Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets

Power pools constitute a set of sometimes complex institutional arrangements for efficiency-enhancing coordination among power systems. In many developing countries, where such institutional arrangements can’t be established over the short term, there still can be scope for voluntary electricity-sha...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Nikandrova, Arina, Steinbuks, Jevgenijs
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	en_US
Published:	Springer 2017
Subjects:	electricity trade risk sharing self-enforcing contracts power systems
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25837

id	okr-10986-25837
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-258372021-05-26T09:05:20Z Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets Nikandrova, Arina Steinbuks, Jevgenijs electricity trade risk sharing self-enforcing contracts power systems Power pools constitute a set of sometimes complex institutional arrangements for efficiency-enhancing coordination among power systems. In many developing countries, where such institutional arrangements can’t be established over the short term, there still can be scope for voluntary electricity-sharing agreements among power systems. Using a particular type of efficient risk-sharing model with no commitment we demonstrate that second-best coordination improvements can be achieved with low to moderate risks of participants leaving the agreement. In the absence of an impartial market operator who can observe production fluctuations in connected power systems, establishing quasi-markets for trading excess electricity helps to achieve some cooperation in mutually beneficial electricity sharing. 2017-01-11T18:23:23Z 2017-01-11T18:23:23Z 2016-12-23 Journal Article Journal of Regulatory Economics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25837 en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Springer Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research Africa Latin America & Caribbean South Asia Central America Latin America South Asia Southern Africa West Africa
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	en_US
topic	electricity trade risk sharing self-enforcing contracts power systems
spellingShingle	electricity trade risk sharing self-enforcing contracts power systems Nikandrova, Arina Steinbuks, Jevgenijs Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets
geographic_facet	Africa Latin America & Caribbean South Asia Central America Latin America South Asia Southern Africa West Africa
description	Power pools constitute a set of sometimes complex institutional arrangements for efficiency-enhancing coordination among power systems. In many developing countries, where such institutional arrangements can’t be established over the short term, there still can be scope for voluntary electricity-sharing agreements among power systems. Using a particular type of efficient risk-sharing model with no commitment we demonstrate that second-best coordination improvements can be achieved with low to moderate risks of participants leaving the agreement. In the absence of an impartial market operator who can observe production fluctuations in connected power systems, establishing quasi-markets for trading excess electricity helps to achieve some cooperation in mutually beneficial electricity sharing.
format	Journal Article
author	Nikandrova, Arina Steinbuks, Jevgenijs
author_facet	Nikandrova, Arina Steinbuks, Jevgenijs
author_sort	Nikandrova, Arina
title	Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets
title_short	Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets
title_full	Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets
title_fullStr	Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets
title_full_unstemmed	Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets
title_sort	contracting for the second best in dysfunctional electricity markets
publisher	Springer
publishDate	2017
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25837
_version_	1764460275787890688

Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets

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