Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities
Most government-owned utilities in developing countries perform poorly when judged as providers of electricity, in part because politicians and officials use their power, not to encourage the utilities to increase sales, improve the collection of b...
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| Format: | Publications & Research |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2015
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/5325767/some-options-improving-governance-state-owned-electricity-utilities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21603 |
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okr-10986-216032021-04-23T14:04:03Z Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities Irwin, Timothy Yamamoto, Chiaki ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING FIRMS ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ASSETS AUDITING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL BANKS CITIZENS COMPANY LAW CONSTITUTIONS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORRUPTION CREDIT RATINGS DEBT DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT EXECUTION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL REPORTING FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS GAAP GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT ROLES INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAWS LEGISLATION LICENSES LOBBYING MINISTERS MINISTERS OF STATE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONETARY POLICY POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR RATING AGENCIES REAL RATE OF RETURN RISK MANAGEMENT SHAREHOLDERS STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES STATEMENTS STOCK EXCHANGE SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TREASURY UTILITIES Most government-owned utilities in developing countries perform poorly when judged as providers of electricity, in part because politicians and officials use their power, not to encourage the utilities to increase sales, improve the collection of bills, and cut costs, but to transfer resources to politically influential groups and, sometimes, extract bribes. To improve the performance of government-owned electricity utilities as electricity utilities, rules and practices must be changed in a way that reduces politicians' willingness or ability to use the utilities for political purposes and subjects the utilities to new sources of pressure to perform well. This paper considers ways in which a government might seek to achieve this goal without privatizing. It focuses on changes in corporate governance-that is, changes in the rules that structure the relationship between the company and the government as its owner. It concludes that governments should be cautious about the prospects for improvement without privatization-since, among other things, creating a truly arms-length relationship between the government and the utility will always be difficult as long as the government remains the utility's owner-but that improvements in corporate governance are still worth pursuing. 2015-03-13T16:25:19Z 2015-03-13T16:25:19Z 2004-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/5325767/some-options-improving-governance-state-owned-electricity-utilities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21603 English en_US Energy and Mining Sector Board discussion paper series;no. 11 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Working Paper |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING FIRMS ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ASSETS AUDITING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL BANKS CITIZENS COMPANY LAW CONSTITUTIONS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORRUPTION CREDIT RATINGS DEBT DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT EXECUTION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL REPORTING FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS GAAP GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT ROLES INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAWS LEGISLATION LICENSES LOBBYING MINISTERS MINISTERS OF STATE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONETARY POLICY POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR RATING AGENCIES REAL RATE OF RETURN RISK MANAGEMENT SHAREHOLDERS STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES STATEMENTS STOCK EXCHANGE SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TREASURY UTILITIES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING FIRMS ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ASSETS AUDITING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL BANKS CITIZENS COMPANY LAW CONSTITUTIONS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORRUPTION CREDIT RATINGS DEBT DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT EXECUTION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL REPORTING FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS GAAP GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT ROLES INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAWS LEGISLATION LICENSES LOBBYING MINISTERS MINISTERS OF STATE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONETARY POLICY POLITICIANS PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR RATING AGENCIES REAL RATE OF RETURN RISK MANAGEMENT SHAREHOLDERS STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES STATEMENTS STOCK EXCHANGE SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TREASURY UTILITIES Irwin, Timothy Yamamoto, Chiaki Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities |
| relation |
Energy and Mining Sector Board discussion
paper series;no. 11 |
| description |
Most government-owned utilities in
developing countries perform poorly when judged as providers
of electricity, in part because politicians and officials
use their power, not to encourage the utilities to increase
sales, improve the collection of bills, and cut costs, but
to transfer resources to politically influential groups and,
sometimes, extract bribes. To improve the performance of
government-owned electricity utilities as electricity
utilities, rules and practices must be changed in a way that
reduces politicians' willingness or ability to use the
utilities for political purposes and subjects the utilities
to new sources of pressure to perform well. This paper
considers ways in which a government might seek to achieve
this goal without privatizing. It focuses on changes in
corporate governance-that is, changes in the rules that
structure the relationship between the company and the
government as its owner. It concludes that governments
should be cautious about the prospects for improvement
without privatization-since, among other things, creating a
truly arms-length relationship between the government and
the utility will always be difficult as long as the
government remains the utility's owner-but that
improvements in corporate governance are still worth pursuing. |
| format |
Publications & Research |
| author |
Irwin, Timothy Yamamoto, Chiaki |
| author_facet |
Irwin, Timothy Yamamoto, Chiaki |
| author_sort |
Irwin, Timothy |
| title |
Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities |
| title_short |
Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities |
| title_full |
Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities |
| title_fullStr |
Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-Owned Electricity Utilities |
| title_sort |
some options for improving the governance of state-owned electricity utilities |
| publisher |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/5325767/some-options-improving-governance-state-owned-electricity-utilities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21603 |
| _version_ |
1764448741706694656 |