Political Economy of Reform
This paper reviews the literature relevant to understanding political constraints to economic reforms. Reform refers to changes in government policies or institutional rules because status quo policies and institutions are not working well to achie...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/290071508764607858/Political-economy-of-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28584 |
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okr-10986-285842021-09-05T12:13:57Z Political Economy of Reform Khemani, Stuti POLICY REFORMS POLITICAL ECONOMY INSTITUTIONS NORMS PREFERENCES This paper reviews the literature relevant to understanding political constraints to economic reforms. Reform refers to changes in government policies or institutional rules because status quo policies and institutions are not working well to achieve the goals of economic well-being and development. Further, reforms refer to the alternative policies and institutions that are available that would most likely perform better than the status quo. The main question examined in the political economy of reform literature has been why reforms are not undertaken when they are needed for the good of society. The succinct answer from the first generation of research is that conflict of interest between organized socio-political groups is responsible for some groups being able to stall reforms so that they can extract greater private rents from status quo policies. The next generation of research is tackling a more fundamental question: why does conflict of interest persist; or, why do some interest groups exert influence against reforms if there are indeed large gains to be had for society? These are questions about norms and preferences in society for public goods. The next step is to examine where norms and preferences for public goods come from, and which institutional arrangements are more conducive to solve the public goods problem of pursuing reforms. After reviewing the available and future directions for research, the paper concludes with what all of this means for policy makers who are interested in understanding the factors behind successful reforms. 2017-10-26T15:07:27Z 2017-10-26T15:07:27Z 2017-10 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/290071508764607858/Political-economy-of-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28584 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8224 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
POLICY REFORMS POLITICAL ECONOMY INSTITUTIONS NORMS PREFERENCES |
| spellingShingle |
POLICY REFORMS POLITICAL ECONOMY INSTITUTIONS NORMS PREFERENCES Khemani, Stuti Political Economy of Reform |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8224 |
| description |
This paper reviews the literature
relevant to understanding political constraints to economic
reforms. Reform refers to changes in government policies or
institutional rules because status quo policies and
institutions are not working well to achieve the goals of
economic well-being and development. Further, reforms refer
to the alternative policies and institutions that are
available that would most likely perform better than the
status quo. The main question examined in the political
economy of reform literature has been why reforms are not
undertaken when they are needed for the good of society. The
succinct answer from the first generation of research is
that conflict of interest between organized socio-political
groups is responsible for some groups being able to stall
reforms so that they can extract greater private rents from
status quo policies. The next generation of research is
tackling a more fundamental question: why does conflict of
interest persist; or, why do some interest groups exert
influence against reforms if there are indeed large gains to
be had for society? These are questions about norms and
preferences in society for public goods. The next step is to
examine where norms and preferences for public goods come
from, and which institutional arrangements are more
conducive to solve the public goods problem of pursuing
reforms. After reviewing the available and future directions
for research, the paper concludes with what all of this
means for policy makers who are interested in understanding
the factors behind successful reforms. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Khemani, Stuti |
| title |
Political Economy of Reform |
| title_short |
Political Economy of Reform |
| title_full |
Political Economy of Reform |
| title_fullStr |
Political Economy of Reform |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Economy of Reform |
| title_sort |
political economy of reform |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/290071508764607858/Political-economy-of-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28584 |
| _version_ |
1764467214103085056 |