Weather Insurance Savings Accounts

Better insurance against rainfall risk could improve the security of hundreds of millions of agricultural households around the world. However, customers have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products. This paper theoretically and expe...

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Main Authors: Stein, Daniel, Tobacman, Jeremy
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
BID
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24324721/weather-insurance-savings-accounts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21849
id okr-10986-21849
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-218492021-04-23T14:04:05Z Weather Insurance Savings Accounts Stein, Daniel Tobacman, Jeremy CATASTROPHIC EVENTS RISKS FINANCIAL SERVICES DEPOSIT HOLDING DURABLE GOODS CUSTOMER GOVERNMENT CROP INSURANCE RISK REDUCTION VALUATION FARMER INCOME INTEREST LIFE INSURANCE GUARANTEES SAVINGS INSTRUMENT MARGINAL COST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS INTEREST RATE OPTION EXCHANGE DISCOUNT RATE INSURER INFORMATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES INSURANCE POLICIES LOAN DISCOUNT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION DISASTER PRIVATE INSURANCE PRICE SAVING INTERNATIONAL BANK INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE COMPANY POLICYHOLDERS OFFER PRICE CROP INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAVINGS FINANCIAL PRODUCT CREDIT UNIONS INSURANCE MARKETS INSURANCE PRODUCT LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES NASCENT MARKET INCOME SHOCK NEW PRODUCT DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS MARKETS RETURN RATES LOANS FARMERS CONSUMER DEMAND INSURANCE COVERAGE INSURANCE POLICY NEGATIVE SHOCK BANK POLICY MARKET PRICE SAVINGS ACCOUNT BANKS TECHNOLOGY DROUGHTS EMERGENCY VALUATIONS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS GOOD WAGES AGRICULTURAL LOANS GENERAL INSURANCE DROUGHT BARRIERS COUPONS DERIVATIVE INSURANCE PRODUCTS ANNUITIES FUTURE CROP INSURANCE SCHEME LOSSES BANK RETURNS CREDIT MICROINSURANCE CLAIMS COINSURANCE RISK EXPOSURE CONSUMERS BIDS PROPERTIES SHARES MICRO-INSURANCE FACE VALUE MARKET FACTORS ECONOMICS EXPOSURE INSURANCE MICROFINANCE LOSS AGENTS RENTERS INSURANCE GOODS SECURITY DURABLE INVESTMENT RISK COMMISSIONS SHARE VALUATION TECHNIQUES POVERTY BANKING MARKET DEMAND BID INVESTMENTS RISK MANAGEMENT LENDING NOMINAL INTEREST RATE INSURANCE COMPANIES UNDERINSURED EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT CUSTOMERS RISK AVERSION COVERAGE PARTIAL RISK GUARANTEE PREMIUMS Better insurance against rainfall risk could improve the security of hundreds of millions of agricultural households around the world. However, customers have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products. This paper theoretically and experimentally analyzes an innovative financial product called a Weather Insurance Savings Account (WISA), which combines savings and rainfall insurance. The paper uses a standard model of intertemporal insurance demand to study how customers demand for a WISA varies with the amount of insurance offered. A laboratory experiment is then used to elicit participants valuations of pure insurance, pure savings, and intermediate WISA types. Contrary to the standard model, within-subjects comparisons show that many participants prefer both pure insurance and pure savings to any interior mixture of the two, suggesting that market demand for a WISA is likely to be low. Additional experimental and observational evidence distinguishes between several alternative explanations. One possibility that survives the additional tests is diminishing sensitivity to losses, as in prospect theory. 2015-05-04T19:00:33Z 2015-05-04T19:00:33Z 2015-04 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24324721/weather-insurance-savings-accounts http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21849 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7235 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
RISKS
FINANCIAL SERVICES
DEPOSIT
HOLDING
DURABLE GOODS
CUSTOMER
GOVERNMENT CROP INSURANCE
RISK REDUCTION
VALUATION
FARMER
INCOME
INTEREST
LIFE INSURANCE
GUARANTEES
SAVINGS INSTRUMENT
MARGINAL COST
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
INTEREST RATE
OPTION
EXCHANGE
DISCOUNT RATE
INSURER
INFORMATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
INSURANCE POLICIES
LOAN
DISCOUNT
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
DISASTER
PRIVATE INSURANCE
PRICE
SAVING
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INSURANCE MARKET
INSURANCE COMPANY
POLICYHOLDERS
OFFER PRICE
CROP INSURANCE
PUBLIC POLICY
SAVINGS
FINANCIAL PRODUCT
CREDIT UNIONS
INSURANCE MARKETS
INSURANCE PRODUCT
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
NASCENT MARKET
INCOME SHOCK
