Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
Better insurance against rainfall risk could improve the security of hundreds of millions of agricultural households around the world. However, customers have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products. This paper theoretically and expe...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24324721/weather-insurance-savings-accounts http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21849 |
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okr-10986-218492021-04-23T14:04:05Z Weather Insurance Savings Accounts Stein, Daniel Tobacman, Jeremy CATASTROPHIC EVENTS RISKS FINANCIAL SERVICES DEPOSIT HOLDING DURABLE GOODS CUSTOMER GOVERNMENT CROP INSURANCE RISK REDUCTION VALUATION FARMER INCOME INTEREST LIFE INSURANCE GUARANTEES SAVINGS INSTRUMENT MARGINAL COST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS INTEREST RATE OPTION EXCHANGE DISCOUNT RATE INSURER INFORMATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES INSURANCE POLICIES LOAN DISCOUNT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION DISASTER PRIVATE INSURANCE PRICE SAVING INTERNATIONAL BANK INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE COMPANY POLICYHOLDERS OFFER PRICE CROP INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAVINGS FINANCIAL PRODUCT CREDIT UNIONS INSURANCE MARKETS INSURANCE PRODUCT LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES NASCENT MARKET INCOME SHOCK NEW PRODUCT DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS MARKETS RETURN RATES LOANS FARMERS CONSUMER DEMAND INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE POLICY NEGATIVE SHOCK BANK POLICY MARKET PRICE SAVINGS ACCOUNT BANKS TECHNOLOGY DROUGHTS EMERGENCY VALUATIONS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS GOOD WAGES AGRICULTURAL LOANS GENERAL INSURANCE DROUGHT BARRIERS COUPONS DERIVATIVE INSURANCE PRODUCTS ANNUITIES FUTURE CROP INSURANCE SCHEME LOSSES BANK RETURNS CREDIT MICROINSURANCE CLAIMS COINSURANCE RISK EXPOSURE CONSUMERS BIDS PROPERTIES SHARES MICRO-INSURANCE FACE VALUE MARKET FACTORS ECONOMICS EXPOSURE INSURANCE MICROFINANCE LOSS AGENTS RENTERS INSURANCE GOODS SECURITY DURABLE INVESTMENT RISK COMMISSIONS SHARE VALUATION TECHNIQUES POVERTY BANKING MARKET DEMAND BID INVESTMENTS RISK MANAGEMENT LENDING NOMINAL INTEREST RATE INSURANCE COMPANIES UNDERINSURED EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT CUSTOMERS RISK AVERSION COVERAGE PARTIAL RISK GUARANTEE PREMIUMS Better insurance against rainfall risk could improve the security of hundreds of millions of agricultural households around the world. However, customers have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products. This paper theoretically and experimentally analyzes an innovative financial product called a Weather Insurance Savings Account (WISA), which combines savings and rainfall insurance. The paper uses a standard model of intertemporal insurance demand to study how customers demand for a WISA varies with the amount of insurance offered. A laboratory experiment is then used to elicit participants valuations of pure insurance, pure savings, and intermediate WISA types. Contrary to the standard model, within-subjects comparisons show that many participants prefer both pure insurance and pure savings to any interior mixture of the two, suggesting that market demand for a WISA is likely to be low. Additional experimental and observational evidence distinguishes between several alternative explanations. One possibility that survives the additional tests is diminishing sensitivity to losses, as in prospect theory. 2015-05-04T19:00:33Z 2015-05-04T19:00:33Z 2015-04 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24324721/weather-insurance-savings-accounts http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21849 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7235 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS RISKS FINANCIAL SERVICES DEPOSIT HOLDING DURABLE GOODS CUSTOMER GOVERNMENT CROP INSURANCE RISK REDUCTION VALUATION FARMER INCOME INTEREST LIFE INSURANCE GUARANTEES SAVINGS INSTRUMENT MARGINAL COST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS INTEREST RATE OPTION EXCHANGE DISCOUNT RATE INSURER INFORMATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES INSURANCE POLICIES LOAN DISCOUNT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION DISASTER PRIVATE INSURANCE PRICE SAVING INTERNATIONAL BANK INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE COMPANY POLICYHOLDERS OFFER PRICE CROP INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAVINGS FINANCIAL PRODUCT CREDIT UNIONS INSURANCE MARKETS INSURANCE PRODUCT LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES NASCENT MARKET INCOME SHOCK NEW PRODUCT DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS MARKETS RETURN