The Distributional Consequences of Group Procurement : Evidence from a Randomized Trial of a Food Security Program in Rural India
Public transfer programs that allow beneficiaries to choose the transferred good may be more efficient, but the poorest beneficiaries may not participate if the good chosen is too costly. A model shows that program targeting and consumption impacts...
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26500182/distributional-consequences-group-procurement-evidence-randomized-trial-food-security-program-rural-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24785 |
Summary: | Public transfer programs that allow
beneficiaries to choose the transferred good may be more
efficient, but the poorest beneficiaries may not participate
if the good chosen is too costly. A model shows that program
targeting and consumption impacts are tied to selected
quality of the provided good. Evidence from a randomized
trial in rural India in which groups of beneficiaries choose
the variety of rice to be offered as a subsidized loan
confirms that choosing lower cost goods self-targets the
program towards the poorest beneficiaries. Consumption
impacts are biggest for wealthiest households and may be
negative for moderately poor households. |
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