Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe
How can patrimonial local-level governance be reformed? Debates on this topic have focused largely on the possibility of reform via pressure from above (superordinate leaders) or below (citizens). This paper tests whether horizontal pressures from...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/652451484165805083/Reforming-village-level-governance-via-horizontal-pressure-evidence-from-an-experiment-in-Zimbabwe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25950 |
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okr-10986-259502021-06-08T14:42:47Z Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe Baldwin, Kate Muyengwa, Shylock Mvukiyehe, Eric village government institutions accountability foreign aid civil society political economy social pressure How can patrimonial local-level governance be reformed? Debates on this topic have focused largely on the possibility of reform via pressure from above (superordinate leaders) or below (citizens). This paper tests whether horizontal pressures from civil society leaders can reform local governance in a context where neither of these mechanisms operates effectively. The study analyzes an experimental intervention in Zimbabwe intended to reduce abuse of power by village heads. Analytic leverage comes from the fact that the 270 study villages were randomly assigned to two variants of the intervention, one in which only village heads were trained on the framework governing village leadership, and one in which civil society leaders were trained alongside village heads. The results suggest that horizontal pressure from civil society leaders increased village heads' knowledge of and compliance with regulated procedures, improved their management of issues and raised citizens' trust in their leadership. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mechanisms through which the trained civil society leaders had these effects suggests they accomplished reform by directly applying social pressure on village heads to abide by regulations. 2017-01-30T17:48:45Z 2017-01-30T17:48:45Z 2017-01 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/652451484165805083/Reforming-village-level-governance-via-horizontal-pressure-evidence-from-an-experiment-in-Zimbabwe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25950 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7941 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Zimbabwe |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
village government institutions accountability foreign aid civil society political economy social pressure |
| spellingShingle |
village government institutions accountability foreign aid civil society political economy social pressure Baldwin, Kate Muyengwa, Shylock Mvukiyehe, Eric Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Zimbabwe |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7941 |
| description |
How can patrimonial local-level
governance be reformed? Debates on this topic have focused
largely on the possibility of reform via pressure from above
(superordinate leaders) or below (citizens). This paper
tests whether horizontal pressures from civil society
leaders can reform local governance in a context where
neither of these mechanisms operates effectively. The study
analyzes an experimental intervention in Zimbabwe intended
to reduce abuse of power by village heads. Analytic leverage
comes from the fact that the 270 study villages were
randomly assigned to two variants of the intervention, one
in which only village heads were trained on the framework
governing village leadership, and one in which civil society
leaders were trained alongside village heads. The results
suggest that horizontal pressure from civil society leaders
increased village heads' knowledge of and compliance
with regulated procedures, improved their management of
issues and raised citizens' trust in their leadership.
A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mechanisms
through which the trained civil society leaders had these
effects suggests they accomplished reform by directly
applying social pressure on village heads to abide by regulations. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Baldwin, Kate Muyengwa, Shylock Mvukiyehe, Eric |
| author_facet |
Baldwin, Kate Muyengwa, Shylock Mvukiyehe, Eric |
| author_sort |
Baldwin, Kate |
| title |
Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe |
| title_short |
Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe |
| title_full |
Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe |
| title_fullStr |
Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Reforming Village-Level Governance via Horizontal Pressure : Evidence from an Experiment in Zimbabwe |
| title_sort |
reforming village-level governance via horizontal pressure : evidence from an experiment in zimbabwe |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/652451484165805083/Reforming-village-level-governance-via-horizontal-pressure-evidence-from-an-experiment-in-Zimbabwe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25950 |
| _version_ |
1764460565350055936 |