Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination

This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: pol...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Rausser, Gordon C., Roland, Gérard
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE ALTERNATIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS ASSET DIVERSIFICATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANK POLICY BID BRIBERY BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY CANDIDATES CHECKS COALITION GOVERNMENT COALITION GOVERNMENTS COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS CONDITIONALITY CONFIDENCE CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE TAXES CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION COUNTRY RISK CREDIBILITY CRIME DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DYNAMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC TRENDS ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS ELECTORAL PROCESS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ENFORCEABILITY ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPLOITATION EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH RATE HIDDEN ACTIONS HIDDEN INFORMATION HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INEFFICIENCY INSTRUMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTERMEDIATE INPUTS INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIONS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL PROCESS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LAWS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS LOBBYING LOCAL MARKET MARKET DISTORTIONS MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE MARKET STRUCTURE MEDIA MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD OPTIMIZATION PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS PATRONAGE PENALTY POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKING POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREFERENCE ANALYSIS PRICE CONTROLS PRIVATE GAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING QUOTAS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY REPRESENTATIVES RULE OF LAW STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TAX TAX COLLECTION TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION TERRORISM TRADE POLICY TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY TRUST FUNDS TURNOVER UNFAIR COMPETITION VIOLENCE VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS WEALTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/899931468346438707/Special-interests-versus-the-public-interest-in-policy-determination http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28251

Description
Summary:	This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination

Similar Items