Preferential Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards : Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR
There is not yet consensus in the trade agreements literature as to whether preferential liberalization leads to more or less multilateral liberalization. However, research thus far has focused mostly on tariff measures of import protection. This p...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26871415/preferential-liberalization-antidumping-safeguards-stumbling-block-evidence-mercosur http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25310 |
| Summary: | There is not yet consensus in the trade
agreements literature as to whether preferential
liberalization leads to more or less multilateral
liberalization. However, research thus far has focused
mostly on tariff measures of import protection. This paper
develops more comprehensive measures of trade policy that
include the temporary trade barrier policies of antidumping
and safeguards. Studies in other contexts have also shown
how these policies can erode some of the trade
liberalization gains that arise when examining tariffs
alone. This paper examines the experiences of Argentina and
Brazil during the formation of the MERCOSUR over 1990-2001.
The study finds that an exclusive focus on applied tariffs
may lead to a mischaracterization of the relationship
between preferential liberalization and liberalization
toward non-member countries. First, any "building
block" evidence that arises by focusing on tariffs
during the period in which MERCOSUR was only a free trade
area can disappear, once the analysis includes changes in
import protection arise through temporary trade barriers.
Furthermore, there is also evidence of a "stumbling
block" effect of preferential tariff liberalization for
the period in which MERCOSUR became a customs union, and
this result tends to strengthen with the inclusion of
temporary trade barriers. Finally, the paper provides a
first empirical examination of whether market power motives
can help explain the patterns of changes in import
protection that are observed in these settings. |
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