Holding on to Monrovia : Protecting a Fragile Peace through Economic Governance and Short-Term Employment
A key driver of Liberia's re-emergence from utter destruction, between 2004 and 2008, was the willingness of international actors to accept the responsibility and risks associated with stabilization. This was accomplished by confronting these...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/174031468263673953/Holding-on-to-Monrovia-protecting-a-fragile-peace-through-economic-governance-and-short-term-employment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/27335 |
Summary: | A key driver of Liberia's
re-emergence from utter destruction, between 2004 and 2008,
was the willingness of international actors to accept the
responsibility and risks associated with stabilization. This
was accomplished by confronting these risks directly, even
at the cost of temporarily filling institutional voids and
sharing sovereignty with the Liberian transitional
authorities. The main international diplomatic
representations and aid agencies on the ground came to
accept from their varying perspectives that peace in Liberia
was fragile and that the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(ACPA) of September 2003 was only the beginning of a
protracted stabilization effort. The domestic market for
consultants and goods did not exist, requiring the World
Bank to innovate with new modes of delivering assistance.
Thus, peace consolidation compelled international partners
to simultaneously (i) prevent full state capture by corrupt
elites in advance of elections and (ii) secure a peace
dividend to vulnerable groups which could most directly
threaten peace (young ex-combatants and refugees). Building
on a solid UN-World Bank partnership, the international
community found the internal consensus to address each of
the two complementary peace consolidation challenges,
adopting two highly innovative instruments: (i) an
anti-corruption scheme labeled Governance and Economic
Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), involving such robust
measures as expatriate co-signing authority, and (ii) a
short-term employment-generation scheme now known as
roads-with- United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),
centered on a rare direct collaboration between the Bank and
the engineering units of the UN's military peacekeeping
force on the ground. This paper examines these two
instruments more closely, in their successes and failures as
well as from the perspective of temporary shared sovereignty
and co-production. |
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