Civil Service Recruitment in Comoros : A Case of Political Clientelism in a Decentralized State
Professional civil service recruitment is a core component of governance for development, as it is necessary for ensuring the capacity of civil servants, service delivery, fiscal sustainability, and proper salary management. Through an ambitious mi...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/25103256/civil-service-recruitment-comoros-case-political-clientelism-decentralized-state http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22851 |
| Summary: | Professional civil service recruitment
is a core component of governance for development, as it is
necessary for ensuring the capacity of civil servants,
service delivery, fiscal sustainability, and proper salary
management. Through an ambitious mixed method approach, this
study seeks to provide a political economy analysis of civil
service recruitment in Comoros—a fragile and decentralized
state with a relatively large portion of spending on
government salaries. More specifically, it aims to explain
the recent dramatic increases in the number of civil
servants in Comoros. The paper presents three main findings
from the analysis. First, in 2010, elections at the national
and local levels were associated with the largest
recruitment in the past decade, due in part to the interplay
of informal institutions such as political clientelism with
the current public financial management system. Second, the
institutions involved in recruitment are not permanent; they
are evolving with the balance of power between the national
and island governments. Third, civil service recruitment
respects qualification standards. |
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