How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries
The author examines the political and institutional processes that produced fundamental pension reform in three post-communist countries: Hungary, Kazakhstan, and Poland. He tests various hypothesis about the relationship between deliberative proce...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/437882/politics-institutions-affect-pension-reform-three-post-communist-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22209 |
| id |
okr-10986-22209 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-222092021-04-23T14:04:06Z How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries Orenstein, Mitchell A. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CITIZENSHIP CIVIL SOCIETY COMMITMENT-BUILDING PHASE COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONTRIBUTION RATES COUNCILS DEFINED CONTRIBUTIONS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FUNDED SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT POLICIES HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INNOVATIONS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INVESTMENT RETURNS LABOR MARKET LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS MINISTERS MULTI-PILLAR SYSTEMS NATIONAL POLICY PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEMS PENSION FUND PENSION REFORM PENSION REFORM DESIGN PENSION REFORM DESIGN ELEMENTS PENSION REFORM PROCESS PENSION REFORMS PENSION SAVINGS PENSION SYSTEM PENSION SYSTEMS PENSIONERS PENSIONS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS PRICE INDEXATION PRIVATE MANAGEMENT PRIVATE PENSION PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS PRIVATE PILLAR PRIVATE PILLARS PROGRAMS PUBLIC AFFAIRS PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC PILLAR PUBLIC PILLARS RADICALISM RATIONALIZATION REFORM POLICY REPRESENTATIVES RETIREMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SAFETY NETS SOCIAL POLICIES SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SCIENCES SOCIAL SECTOR SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM STATE BUREAUCRACY SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS TAX REVENUES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VETO WAR The author examines the political and institutional processes that produced fundamental pension reform in three post-communist countries: Hungary, Kazakhstan, and Poland. He tests various hypothesis about the relationship between deliberative process and outcomes through detailed case studies of pension reform. The outcomes of reform were similar: each country implemented a mandatory funded pension system as part of reform, but the extent, and configuration of changes, greatly differed. Countries with more veto actors - social and institutional actors with an effective veto over reform - engaged in less radical reform, as theory predicted. Poland and Hungary generated less radical change than Kazakhstan, partly because they have more representative political systems, to which more associations, interest groups, and proposal actors have access. Proposal actors shape the reform agenda and influence the positions of key veto actors. Pension reform takes longer in countries with more veto and proposal actors, such as Poland and Hungary. Legacies of policy, the development of civil society, and international organizations, also profoundly affect the shape and progress of reform. The author sees pension reform as happening in three phases: commitment-building, coalition-building, and implementation. He presents hypothesis about tradeoffs among inclusiveness (of process), radicalism (of reform), and participation in, and compliance with, the new system. The hypothesis: including more, and more various, veto and proposal actors early in the deliberative process, increases buy-in and compliance when reform is implemented, but at the expense of faster and greater change. Early challenges in implementation in all three countries, nut especially in Kazakhstan, suggest the importance of improving buy-in through inclusive deliberative processes, where possible. 2015-07-17T17:49:51Z 2015-07-17T17:49:51Z 2000-03 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/437882/politics-institutions-affect-pension-reform-three-post-communist-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22209 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2310 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Europe and Central Asia Hungary Kazakhstan Poland |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CITIZENSHIP CIVIL SOCIETY COMMITMENT-BUILDING PHASE COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONTRIBUTION RATES COUNCILS DEFINED CONTRIBUTIONS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FUNDED SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT POLICIES HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INNOVATIONS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INVESTMENT RETURNS LABOR MARKET LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS MINISTERS MULTI-PILLAR SYSTEMS NATIONAL POLICY PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEMS PENSION FUND PENSION REFORM PENSION REFORM DESIGN PENSION REFORM DESIGN ELEMENTS PENSION REFORM PROCESS PENSION REFORMS PENSION SAVINGS PENSION SYSTEM PENSION SYSTEMS PENSIONERS PENSIONS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS PRICE INDEXATION PRIVATE MANAGEMENT PRIVATE PENSION PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS PRIVATE PILLAR PRIVATE PILLARS PROGRAMS PUBLIC AFFAIRS PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC PILLAR PUBLIC PILLARS RADICALISM RATIONALIZATION REFORM POLICY REPRESENTATIVES RETIREMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SAFETY NETS SOCIAL POLICIES SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SCIENCES SOCIAL SECTOR SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM STATE BUREAUCRACY SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS TAX REVENUES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VETO WAR |
