Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of Califo...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26351641/property-rights-fishing-cooperatives-well-work http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24500 |
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okr-10986-245002021-05-25T10:54:39Z Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila LIMITED FISH CORPORATE ENTITIES EQUIPMENT SEA BASS PRICE LEVELS STOCK SALES BUYER FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY SOLE INFORMATION MONITORING COOP DELAWARE MARKET SHARES PRICING PRICE TIME PERIOD OPEN ACCESS INSTITUTIONS STATES ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP ACQUISITION PROXY USER GROUP ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRODUCTS PRODUCTIVITY CO-OP GLOBALIZATION BUYERS MARKETING MARKETS TRUST PRIVATE INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCT COOPERATIVE FISHING NATURAL RESOURCES MARINE FISHERY EXPORT MARKET LEGAL FRAMEWORK FISHING RIGHTS SALMON FISHERY FISHING DIRECTORS ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS MARKET PRICE PRICE CHANGE TRANSACTIONS USERS TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTION PDF INSPECTION RESULTS FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD PRICE ADJUSTMENTS FISHERY COOPERATIVES AQUACULTURE MARKET PRICES VALUE FISHES BANK INVESTIGATION FISH SPECIES DEMAND TUNA EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES ASSOCIATION CONSUMER PRICE PRICE LEVEL COLLECTIVE PRICE CHANGES EXPENDITURES SALE AVERAGE PRICE FLEET MARINE ECOSYSTEMS MARINE FISHERIES MARKET PRICE INCREASE LOBSTERS MSY FISH POPULATIONS RESULT FISHERIES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ICT STATE OPEN MARKET SECURITY STOCKS SCIENCE FOUNDATION INVESTMENT NATURAL RESOURCE FISHING INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION SUPPLY MARKET POWER COOPERATIVES FISHING GROUNDS INDIVIDUALS INSTITUTION SNAILS PROFIT UNIVERSITY FISHERY FINANCIAL SUPPORT CONSUMER PRICE INDEX COOPERATIVE FISHERIES SOCIETY PRICE DECREASE SHRIMP DATABASE PROFITS COLLECTIVE ACTION PRICE INDEX FISHERMEN FRESHWATER FISH COOPERATIVE FISHERS PRICES COMMERCIAL FISHING SPREAD COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling setting for theoretical and empirical analysis. A dynamic theoretical model demonstrates how fishing cooperatives' management choices are shaped by the presence of property rights, the mobility of resources, and predictable environmental fluctuations. More aggressive management comes in the form of the cooperative leadership paying lower prices to cooperative members for their catch, as lower prices disincentivize fishing effort. The model's implications are empirically tested using three years of daily logbook data on prices and catches for three cooperatives from the Gulf of California. One cooperative enjoys property rights while the other two do not. There is empirical evidence in support of the model: compared to the other cooperatives, the cooperative with strong property rights pays members a lower price, pays especially lower prices for less mobile species, and decreases prices when environmental fluctuations cause population growth rates to fall. The results from this case study demonstrate the viability of cooperative management of resources but also point toward quantitatively important limitations created by the mismatch between the scale of a property right and the scale of a resource. 2016-06-13T20:34:09Z 2016-06-13T20:34:09Z 2016-05 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26351641/property-rights-fishing-cooperatives-well-work http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24500 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7662 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Mexico United States |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
LIMITED FISH CORPORATE ENTITIES EQUIPMENT SEA BASS PRICE LEVELS STOCK SALES BUYER FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY SOLE INFORMATION MONITORING COOP DELAWARE MARKET SHARES PRICING PRICE TIME PERIOD OPEN ACCESS INSTITUTIONS STATES ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP ACQUISITION PROXY USER GROUP ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRODUCTS PRODUCTIVITY CO-OP GLOBALIZATION BUYERS MARKETING MARKETS TRUST PRIVATE INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCT COOPERATIVE FISHING NATURAL RESOURCES MARINE FISHERY EXPORT MARKET LEGAL FRAMEWORK FISHING RIGHTS SALMON FISHERY FISHING DIRECTORS ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS MARKET PRICE PRICE CHANGE TRANSACTIONS USERS TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTION INSPECTION RESULTS FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD PRICE ADJUSTMENTS FISHERY COOPERATIVES AQUACULTURE MARKET PRICES VALUE FISHES BANK INVESTIGATION FISH SPECIES DEMAND TUNA EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES ASSOCIATION CONSUMER PRICE PRICE LEVEL COLLECTIVE PRICE CHANGES EXPENDITURES SALE AVERAGE PRICE FLEET MARINE ECOSYSTEMS MARINE FISHERIES MARKET PRICE INCREASE LOBSTERS MSY FISH POPULATIONS RESULT FISHERIES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ICT STATE OPEN MARKET SECURITY STOCKS SCIENCE FOUNDATION INVESTMENT NATURAL RESOURCE FISHING INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION SUPPLY MARKET POWER COOPERATIVES FISHING GROUNDS INDIVIDUALS INSTITUTION SNAILS PROFIT UNIVERSITY FISHERY FINANCIAL SUPPORT CONSUMER PRICE INDEX COOPERATIVE FISHERIES SOCIETY PRICE DECREASE SHRIMP DATABASE PROFITS COLLECTIVE ACTION PRICE INDEX FISHERMEN FRESHWATER FISH COOPERATIVE FISHERS PRICES COMMERCIAL FISHING SPREAD COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES |
