When Elites Meet : Decentralization, Power-Sharing, and Public Goods Provision in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone
Over the past decade, decentralization of fiscal and policy-making authority has become a cornerstone of development organizations’ recommendations for good governance. Yet the institutional design of multilayered government can create tensions as...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24696358/elites-meet-decentralization-power-sharing-public-goods-provision-post-conflict-sierra-leone http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22216 |
| Summary: | Over the past decade, decentralization
of fiscal and policy-making authority has become a
cornerstone of development organizations’ recommendations
for good governance. Yet the institutional design of
multilayered government can create tensions as new elites
attempt to fill governing spaces long occupied by
traditional patrons. This paper uses the case of
post-conflict Sierra Leone to explore the power-sharing
dynamics between traditional hereditary chiefs and newly
elected community councilors, and how these dynamics affect
the provision of local public goods. The paper uses data on
several measures of local service provision and finds that
councilor/chief relationships defined by competition are
associated with higher levels of public goods provision as
well as greater improvements in these goods between council
areas over time. Relationships defined by frequent contact
in the absence of disputes as well as higher frequencies of
familial ties between the two sets of actors are associated
with worse local development outcomes. This evidence
suggests that greater competition between elite groups is
beneficial for local development, whereas collusion or
cooption between old and new elites harms the provision of
local public goods. |
|---|