Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests

This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Masters, William A., Garcia, Andres F.
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/118971468330890828/Agricultural-price-distortion-and-stabilization-stylized-facts-and-hypothesis-tests
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28175
id okr-10986-28175
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-281752021-04-23T14:04:45Z Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests Masters, William A. Garcia, Andres F. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL PRICE AGRICULTURAL PRICES AGRICULTURE BARRIER BARRIER TO ENTRY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CHECKS AND BALANCES COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITIES COMMODITY COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPETITIVE MARKET COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS DATA QUALITY DEMAND DEPOSITS DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXPENDITURE EXPORTS FISCAL POLICIES FOOD PRICE FOOD PRICES FOREIGN CURRENCY FREE TRADE GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE HOME MARKET IMPORT QUOTAS INCOME INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INCUMBENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR FORCE LIBERALIZATIONS LOCAL CURRENCY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES M2 MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE NATIONAL INCOME NATURAL RESOURCE OPPORTUNITY COSTS PARTICULAR COUNTRIES PARTICULAR COUNTRY PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ACTIVITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER PRICE CHANGES PRICE DISTORTION PRICE DISTORTIONS PRICE LEVELS PRICE POLICY PRICE STABILITY PRICE STABILIZATION PRICING POLICY PRIVATE INVESTMENTS REAL GDP REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT REAL INCOME RENT SEEKING RENT SEEKING BEHAVIOR RENTS SAVINGS SOCIAL COST SPECIALIZATION SPREAD TAX TAX RATES TAXATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES VALUE ADDED WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents' rational ignorance about small per person effects, governance institutions' control of rent seeking by political leaders, governments' revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy making. We also find that larger groups obtain more favorable policies, suggesting that positive group size effects outweigh any negative influence from free ridership, and that demographically driven entry of new farmers is associated with less favorable farm policies, suggesting the arrival of new farmers erodes policy rents and discourages political activity by incumbents. Another new result is that governments achieve very little price stabilization relative to our benchmark estimates of undistorted prices, and governments in the poorest countries actually destabilize domestic prices. 2017-09-07T18:00:05Z 2017-09-07T18:00:05Z 2009-05 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/118971468330890828/Agricultural-price-distortion-and-stabilization-stylized-facts-and-hypothesis-tests http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28175 English en_US Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;86 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
AGRICULTURAL PRICE
AGRICULTURAL PRICES
AGRICULTURE
BARRIER
BARRIER TO ENTRY
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
BENCHMARK
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMMODITIES
COMMODITY
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
COMPETITIVE MARKET
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS
DATA QUALITY
DEMAND DEPOSITS
DEMOCRACY
DEMOGRAPHIC
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DOMESTIC PRICE
DOMESTIC PRICES
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC THEORY
EMPLOYMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
EXPENDITURE
EXPORTS
FISCAL POLICIES
FOOD PRICE
FOOD PRICES
FOREIGN CURRENCY
FREE TRADE
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA
GROWTH RATE
HOME MARKET
IMPORT QUOTAS
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INCOMES
INCUMBENT
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LIBERALIZATIONS
LOCAL CURRENCY
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
M2
MARKET FAILURES
MARKET PRICE
NATIONAL INCOME
NATURAL RESOURCE
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
PARTICULAR COUNTRIES
PARTICULAR COUNTRY
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL POWER
PRICE CHANGES
PRICE DISTORTION
PRICE DISTORTIONS
PRICE LEVELS
PRICE POLICY
PRICE STABILITY
PRICE STABILIZATION
PRICING POLICY
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
REAL GDP
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
REAL INCOME
RENT SEEKING
RENT SEEKING BEHAVIOR
RENTS
SAVINGS
SOCIAL COST
SPECIALIZATION
SPREAD
TAX
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
VALUE ADDED
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
spellingShingle AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
AGRICULTURAL PRICE
AGRICULTURAL PRICES
AGRICULTURE
BARRIER
BARRIER TO ENTRY
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
BENCHMARK
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CHECKS AND BALANCES
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMMODITIES
COMMODITY
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
COMPETITIVE MARKET
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
CONSUMERS
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS
DATA QUALITY
DEMAND DEPOSITS
DEMOCRACY
DEMOGRAPHIC
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DOMESTIC PRICE
DOMESTIC PRICES
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC THEORY
EMPLOYMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
EXPENDITURE
EXPORTS
FISCAL POLICIES
FOOD PRICE
FOOD PRICES
FOREIGN CURRENCY
FREE TRADE
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA
GROWTH RATE
HOME MARKET
IMPORT QUOTAS
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INCOMES
INCUMBENT
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LABOR FORCE
LIBERALIZATIONS
LOCAL CURRENCY
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
M2
MARKET FAILURES
MARKET PRICE
NATIONAL INCOME
NATURAL RESOURCE
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
PARTICULAR COUNTRIES
PARTICULAR COUNTRY
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL POWER
PRICE CHANGES
PRICE DISTORTION
PRICE DISTORTIONS
PRICE LEVELS
PRICE POLICY
PRICE STABILITY
PRICE STABILIZATION
PRICING POLICY
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
REAL GDP
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
REAL INCOME
RENT SEEKING
RENT SEEKING BEHAVIOR
RENTS
SAVINGS
SOCIAL COST
SPECIALIZATION
SPREAD
TAX
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
VALUE ADDED
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
WORLD TRADE
Masters, William A.
Garcia, Andres F.
Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
relation Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;86
description This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents' rational ignorance about small per person effects, governance institutions' control of rent seeking by political leaders, governments' revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy making. We also find that larger groups obtain more favorable policies, suggesting that positive group size effects outweigh any negative influence from free ridership, and that demographically driven entry of new farmers is associated with less favorable farm policies, suggesting the arrival of new farmers erodes policy rents and discourages political activity by incumbents. Another new result is that governments achieve very little price stabilization relative to our benchmark estimates of undistorted prices, and governments in the poorest countries actually destabilize domestic prices.
format Working Paper
author Masters, William A.
Garcia, Andres F.
author_facet Masters, William A.
Garcia, Andres F.
author_sort Masters, William A.
title Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
title_short Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
title_full Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
title_fullStr Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
title_full_unstemmed Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization : Stylized Facts and Hypothesis Tests
title_sort agricultural price distortion and stabilization : stylized facts and hypothesis tests
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2017
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/118971468330890828/Agricultural-price-distortion-and-stabilization-stylized-facts-and-hypothesis-tests
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28175
_version_ 1764465451963777024