| spellingShingle |
LIMITED FISH CORPORATE ENTITIES EQUIPMENT SEA BASS PRICE LEVELS STOCK SALES BUYER FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY SOLE INFORMATION MONITORING COOP DELAWARE MARKET SHARES PRICING PRICE TIME PERIOD OPEN ACCESS INSTITUTIONS STATES ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP ACQUISITION PROXY USER GROUP ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRODUCTS PRODUCTIVITY CO-OP GLOBALIZATION BUYERS MARKETING MARKETS TRUST PRIVATE INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCT COOPERATIVE FISHING NATURAL RESOURCES MARINE FISHERY EXPORT MARKET LEGAL FRAMEWORK FISHING RIGHTS SALMON FISHERY FISHING DIRECTORS ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS MARKET PRICE PRICE CHANGE TRANSACTIONS USERS TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTION INSPECTION RESULTS FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD PRICE ADJUSTMENTS FISHERY COOPERATIVES AQUACULTURE MARKET PRICES VALUE FISHES BANK INVESTIGATION FISH SPECIES DEMAND TUNA EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES ASSOCIATION CONSUMER PRICE PRICE LEVEL COLLECTIVE PRICE CHANGES EXPENDITURES SALE AVERAGE PRICE FLEET MARINE ECOSYSTEMS MARINE FISHERIES MARKET PRICE INCREASE LOBSTERS MSY FISH POPULATIONS RESULT FISHERIES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ICT STATE OPEN MARKET SECURITY STOCKS SCIENCE FOUNDATION INVESTMENT NATURAL RESOURCE FISHING INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION SUPPLY MARKET POWER COOPERATIVES FISHING GROUNDS INDIVIDUALS INSTITUTION SNAILS PROFIT UNIVERSITY FISHERY FINANCIAL SUPPORT CONSUMER PRICE INDEX COOPERATIVE FISHERIES SOCIETY PRICE DECREASE SHRIMP DATABASE PROFITS COLLECTIVE ACTION PRICE INDEX FISHERMEN FRESHWATER FISH COOPERATIVE FISHERS PRICES COMMERCIAL FISHING SPREAD COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Mexico United States |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7662 |
| description |
Devolving property rights to local
institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy
for natural resource management in developing countries. The
use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating
in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling
setting for theoretical and empirical analysis. A dynamic
theoretical model demonstrates how fishing
cooperatives' management choices are shaped by the
presence of property rights, the mobility of resources, and
predictable environmental fluctuations. More aggressive
management comes in the form of the cooperative leadership
paying lower prices to cooperative members for their catch,
as lower prices disincentivize fishing effort. The
model's implications are empirically tested using three
years of daily logbook data on prices and catches for three
cooperatives from the Gulf of California. One cooperative
enjoys property rights while the other two do not. There is
empirical evidence in support of the model: compared to the
other cooperatives, the cooperative with strong property
rights pays members a lower price, pays especially lower
prices for less mobile species, and decreases prices when
environmental fluctuations cause population growth rates to
fall. The results from this case study demonstrate the
viability of cooperative management of resources but also
point toward quantitatively important limitations created by
the mismatch between the scale of a property right and the
scale of a resource. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila |
| author_facet |
Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila |
| author_sort |
Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio |
| title |
Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? |
| title_short |
Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? |
| title_full |
Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? |
| title_fullStr |
Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? |
| title_sort |
property rights for fishing cooperatives : how (and how well) do they work? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26351641/property-rights-fishing-cooperatives-well-work http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24500 |
| _version_ |
1764456881609244672 |