Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution

In many countries safety nets consist predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens would be supportive of redistribut...

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Main Authors:	Silva, Joana, Morgandi, Matteo, Levin, Victoria
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:	AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26377292/trust-government-support-redistribution-transforming-electricity-governance-india-india’s-power-sector-regulation-enabled-consumers’-power http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24514

id	okr-10986-24514
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-245142021-04-23T14:04:22Z Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution Silva, Joana Morgandi, Matteo Levin, Victoria AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY In many countries safety nets consist predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens would be supportive of redistributive programs. Results from a behavioral experiment based on a nationally representative sample in Jordan reveal that increasing transparency in benefit delivery makes middle-class citizens (particularly among the youth and low-trust individuals) more willing to forgo their own welfare to benefit the poor. Moreover, increasing transparency enhances the relative support for cash-based safety nets, which have greater impact on poverty compared with in-kind transfers, but may be perceived as more prone to elite capture. 2016-06-13T22:04:05Z 2016-06-13T22:04:05Z 2016-05 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26377292/trust-government-support-redistribution-transforming-electricity-governance-india-india’s-power-sector-regulation-enabled-consumers’-power http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24514 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7675 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY
spellingShingle	AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY Silva, Joana Morgandi, Matteo Levin, Victoria Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7675
description	In many countries safety nets consist predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens would be supportive of redistributive programs. Results from a behavioral experiment based on a nationally representative sample in Jordan reveal that increasing transparency in benefit delivery makes middle-class citizens (particularly among the youth and low-trust individuals) more willing to forgo their own welfare to benefit the poor. Moreover, increasing transparency enhances the relative support for cash-based safety nets, which have greater impact on poverty compared with in-kind transfers, but may be perceived as more prone to elite capture.
format	Working Paper
author	Silva, Joana Morgandi, Matteo Levin, Victoria
author_facet	Silva, Joana Morgandi, Matteo Levin, Victoria
author_sort	Silva, Joana
title	Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
title_short	Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
title_full	Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
title_fullStr	Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
title_full_unstemmed	Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
title_sort	trust in government and support for redistribution
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2016
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26377292/trust-government-support-redistribution-transforming-electricity-governance-india-india’s-power-sector-regulation-enabled-consumers’-power http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24514
_version_	1764456919141974016

Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution

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