Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/118971468330890828/Agricultural-price-distortion-and-stabilization-stylized-facts-and-hypothesis-tests http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28175 |
Summary: | This paper describes agricultural policy
choices and tests some predictions of political economy
theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts:
governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and
subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports
more than nontradables and tax more and subsidize less where
there is more land per capita. We test a variety of
political economy explanations, finding results consistent
with hypothesized effects of rural and urban
constituents' rational ignorance about small per person
effects, governance institutions' control of rent
seeking by political leaders, governments' revenue
motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in
policy making. We also find that larger groups obtain more
favorable policies, suggesting that positive group size
effects outweigh any negative influence from free ridership,
and that demographically driven entry of new farmers is
associated with less favorable farm policies, suggesting the
arrival of new farmers erodes policy rents and discourages
political activity by incumbents. Another new result is that
governments achieve very little price stabilization relative
to our benchmark estimates of undistorted prices, and
governments in the poorest countries actually destabilize
domestic prices. |
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