Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan
This paper presents evidence from the first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a government-administered pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a sample of publi...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24638080/teacher-performance-pay-experimental-evidence-pakistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22180 |
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okr-10986-221802021-04-23T14:04:07Z Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Raju, Dhushyanth SKILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLS SCHOOL TEACHERS LEVEL OF SKILL TEACHERS EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ACHIEVEMENT TESTS STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO SCHOOL HEAD EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT ENROLLMENT DISTRICT EDUCATION SCHOOL ENROLLMENT GROUPS HIGH SCHOOL HEAD TEACHER EDUCATION OUTCOMES CLASSROOM RATIO PAPERS TEACHER PERFORMANCE SCHOOL CENSUS TEACHER COMPETENCY SCHOOL LOCATION SCHOOL INDICATORS EXAMS EXAM HIGH SCHOOLS OPEN ACCESS EDUCATION SECTOR EDUCATION FOR ALL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING EDUCATORS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS EFFECTIVE TEACHING PRIVATE SCHOOLS GRADUATE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION SCHOOL VISITS SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT STUDENT OUTCOMES PROVINCIAL EDUCATION PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT OFFICIAL CURRICULUM LEARNING SCHOOL QUALITY RESEARCH TEACHER SALARIES FIRST GRADE SCHOOL STUDENTS PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT FIGURES TEACHING PASS RATE SCHOOL LEVEL PRIMARY SCHOOLS SCHOOL MANAGEMENT EDUCATION SYSTEMS EXAM SCORE ENROLLMENT BY GRADE SCHOOL PARTICIPATION SCHOOL YEAR EXAM QUESTIONS RURAL SCHOOLS PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SCIENCE VALUES TEACHER WORKFORCE PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS STUDENT SCHOOLS HEAD TEACHERS PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE TEACHERS EDUCATION REFORM URBAN SCHOOLS ENROLLMENT DATA ENROLLMENT RATE SCHOOL LEADERS RESEARCHERS PRIMARY SCHOOL LEVEL EARLY CHILDHOOD STUDENT SCORES NUTRITION SCHOOL SYSTEMS GRADE EXAM EDUCATION GOALS LEARNING OBJECTIVES SMALL SCHOOLS CURRICULUM TEACHER SCHOOL NUTRITION TEACHER SHORTAGES EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES TEACHER RATIO CHILDREN EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS FUNCTIONAL SCHOOLS EDUCATION STUDENT TEACHER RATIO SCHOOL PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCES RURAL AREAS PRIVATE SCHOOL TEACHERS SCHOOL TEACHER TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT GIRLS ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PRIMARY LEVEL LEADERSHIP SCHOOL EDUCATION INTERVENTIONS NET ENROLLMENT NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDENTS PER TEACHER EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS NET ENROLLMENT RATE PRIMARY EDUCATION READERS CLASSROOM CLASSROOMS SCHOOL HIGHER GRADES NUMBER OF TEACHERS STUDENT LEARNING EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANNUAL SCHOOL CENSUS PARTICIPATION RATES UNIVERSITIES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE SCHOOL SCHOOL AGE This paper presents evidence from the first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a government-administered pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a sample of public primary schools with the lowest mean student exam scores in the province. Bonuses are linked to three school-level indicators: the gain in student exam scores, the gain in school enrollment, and the level of student exam participation. Bonus receipt and size are also randomly assigned across schools according to whether or not the teacher is the school’s head. On average, the program increases school enrollment by 4.1 percent and student exam participation rates by 3.4 percentage points, both in the third year. The analysis does not find that the program increases student exam scores in any year. Mean impacts are similar across program variants. The positive mean impact on school enrollment is mainly seen in urban schools and the positive mean impact on student exam participation rates is only seen in rural schools. 2015-07-16T16:10:55Z 2015-07-16T16:10:55Z 2015-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24638080/teacher-performance-pay-experimental-evidence-pakistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22180 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7307 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia Pakistan |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
SKILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLS SCHOOL TEACHERS LEVEL OF SKILL TEACHERS EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ACHIEVEMENT TESTS STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO SCHOOL HEAD EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT ENROLLMENT DISTRICT EDUCATION SCHOOL ENROLLMENT GROUPS HIGH SCHOOL HEAD TEACHER EDUCATION OUTCOMES CLASSROOM RATIO PAPERS TEACHER PERFORMANCE SCHOOL CENSUS TEACHER COMPETENCY SCHOOL LOCATION SCHOOL INDICATORS EXAMS EXAM HIGH SCHOOLS OPEN ACCESS EDUCATION SECTOR EDUCATION FOR ALL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING EDUCATORS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS EFFECTIVE TEACHING PRIVATE SCHOOLS GRADUATE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION SCHOOL VISITS SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT STUDENT OUTCOMES PROVINCIAL EDUCATION PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT OFFICIAL CURRICULUM LEARNING SCHOOL QUALITY RESEARCH TEACHER SALARIES FIRST GRADE SCHOOL STUDENTS PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT FIGURES TEACHING PASS RATE SCHOOL LEVEL PRIMARY SCHOOLS SCHOOL MANAGEMENT EDUCATION SYSTEMS EXAM SCORE ENROLLMENT BY GRADE SCHOOL PARTICIPATION SCHOOL YEAR EXAM QUESTIONS RURAL SCHOOLS PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SCIENCE VALUES TEACHER WORKFORCE PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS STUDENT SCHOOLS HEAD TEACHERS PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE TEACHERS EDUCATION REFORM URBAN SCHOOLS ENROLLMENT DATA ENROLLMENT RATE SCHOOL LEADERS RESEARCHERS PRIMARY SCHOOL LEVEL EARLY CHILDHOOD STUDENT SCORES NUTRITION SCHOOL SYSTEMS GRADE EXAM EDUCATION GOALS LEARNING OBJECTIVES SMALL SCHOOLS CURRICULUM TEACHER SCHOOL NUTRITION TEACHER SHORTAGES EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES TEACHER RATIO CHILDREN EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS FUNCTIONAL SCHOOLS EDUCATION STUDENT TEACHER RATIO SCHOOL PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCES RURAL AREAS PRIVATE SCHOOL TEACHERS SCHOOL TEACHER TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT GIRLS ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PRIMARY LEVEL LEADERSHIP SCHOOL EDUCATION INTERVENTIONS NET ENROLLMENT NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDENTS PER TEACHER EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS NET ENROLLMENT RATE PRIMARY EDUCATION READERS CLASSROOM CLASSROOMS SCHOOL HIGHER GRADES NUMBER OF TEACHERS STUDENT LEARNING EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANNUAL SCHOOL CENSUS PARTICIPATION RATES UNIVERSITIES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE SCHOOL SCHOOL AGE |
spellingShingle |
SKILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLS SCHOOL TEACHERS LEVEL OF SKILL TEACHERS EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ACHIEVEMENT TESTS STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO SCHOOL HEAD EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT ENROLLMENT DISTRICT EDUCATION SCHOOL ENROLLMENT GROUPS HIGH SCHOOL HEAD TEACHER EDUCATION OUTCOMES CLASSROOM RATIO PAPERS TEACHER PERFORMANCE SCHOOL CENSUS TEACHER COMPETENCY SCHOOL LOCATION SCHOOL INDICATORS EXAMS EXAM HIGH SCHOOLS OPEN ACCESS EDUCATION SECTOR EDUCATION FOR ALL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING EDUCATORS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS EFFECTIVE TEACHING PRIVATE SCHOOLS GRADUATE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION SCHOOL VISITS SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT STUDENT OUTCOMES PROVINCIAL EDUCATION PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT OFFICIAL CURRICULUM LEARNING SCHOOL QUALITY RESEARCH TEACHER SALARIES FIRST GRADE SCHOOL STUDENTS PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT FIGURES TEACHING PASS RATE SCHOOL LEVEL PRIMARY SCHOOLS SCHOOL MANAGEMENT EDUCATION SYSTEMS EXAM SCORE ENROLLMENT BY GRADE SCHOOL PARTICIPATION SCHOOL YEAR EXAM QUESTIONS RURAL SCHOOLS PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SCIENCE VALUES TEACHER WORKFORCE PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS STUDENT SCHOOLS HEAD TEACHERS PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE TEACHERS EDUCATION REFORM URBAN SCHOOLS ENROLLMENT DATA ENROLLMENT RATE SCHOOL LEADERS RESEARCHERS PRIMARY SCHOOL LEVEL EARLY CHILDHOOD STUDENT SCORES NUTRITION SCHOOL SYSTEMS GRADE EXAM EDUCATION GOALS LEARNING OBJECTIVES SMALL SCHOOLS CURRICULUM TEACHER SCHOOL NUTRITION TEACHER SHORTAGES EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES TEACHER RATIO CHILDREN EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS FUNCTIONAL SCHOOLS EDUCATION STUDENT TEACHER RATIO SCHOOL PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCES RURAL AREAS PRIVATE SCHOOL TEACHERS SCHOOL TEACHER TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT GIRLS ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PRIMARY LEVEL LEADERSHIP SCHOOL EDUCATION INTERVENTIONS NET ENROLLMENT NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDENTS PER TEACHER EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS NET ENROLLMENT RATE PRIMARY EDUCATION READERS CLASSROOM CLASSROOMS SCHOOL HIGHER GRADES NUMBER OF TEACHERS STUDENT LEARNING EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANNUAL SCHOOL CENSUS PARTICIPATION RATES UNIVERSITIES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE SCHOOL SCHOOL AGE Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Raju, Dhushyanth Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan |
geographic_facet |
South Asia Pakistan |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7307 |
description |
This paper presents evidence from the
first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a
government-administered pilot teacher performance pay
program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash
bonuses to teachers in a sample of public primary schools
with the lowest mean student exam scores in the province.
Bonuses are linked to three school-level indicators: the
gain in student exam scores, the gain in school enrollment,
and the level of student exam participation. Bonus receipt
and size are also randomly assigned across schools according
to whether or not the teacher is the school’s head. On
average, the program increases school enrollment by 4.1
percent and student exam participation rates by 3.4
percentage points, both in the third year. The analysis does
not find that the program increases student exam scores in
any year. Mean impacts are similar across program variants.
The positive mean impact on school enrollment is mainly seen
in urban schools and the positive mean impact on student
exam participation rates is only seen in rural schools. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Raju, Dhushyanth |
author_facet |
Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Raju, Dhushyanth |
author_sort |
Barrera-Osorio, Felipe |
title |
Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan |
title_short |
Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan |
title_full |
Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan |
title_fullStr |
Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan |
title_full_unstemmed |
Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan |
title_sort |
teacher performance pay : experimental evidence from pakistan |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2015 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24638080/teacher-performance-pay-experimental-evidence-pakistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22180 |
_version_ |
1764450368573407232 |