUDY INCOME TAX INCOME TAXATION INCOME TAXES INCOME TRANSFERS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY MEASURES INSURANCE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP JOB CREATION LABOR MARKETS LABOUR MARKET LACK OF INFORMATION LOW INCOME MACROECONOMICS MARKET INCOME MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY MARKET INCOMES MARKET SHARE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MEDIAN VOTER HYPOTHESIS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS INCOME SHARE MIDDLE QUINTILES NEGATIVE EFFECT NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLD AGE OLIGARCHY OPEN ECONOMIES PAYROLL TAXES PENSION PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS PENSION INCOME PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERSONAL INCOME POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL UNREST POOR POSITIVE EFFECT POWER PARITY PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE TRANSFERS PROGRAMS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC PENSIONS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PURCHASING POWER RANDOM EFFECTS REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES REDISTRIBUTION POLICY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL INHABITANTS SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES SIGNIFICANT EFFECT SOCIAL TRANSFERS STATE PENSIONS TAX TAX REVENUES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TRANSFER PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
spellingShingle	AGGREGATE INEQUALITY AVERAGE INCOME BARRIERS TO ENTRY CASH PROPERTY INCOME CASH TRANSFERS COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION COMMODITY COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS DATA SET DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPOSABLE INCOME DISPOSABLE INCOMES DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMY LITERATURE EMPIRICAL TEST EXPORTS FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROSS INCOME GROSS INCOMES HIGH INEQUALITY HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME = GROSS INCOME DATA INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME FLUCTUATIONS INCOME GROUP INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME QUINTILES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCOME SHARE INCOME SHARES INCOME STUDY INCOME TAX INCOME TAXATION INCOME TAXES INCOME TRANSFERS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY MEASURES INSURANCE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP JOB CREATION LABOR MARKETS LABOUR MARKET LACK OF INFORMATION LOW INCOME MACROECONOMICS MARKET INCOME MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY MARKET INCOMES MARKET SHARE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MEDIAN VOTER HYPOTHESIS MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS INCOME SHARE MIDDLE QUINTILES NEGATIVE EFFECT NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLD AGE OLIGARCHY OPEN ECONOMIES PAYROLL TAXES PENSION PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS PENSION INCOME PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERSONAL INCOME POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL UNREST POOR POSITIVE EFFECT POWER PARITY PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE TRANSFERS PROGRAMS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC PENSIONS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PURCHASING POWER RANDOM EFFECTS REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES REDISTRIBUTION POLICY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL INHABITANTS SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES SIGNIFICANT EFFECT SOCIAL TRANSFERS STATE PENSIONS TAX TAX REVENUES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TRANSFER PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS Keefer, Philip Milanovic, Branko Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7129
description	This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but still contested -- assumption of the political economy literature, left-wing governments redistribute more. In addition, consistent with recent research on the importance of party organization and the organizational differences between younger and older parties, older left-wing parties are more likely to internalize the long-run costs of redistribution and to be more credible in their commitment to redistribution, leading them to redistribute less. With entirely different data, the paper also provides evidence on mechanisms: left-wing governments not only redistribute more, they tax more; older left-wing parties, though, tax less than younger ones.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Keefer, Philip Milanovic, Branko
author_facet	Keefer, Philip Milanovic, Branko
author_sort	Keefer, Philip
title	Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality
title_short	Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality
title_full	Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality
title_fullStr	Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality
title_full_unstemmed	Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality
title_sort	party age and party color : new results on the political economy of redistribution and inequality
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20464333/party-age-party-color-new-results-political-economy-redistribution-inequality http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20701
_version_	1764447013876793344

Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality

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