NEW PRODUCT
DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
MARKETS
RETURN
RATES
LOANS
FARMERS
CONSUMER DEMAND
INSURANCE COVERAGE
INSURANCE POLICY
NEGATIVE SHOCK
BANK POLICY
MARKET PRICE
SAVINGS ACCOUNT
BANKS
TECHNOLOGY
DROUGHTS
EMERGENCY
VALUATIONS
CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
GOOD
WAGES
AGRICULTURAL LOANS
GENERAL INSURANCE
DROUGHT
BARRIERS
COUPONS
DERIVATIVE
INSURANCE PRODUCTS
ANNUITIES
FUTURE
CROP INSURANCE SCHEME
LOSSES
BANK
RETURNS
CREDIT
MICROINSURANCE
CLAIMS
COINSURANCE
RISK EXPOSURE
CONSUMERS
BIDS
PROPERTIES
SHARES
MICRO-INSURANCE
FACE VALUE
MARKET
FACTORS
ECONOMICS
EXPOSURE
INSURANCE
MICROFINANCE
LOSS
AGENTS
RENTERS INSURANCE
GOODS
SECURITY
DURABLE
INVESTMENT
RISK
COMMISSIONS
SHARE
VALUATION TECHNIQUES
POVERTY
BANKING
MARKET DEMAND
BID
INVESTMENTS
RISK MANAGEMENT
LENDING
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE
INSURANCE COMPANIES
UNDERINSURED
EXCHANGE RATE
INSTRUMENT
CUSTOMERS
RISK AVERSION
COVERAGE
PARTIAL RISK
GUARANTEE
PREMIUMS
spellingShingle CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
RISKS
FINANCIAL SERVICES
DEPOSIT
HOLDING
DURABLE GOODS
CUSTOMER
GOVERNMENT CROP INSURANCE
RISK REDUCTION
VALUATION
FARMER
INCOME
INTEREST
LIFE INSURANCE
GUARANTEES
SAVINGS INSTRUMENT
MARGINAL COST
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
INTEREST RATE
OPTION
EXCHANGE
DISCOUNT RATE
INSURER
INFORMATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
INSURANCE POLICIES
LOAN
DISCOUNT
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
DISASTER
PRIVATE INSURANCE
PRICE
SAVING
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INSURANCE MARKET
INSURANCE COMPANY
POLICYHOLDERS
OFFER PRICE
CROP INSURANCE
PUBLIC POLICY
SAVINGS
FINANCIAL PRODUCT
CREDIT UNIONS
INSURANCE MARKETS
INSURANCE PRODUCT
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
NASCENT MARKET
INCOME SHOCK
NEW PRODUCT
DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
MARKETS
RETURN
RATES
LOANS
FARMERS
CONSUMER DEMAND
INSURANCE COVERAGE
INSURANCE POLICY
NEGATIVE SHOCK
BANK POLICY
MARKET PRICE
SAVINGS ACCOUNT
BANKS
TECHNOLOGY
DROUGHTS
EMERGENCY
VALUATIONS
CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
GOOD
WAGES
AGRICULTURAL LOANS
GENERAL INSURANCE
DROUGHT
BARRIERS
COUPONS
DERIVATIVE
INSURANCE PRODUCTS
ANNUITIES
FUTURE
CROP INSURANCE SCHEME
LOSSES
BANK
RETURNS
CREDIT
MICROINSURANCE
CLAIMS
COINSURANCE
RISK EXPOSURE
CONSUMERS
BIDS
PROPERTIES
SHARES
MICRO-INSURANCE
FACE VALUE
MARKET
FACTORS
ECONOMICS
EXPOSURE
INSURANCE
MICROFINANCE
LOSS
AGENTS
RENTERS INSURANCE
GOODS
SECURITY
DURABLE
INVESTMENT
RISK
COMMISSIONS
SHARE
VALUATION TECHNIQUES
POVERTY
BANKING
MARKET DEMAND
BID
INVESTMENTS
RISK MANAGEMENT
LENDING
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE
INSURANCE COMPANIES
UNDERINSURED
EXCHANGE RATE
INSTRUMENT
CUSTOMERS
RISK AVERSION
COVERAGE
PARTIAL RISK
GUARANTEE
PREMIUMS
Stein, Daniel
Tobacman, Jeremy
Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7235
description Better insurance against rainfall risk could improve the security of hundreds of millions of agricultural households around the world. However, customers have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products. This paper theoretically and experimentally analyzes an innovative financial product called a Weather Insurance Savings Account (WISA), which combines savings and rainfall insurance. The paper uses a standard model of intertemporal insurance demand to study how customers demand for a WISA varies with the amount of insurance offered. A laboratory experiment is then used to elicit participants valuations of pure insurance, pure savings, and intermediate WISA types. Contrary to the standard model, within-subjects comparisons show that many participants prefer both pure insurance and pure savings to any interior mixture of the two, suggesting that market demand for a WISA is likely to be low. Additional experimental and observational evidence distinguishes between several alternative explanations. One possibility that survives the additional tests is diminishing sensitivity to losses, as in prospect theory.
format Working Paper
author Stein, Daniel
Tobacman, Jeremy
author_facet Stein, Daniel
Tobacman, Jeremy
author_sort Stein, Daniel
title Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
title_short Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
title_full Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
title_fullStr Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
title_full_unstemmed Weather Insurance Savings Accounts
title_sort weather insurance savings accounts
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2015
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24324721/weather-insurance-savings-accounts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21849
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