Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe
How can patrimonial local-level governance be reformed? Debates on this topic have focused largely on the possibility of reform via pressure from above (superordinate leaders) or below (citizens). This paper tests whether horizontal pressures from...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/652451484165805083/Reforming-village-level-governance-via-horizontal-pressure-evidence-from-an-experiment-in-Zimbabwe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25950 |
| Summary: | How can patrimonial local-level
governance be reformed? Debates on this topic have focused
largely on the possibility of reform via pressure from above
(superordinate leaders) or below (citizens). This paper
tests whether horizontal pressures from civil society
leaders can reform local governance in a context where
neither of these mechanisms operates effectively. The study
analyzes an experimental intervention in Zimbabwe intended
to reduce abuse of power by village heads. Analytic leverage
comes from the fact that the 270 study villages were
randomly assigned to two variants of the intervention, one
in which only village heads were trained on the framework
governing village leadership, and one in which civil society
leaders were trained alongside village heads. The results
suggest that horizontal pressure from civil society leaders
increased village heads' knowledge of and compliance
with regulated procedures, improved their management of
issues and raised citizens' trust in their leadership.
A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mechanisms
through which the trained civil society leaders had these
effects suggests they accomplished reform by directly
applying social pressure on village heads to abide by regulations. |
|---|