Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement
This paper examines the implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, the paper models formal trade dispu...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24402477/trade-agreements-enforcement-evidence-wto-dispute-settlement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21856 |
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okr-10986-21856 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS TRADE VOLUMES EXPORT SUPPLY URUGUAY ROUND LIABILITY PANEL REPORT TRADE LOSSES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AD VALOREM DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INCOME INTEREST EXPECTATIONS IMPORTING COUNTRIES TRADE BARRIERS COUNTERVAILING DUTIES INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM REAL GDP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CHANGES IN TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES GDP PER CAPITA EXPORTS NATIONAL TREATMENT ELASTICITY GLOBAL” POLICIES TRADE FLOWS ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPORTERS EXPORT PRICES DEMAND ELASTICITIES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WELFARE INCENTIVES EQUILIBRIUM TRADE NEGOTIATORS VARIABLES IMPORTED PRODUCTS PANEL REPORTS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM MARKET ACCESS INTERNATIONAL BANK EXPORT SUBSIDIES DISPUTE RESOLUTION TRADE AGREEMENTS EXPORTING COUNTRY IMPORT PRODUCTS OIL PRICES ABSOLUTE VALUE CONSUMER SURPLUS REGIONAL TRADE CASE LAW VALUE OF IMPORTS ANTIDUMPING IMPORT POLICY EXTERNALITIES IMPORT PROTECTION FREE RIDER PROBLEM WTO IMPORT RESTRICTIONS WORLD PRICES TRADE DISPUTES ACCESS ECONOMICS LITERATURE FREE RIDER TRADE POLICY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT RULES TRADE AGREEMENT AVERAGE TRADE TRADE PREFERENCE TRADE MOTIVES TRADE EXTERNALITIES LEGAL ASPECTS EXTERNALITY IMPORT MARKETS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS EXPORTING COUNTRIES VALUE DEMAND SHOCKS CONCESSIONS DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION EXPORT SHARES MEASUREMENT FOREIGN EXPORTERS MANAGED TRADE BENCHMARK INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ECONOMIC THEORY TRADE LIBERALIZATION SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ECONOMICS ECONOMIC MODELS WORLD TRADING SYSTEM TERMS OF TRADE RECIPROCITY ECONOMIC LAW DOMESTIC DEMAND APPELLATE BODY REPORT TRADE DATA IMPORTING COUNTRY EXPORT POLICY TRADE APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY GDP DOMESTIC PRICES GOODS THEORY TRADING SYSTEM LEGAL SYSTEM BILATERAL TRADE TRADE RESTRICTION APPELLATE BODY ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS SUPPLY RETALIATION LEVELS PRODUCT MARKETS TRADE DISPUTE IMPORT POLICIES INTERNATIONAL LAW LEGAL PROCEDURES BILATERAL TRADE DATA POLICY RESEARCH ARBITRAGE OUTCOMES IMPORT VALUE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS PRICES ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH |
| spellingShingle |
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS TRADE VOLUMES EXPORT SUPPLY URUGUAY ROUND LIABILITY PANEL REPORT TRADE LOSSES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AD VALOREM DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INCOME INTEREST EXPECTATIONS IMPORTING COUNTRIES TRADE BARRIERS COUNTERVAILING DUTIES INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM REAL GDP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CHANGES IN TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES GDP PER CAPITA EXPORTS NATIONAL TREATMENT ELASTICITY GLOBAL” POLICIES TRADE FLOWS ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPORTERS EXPORT PRICES DEMAND ELASTICITIES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WELFARE INCENTIVES EQUILIBRIUM TRADE NEGOTIATORS VARIABLES IMPORTED PRODUCTS PANEL REPORTS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM MARKET ACCESS INTERNATIONAL BANK EXPORT SUBSIDIES DISPUTE RESOLUTION TRADE AGREEMENTS EXPORTING COUNTRY IMPORT PRODUCTS OIL PRICES ABSOLUTE VALUE CONSUMER SURPLUS REGIONAL TRADE CASE LAW VALUE OF IMPORTS ANTIDUMPING IMPORT POLICY EXTERNALITIES IMPORT PROTECTION FREE RIDER PROBLEM WTO IMPORT RESTRICTIONS WORLD PRICES TRADE DISPUTES ACCESS ECONOMICS LITERATURE FREE RIDER TRADE POLICY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT RULES TRADE AGREEMENT AVERAGE TRADE TRADE PREFERENCE TRADE MOTIVES TRADE EXTERNALITIES LEGAL ASPECTS EXTERNALITY IMPORT MARKETS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS EXPORTING COUNTRIES VALUE DEMAND SHOCKS CONCESSIONS DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION EXPORT SHARES MEASUREMENT FOREIGN EXPORTERS MANAGED TRADE BENCHMARK INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ECONOMIC THEORY TRADE LIBERALIZATION SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ECONOMICS ECONOMIC MODELS WORLD TRADING SYSTEM TERMS OF TRADE RECIPROCITY ECONOMIC LAW DOMESTIC DEMAND APPELLATE BODY REPORT TRADE DATA IMPORTING COUNTRY EXPORT POLICY TRADE APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY GDP DOMESTIC PRICES GOODS THEORY TRADING SYSTEM LEGAL SYSTEM BILATERAL TRADE TRADE RESTRICTION APPELLATE BODY ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS SUPPLY RETALIATION LEVELS PRODUCT MARKETS TRADE DISPUTE IMPORT POLICIES INTERNATIONAL LAW LEGAL PROCEDURES BILATERAL TRADE DATA POLICY RESEARCH ARBITRAGE OUTCOMES IMPORT VALUE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS PRICES ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH Bown, Chad P. Reynolds, Kara Marie Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7242 |
| description |
This paper examines the implications of
the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes
arising under the enforcement provisions of international
agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, the
paper models formal trade dispute negotiations as
potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality
problem that governments implement import protection above
the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the
