Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
The primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies m...
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| Language: | English en_US |
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24715 |
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okr-10986-247152021-04-23T14:04:27Z Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa Al-Dahdah, Edouard Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina Raballand, Gael Sergenti, Ernest Ababsa, Myriam IMPLEMENTATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS CUSTOMS POLICY INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY INHERITANCE RULE OF LAW INCENTIVES TAXATION DISCRETION The primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies more systematically enforced than others? Are “good” laws likely to be enacted, and if not, what stands in the way? We answer these questions using a theoretical framework and detailed empirical data and illustrate with case studies from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. We believe that the best way to understand the variation in the drafting and implementation of laws and policies is to examine the interests and incentives of those responsible for these tasks – policymakers and bureaucrats. If laws and their enforcement offer concrete benefits to these ruling elites, they are more likely to be systematically enforced. If they don't, implementation is selective, discretionary, if not nil. Our first contribution is in extending the application of the concept of the rule of law beyond its traditional focus on specific organizations like the courts and the police, to economic sectors such as customs, taxation and land inheritance, in a search for a direct causal relationship with economic development outcomes. Instead of limiting ourselves to a particular type of organization or a legalistic approach to the rule of law, we present a broader theory of how laws are made and implemented across different types of sectors and organizations. Our second contribution is in demonstrating how powerful interests affect implementation outcomes. The incentives elites have to build and support rule-of-law institutions derive from the distribution of power in society, which is partly a historical given. The point we make is that it is not deterministic. Realigning the incentive structures for reform among key actors and organizations, through accountability and competition, can dramatically improve the chances that rule-of-law institutions will take root. On the other hand, building the capacity of organizations without first changing institutional incentives is likely to lead to perverse outcomes. 2016-07-19T21:41:56Z 2016-07-19T21:41:56Z 2016-07-19 Book 978-1-4648-0886-9 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24715 English en_US Directions in Development--Pubic Sector Governance; CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Publication Middle East and North Africa Middle East North Africa Jordan Morocco Tunisia |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
IMPLEMENTATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS CUSTOMS POLICY INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY INHERITANCE RULE OF LAW INCENTIVES TAXATION DISCRETION |
| spellingShingle |
IMPLEMENTATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS CUSTOMS POLICY INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY INHERITANCE RULE OF LAW INCENTIVES TAXATION DISCRETION Al-Dahdah, Edouard Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina Raballand, Gael Sergenti, Ernest Ababsa, Myriam Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa |
| geographic_facet |
Middle East and North Africa Middle East North Africa Jordan Morocco Tunisia |
| relation |
Directions in Development--Pubic Sector Governance; |
| description |
The primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies more systematically enforced than others? Are “good” laws likely to be enacted, and if not, what stands in the way?
We answer these questions using a theoretical framework and detailed empirical data and illustrate with case studies from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. We believe that the best way to understand the variation in the drafting and implementation of laws and policies is to examine the interests and incentives of those responsible for these tasks – policymakers and bureaucrats. If laws and their enforcement offer concrete benefits to these ruling elites, they are more likely to be systematically enforced. If they don't, implementation is selective, discretionary, if not nil.
Our first contribution is in extending the application of the concept of the rule of law beyond its traditional focus on specific organizations like the courts and the police, to economic sectors such as customs, taxation and land inheritance, in a search for a direct causal relationship with economic development outcomes. Instead of limiting ourselves to a particular type of organization or a legalistic approach to the rule of law, we present a broader theory of how laws are made and implemented across different types of sectors and organizations.
Our second contribution is in demonstrating how powerful interests affect implementation outcomes. The incentives elites have to build and support rule-of-law institutions derive from the distribution of power in society, which is partly a historical given. The point we make is that it is not deterministic. Realigning the incentive structures for reform among key actors and organizations, through accountability and competition, can dramatically improve the chances that rule-of-law institutions will take root. On the other hand, building the capacity of organizations without first changing institutional incentives is likely to lead to perverse outcomes. |
| format |
Book |
| author |
Al-Dahdah, Edouard Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina Raballand, Gael Sergenti, Ernest Ababsa, Myriam |
| author_facet |
Al-Dahdah, Edouard Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina Raballand, Gael Sergenti, Ernest Ababsa, Myriam |
| author_sort |
Al-Dahdah, Edouard |
| title |
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa |
| title_short |
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa |
| title_full |
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa |
| title_fullStr |
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice : Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa |
| title_sort |
rules on paper, rules in practice : enforcing laws and policies in the middle east and north africa |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24715 |
| _version_ |
1764457627797946368 |