| spellingShingle |
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CITIZENSHIP CIVIL SOCIETY COMMITMENT-BUILDING PHASE COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONTRIBUTION RATES COUNCILS DEFINED CONTRIBUTIONS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FUNDED SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT POLICIES HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INNOVATIONS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INVESTMENT RETURNS LABOR MARKET LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS MINISTERS MULTI-PILLAR SYSTEMS NATIONAL POLICY PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEMS PENSION FUND PENSION REFORM PENSION REFORM DESIGN PENSION REFORM DESIGN ELEMENTS PENSION REFORM PROCESS PENSION REFORMS PENSION SAVINGS PENSION SYSTEM PENSION SYSTEMS PENSIONERS PENSIONS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS PRICE INDEXATION PRIVATE MANAGEMENT PRIVATE PENSION PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS PRIVATE PILLAR PRIVATE PILLARS PROGRAMS PUBLIC AFFAIRS PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC PILLAR PUBLIC PILLARS RADICALISM RATIONALIZATION REFORM POLICY REPRESENTATIVES RETIREMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SAFETY NETS SOCIAL POLICIES SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SCIENCES SOCIAL SECTOR SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM STATE BUREAUCRACY SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS TAX REVENUES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VETO WAR Orenstein, Mitchell A. How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries |
| geographic_facet |
Europe and Central Asia Hungary Kazakhstan Poland |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2310 |
| description |
The author examines the political and
institutional processes that produced fundamental pension
reform in three post-communist countries: Hungary,
Kazakhstan, and Poland. He tests various hypothesis about
the relationship between deliberative process and outcomes
through detailed case studies of pension reform. The
outcomes of reform were similar: each country implemented a
mandatory funded pension system as part of reform, but the
extent, and configuration of changes, greatly differed.
Countries with more veto actors - social and institutional
actors with an effective veto over reform - engaged in less
radical reform, as theory predicted. Poland and Hungary
generated less radical change than Kazakhstan, partly
because they have more representative political systems, to
which more associations, interest groups, and proposal
actors have access. Proposal actors shape the reform agenda
and influence the positions of key veto actors. Pension
reform takes longer in countries with more veto and proposal
actors, such as Poland and Hungary. Legacies of policy, the
development of civil society, and international
organizations, also profoundly affect the shape and progress
of reform. The author sees pension reform as happening in
three phases: commitment-building, coalition-building, and
implementation. He presents hypothesis about tradeoffs among
inclusiveness (of process), radicalism (of reform), and
participation in, and compliance with, the new system. The
hypothesis: including more, and more various, veto and
proposal actors early in the deliberative process, increases
buy-in and compliance when reform is implemented, but at the
expense of faster and greater change. Early challenges in
implementation in all three countries, nut especially in
Kazakhstan, suggest the importance of improving buy-in
through inclusive deliberative processes, where possible. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Orenstein, Mitchell A. |
| author_facet |
Orenstein, Mitchell A. |
| author_sort |
Orenstein, Mitchell A. |
| title |
How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries |
| title_short |
How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries |
| title_full |
How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries |
| title_fullStr |
How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries |
| title_full_unstemmed |
How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries |
| title_sort |
how politics and institutions affect pension reform in three postcommunist countries |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/437882/politics-institutions-affect-pension-reform-three-post-communist-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22209 |
| _version_ |
1764449835995365376 |