Agricultural Distortion Patterns since the 1950s : What Needs Explaining?
This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/665961468334205439/Agricultural-distortion-patterns-since-the-1950s-what-needs-explaining http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28173 |
Summary: | This paper summarizes a new database
that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy
developments over the past half century on distortions to
agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for
food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income
spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt
not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products
but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and
they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the
other hand, the governments of many developing countries
have directly taxed their farmers over the past
half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also
indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting
imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing
farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by
both own-country and other countries' agricultural
price and international trade policies. The authors
summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn
from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the
attention of political economy theorists, historians and
econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in
addressing such questions as the following: where is there
still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what
extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some
developing-country food producers are now being protected
from import competition along the lines of the examples of
earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the
political economy forces behind the more-successful
reformers, and how do they compare with those in
less-successful countries where major distortions in
agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the
pattern of distortions across not only countries but also
industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments
within the agricultural sector of each country? |
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