Preferential Resource Spending under an Employment Guarantee : The Political Economy of MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh
Are ostensibly demand-driven public works programs with high levels of safeguards nonetheless susceptible to political influence? This conjecture is investigated using expenditure data at the local level from India's National Rural Employment...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26782077/preferential-resource-spending-under-employment-guarantee-political-economy-mgnregs-andhra-pradesh http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25131 |
| Summary: | Are ostensibly demand-driven public
works programs with high levels of safeguards nonetheless
susceptible to political influence? This conjecture is
investigated using expenditure data at the local level from
India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.
Focusing on one state where accountability and transparency
mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts
have been widely applauded, there is no evidence of
partisan-influenced spending before the 2009 election
however a statistically significant but small in magnitude
effect after the 2009 election. Most variation in public
works expenditures is explained by the observed needs of
potential beneficiaries, as the scheme intended. |
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