RATES LOANS FARMERS CONSUMER DEMAND INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE POLICY NEGATIVE SHOCK BANK POLICY MARKET PRICE SAVINGS ACCOUNT BANKS TECHNOLOGY DROUGHTS EMERGENCY VALUATIONS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS GOOD WAGES AGRICULTURAL LOANS GENERAL INSURANCE DROUGHT BARRIERS COUPONS DERIVATIVE INSURANCE PRODUCTS ANNUITIES FUTURE CROP INSURANCE SCHEME LOSSES BANK RETURNS CREDIT MICROINSURANCE CLAIMS COINSURANCE RISK EXPOSURE CONSUMERS BIDS PROPERTIES SHARES MICRO-INSURANCE FACE VALUE MARKET FACTORS ECONOMICS EXPOSURE INSURANCE MICROFINANCE LOSS AGENTS RENTERS INSURANCE GOODS SECURITY DURABLE INVESTMENT RISK COMMISSIONS SHARE VALUATION TECHNIQUES POVERTY BANKING MARKET DEMAND BID INVESTMENTS RISK MANAGEMENT LENDING NOMINAL INTEREST RATE INSURANCE COMPANIES UNDERINSURED EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT CUSTOMERS RISK AVERSION COVERAGE PARTIAL RISK GUARANTEE PREMIUMS |
spellingShingle |
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS RISKS FINANCIAL SERVICES DEPOSIT HOLDING DURABLE GOODS CUSTOMER GOVERNMENT CROP INSURANCE RISK REDUCTION VALUATION FARMER INCOME INTEREST LIFE INSURANCE GUARANTEES SAVINGS INSTRUMENT MARGINAL COST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS INTEREST RATE OPTION EXCHANGE DISCOUNT RATE INSURER INFORMATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES INSURANCE POLICIES LOAN DISCOUNT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION DISASTER PRIVATE INSURANCE PRICE SAVING INTERNATIONAL BANK INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE COMPANY POLICYHOLDERS OFFER PRICE CROP INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAVINGS FINANCIAL PRODUCT CREDIT UNIONS INSURANCE MARKETS INSURANCE PRODUCT LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES NASCENT MARKET INCOME SHOCK NEW PRODUCT DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS MARKETS RETURN RATES LOANS FARMERS CONSUMER DEMAND INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE POLICY NEGATIVE SHOCK BANK POLICY MARKET PRICE SAVINGS ACCOUNT BANKS TECHNOLOGY DROUGHTS EMERGENCY VALUATIONS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS GOOD WAGES AGRICULTURAL LOANS GENERAL INSURANCE DROUGHT BARRIERS COUPONS DERIVATIVE INSURANCE PRODUCTS ANNUITIES FUTURE CROP INSURANCE SCHEME LOSSES BANK RETURNS CREDIT MICROINSURANCE CLAIMS COINSURANCE RISK EXPOSURE CONSUMERS BIDS PROPERTIES SHARES MICRO-INSURANCE FACE VALUE MARKET FACTORS ECONOMICS EXPOSURE INSURANCE MICROFINANCE LOSS AGENTS RENTERS INSURANCE GOODS SECURITY DURABLE INVESTMENT RISK COMMISSIONS SHARE VALUATION TECHNIQUES POVERTY BANKING MARKET DEMAND BID INVESTMENTS RISK MANAGEMENT LENDING NOMINAL INTEREST RATE INSURANCE COMPANIES UNDERINSURED EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT CUSTOMERS RISK AVERSION COVERAGE PARTIAL RISK GUARANTEE PREMIUMS Stein, Daniel Tobacman, Jeremy Weather Insurance Savings Accounts |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7235 |
description |
Better insurance against rainfall risk
could improve the security of hundreds of millions of
agricultural households around the world. However, customers
have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products.
This paper theoretically and experimentally analyzes an
innovative financial product called a Weather Insurance
Savings Account (WISA), which combines savings and rainfall
insurance. The paper uses a standard model of intertemporal
insurance demand to study how customers demand for a WISA
varies with the amount of insurance offered. A laboratory
experiment is then used to elicit participants valuations of
pure insurance, pure savings, and intermediate WISA types.
Contrary to the standard model, within-subjects comparisons
show that many participants prefer both pure insurance and
pure savings to any interior mixture of the two, suggesting
that market demand for a WISA is likely to be low.
Additional experimental and observational evidence
distinguishes between several alternative explanations. One
possibility that survives the additional tests is
diminishing sensitivity to losses, as in prospect theory. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Stein, Daniel Tobacman, Jeremy |
author_facet |
Stein, Daniel Tobacman, Jeremy |
author_sort |
Stein, Daniel |
title |
Weather Insurance Savings Accounts |
title_short |
Weather Insurance Savings Accounts |
title_full |
Weather Insurance Savings Accounts |
title_fullStr |
Weather Insurance Savings Accounts |
title_full_unstemmed |
Weather Insurance Savings Accounts |
title_sort |
weather insurance savings accounts |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2015 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24324721/weather-insurance-savings-accounts http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21849 |
_version_ |
1764449429005271040 |