policys costs to trading partners. The approach is to extend
earlier theoretical models of trade agreement accession
negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations in
order to guide the empirical assessment. The paper uses
instrumental variables to estimate the model on trade volume
outcomes from World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes over
1995–2009. The evidence is consistent with theoretical
predictions that larger import volume outcomes are
associated with products that have smaller increases in
foreign exporter-received prices (terms-of-trade losses for
the importer) as a result of the dispute, larger pre-dispute
import volumes, larger import demand elasticities, and
smaller foreign export supply elasticities. Dispute
settlement outcome differences are also explained by
variation in institutionally-motivated measures of
retaliation capacity and the severity of the free-rider
problem associated with foreign exporter concentration. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Bown, Chad P. Reynolds, Kara Marie |
| author_facet |
Bown, Chad P. Reynolds, Kara Marie |
| author_sort |
Bown, Chad P. |
| title |
Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement |
| title_short |
Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement |
| title_full |
Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement |
| title_fullStr |
Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement |
| title_sort |
trade agreements and enforcement : evidence from wto dispute settlement |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24402477/trade-agreements-enforcement-evidence-wto-dispute-settlement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21856 |
| _version_ |
1764449451053678592 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-218562021-06-14T10:20:23Z Trade Agreements and Enforcement : Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement Bown, Chad P. Reynolds, Kara Marie SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS TRADE VOLUMES EXPORT SUPPLY URUGUAY ROUND LIABILITY PANEL REPORT TRADE LOSSES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AD VALOREM DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INCOME INTEREST EXPECTATIONS IMPORTING COUNTRIES TRADE BARRIERS COUNTERVAILING DUTIES INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM REAL GDP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CHANGES IN TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES GDP PER CAPITA EXPORTS NATIONAL TREATMENT ELASTICITY GLOBAL” POLICIES TRADE FLOWS ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPORTERS EXPORT PRICES DEMAND ELASTICITIES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WELFARE INCENTIVES EQUILIBRIUM TRADE NEGOTIATORS VARIABLES IMPORTED PRODUCTS PANEL REPORTS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM MARKET ACCESS INTERNATIONAL BANK EXPORT SUBSIDIES DISPUTE RESOLUTION TRADE AGREEMENTS EXPORTING COUNTRY IMPORT PRODUCTS OIL PRICES ABSOLUTE VALUE CONSUMER SURPLUS REGIONAL TRADE CASE LAW VALUE OF IMPORTS ANTIDUMPING IMPORT POLICY EXTERNALITIES IMPORT PROTECTION FREE RIDER PROBLEM WTO IMPORT RESTRICTIONS WORLD PRICES TRADE DISPUTES ACCESS ECONOMICS LITERATURE FREE RIDER TRADE POLICY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT RULES TRADE AGREEMENT AVERAGE TRADE TRADE PREFERENCE TRADE MOTIVES TRADE EXTERNALITIES LEGAL ASPECTS EXTERNALITY IMPORT MARKETS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS EXPORTING COUNTRIES VALUE DEMAND SHOCKS CONCESSIONS DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION EXPORT SHARES MEASUREMENT FOREIGN EXPORTERS MANAGED TRADE BENCHMARK INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ECONOMIC THEORY TRADE LIBERALIZATION SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ECONOMICS ECONOMIC MODELS WORLD TRADING SYSTEM TERMS OF TRADE RECIPROCITY ECONOMIC LAW DOMESTIC DEMAND APPELLATE BODY REPORT TRADE DATA IMPORTING COUNTRY EXPORT POLICY TRADE APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY GDP DOMESTIC PRICES GOODS THEORY TRADING SYSTEM LEGAL SYSTEM BILATERAL TRADE TRADE RESTRICTION APPELLATE BODY ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS SUPPLY RETALIATION LEVELS PRODUCT MARKETS TRADE DISPUTE IMPORT POLICIES INTERNATIONAL LAW LEGAL PROCEDURES BILATERAL TRADE DATA POLICY RESEARCH ARBITRAGE OUTCOMES IMPORT VALUE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS PRICES ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY FUTURE RESEARCH This paper examines the implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, the paper models formal trade dispute negotiations as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policys costs to trading partners. The approach is to extend earlier theoretical models of trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations in order to guide the empirical assessment. The paper uses instrumental variables to estimate the model on trade volume outcomes from World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes over 1995–2009. The evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions that larger import volume outcomes are associated with products that have smaller increases in foreign exporter-received prices (terms-of-trade losses for the importer) as a result of the dispute, larger pre-dispute import volumes, larger import demand elasticities, and smaller foreign export supply elasticities. Dispute settlement outcome differences are also explained by variation in institutionally-motivated measures of retaliation capacity and the severity of the free-rider problem associated with foreign exporter concentration. 2015-05-04T20:36:16Z 2015-05-04T20:36:16Z 2015-04 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/04/24402477/trade-agreements-enforcement-evidence-wto-dispute-settlement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21856 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7242 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |