Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa
This paper uses new data on agricultural policy interventions to examine the political economy of agricultural trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, African governments have discriminated against agricultural producers in general (rel...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/929221468000913424/Political-economy-of-agricultural-trade-interventions-in-Africa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28166 |
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okr-10986-281662021-04-23T14:04:45Z Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa Bates, Robert H. Block, Steven AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE ARABLE LAND ARID NORTH CASH CROP CASH CROPS CASSAVA CITIZENS COCOA COCOA INDUSTRY COFFEE INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT CROP PRODUCTION CULTURAL CHANGE DEMOCRACY DISCRIMINATION DOMESTIC PRICES ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EXPORTS FARM HOUSEHOLDS FARMERS FOOD CONSUMERS FOOD CROP FOOD CROPS FOOD PRICES FOOD SECURITY FOODCROPS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL MARKETS GOVERNMENT POLICIES GROSS NATIONAL INCOME INCOME REDISTRIBUTION LABOR FORCE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT MAIZE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL POPULATION NATURAL ENDOWMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES NUTS PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR REGIONS POPULATION CHANGES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTION OF CASH CROPS PROGRESS PROSPEROUS REGIONS REAL GDP REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION REGIONAL ALLOCATION REGIONAL DIFFERENCES REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION REGIONAL INCOME REGIONAL INEQUALITY REGIONALISM RESPECT RICE RICH REGIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMERS RURAL DWELLERS RURAL POPULATION RURAL POPULATIONS RURAL SECTOR SECTORAL POLICIES SOCIAL WELFARE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION SUGAR TEA TRADE BARRIERS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TUBERS WHEAT YAMS This paper uses new data on agricultural policy interventions to examine the political economy of agricultural trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, African governments have discriminated against agricultural producers in general (relative to producers in non-agricultural sectors), and against producers of export agriculture in particular. While more moderate in recent years, these patterns of discrimination persist. They do so even though farmers comprise a political majority. Rather than claiming the existence of a single best approach to the analysis of policy choice, the authors explore the impact of three factors: institutions, regional inequality, and tax revenue-generation. The authors find that agricultural taxation increases with the rural population share in the absence of electoral party competition; yet, the existence of party competition turns the lobbying disadvantage of the rural majority into political advantage. The authors also find that privileged cash crop regions are particular targets for redistributive taxation, unless the country's president comes from that region. In addition, governments of resource-rich countries, while continuing to tax export producers, reduce their taxation of food consumers. 2017-09-07T17:10:41Z 2017-09-07T17:10:41Z 2009-05 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/929221468000913424/Political-economy-of-agricultural-trade-interventions-in-Africa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28166 English en_US Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;87 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Sub-Saharan Africa |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE ARABLE LAND ARID NORTH CASH CROP CASH CROPS CASSAVA CITIZENS COCOA COCOA INDUSTRY COFFEE INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT CROP PRODUCTION CULTURAL CHANGE DEMOCRACY DISCRIMINATION DOMESTIC PRICES ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EXPORTS FARM HOUSEHOLDS FARMERS FOOD CONSUMERS FOOD CROP FOOD CROPS FOOD PRICES FOOD SECURITY FOODCROPS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL MARKETS GOVERNMENT POLICIES GROSS NATIONAL INCOME INCOME REDISTRIBUTION LABOR FORCE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT MAIZE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL POPULATION NATURAL ENDOWMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES NUTS PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR REGIONS POPULATION CHANGES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTION OF CASH CROPS PROGRESS PROSPEROUS REGIONS REAL GDP REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION REGIONAL ALLOCATION REGIONAL DIFFERENCES REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION REGIONAL INCOME REGIONAL INEQUALITY REGIONALISM RESPECT RICE RICH REGIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMERS RURAL DWELLERS RURAL POPULATION RURAL POPULATIONS RURAL SECTOR SECTORAL POLICIES SOCIAL WELFARE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION SUGAR TEA TRADE BARRIERS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TUBERS WHEAT YAMS |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE ARABLE LAND ARID NORTH CASH CROP CASH CROPS CASSAVA CITIZENS COCOA COCOA INDUSTRY COFFEE INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT CROP PRODUCTION CULTURAL CHANGE DEMOCRACY DISCRIMINATION DOMESTIC PRICES ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EXPORTS FARM HOUSEHOLDS FARMERS FOOD CONSUMERS FOOD CROP FOOD CROPS FOOD PRICES FOOD SECURITY FOODCROPS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GLOBAL MARKETS GOVERNMENT POLICIES GROSS NATIONAL INCOME INCOME REDISTRIBUTION LABOR FORCE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT MAIZE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL POPULATION NATURAL ENDOWMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES NUTS PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR REGIONS POPULATION CHANGES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTION OF CASH CROPS PROGRESS PROSPEROUS REGIONS REAL GDP REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION REGIONAL ALLOCATION REGIONAL DIFFERENCES REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION REGIONAL INCOME REGIONAL INEQUALITY REGIONALISM RESPECT RICE RICH REGIONS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMERS RURAL DWELLERS RURAL POPULATION RURAL POPULATIONS RURAL SECTOR SECTORAL POLICIES SOCIAL WELFARE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION SUGAR TEA TRADE BARRIERS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TUBERS WHEAT YAMS Bates, Robert H. Block, Steven Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Sub-Saharan Africa |
| relation |
Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;87 |
| description |
This paper uses new data on agricultural
policy interventions to examine the political economy of
agricultural trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Historically, African governments have discriminated against
agricultural producers in general (relative to producers in
non-agricultural sectors), and against producers of export
agriculture in particular. While more moderate in recent
years, these patterns of discrimination persist. They do so
even though farmers comprise a political majority. Rather
than claiming the existence of a single best approach to the
analysis of policy choice, the authors explore the impact of
three factors: institutions, regional inequality, and tax
revenue-generation. The authors find that agricultural
taxation increases with the rural population share in the
absence of electoral party competition; yet, the existence
of party competition turns the lobbying disadvantage of the
rural majority into political advantage. The authors also
find that privileged cash crop regions are particular
targets for redistributive taxation, unless the
country's president comes from that region. In
addition, governments of resource-rich countries, while
continuing to tax export producers, reduce their taxation of
food consumers. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Bates, Robert H. Block, Steven |
| author_facet |
Bates, Robert H. Block, Steven |
| author_sort |
Bates, Robert H. |
| title |
Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa |
| title_short |
Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa |
| title_full |
Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa |
| title_fullStr |
Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa |
| title_sort |
political economy of agricultural trade interventions in africa |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/929221468000913424/Political-economy-of-agricultural-trade-interventions-in-Africa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28166 |
| _version_ |
1764465430236233728 |