Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK

This paper investigates whether the prospect of redistribution hinders the formation of efficiency-enhancing groups. An experiment is conducted in a Kenyan slum, Ugandan villages, and a UK university town and used to test, in an anonymous setting w...

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Main Authors:	Fafchamps, Marcel, Hill, Ruth Vargas
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:	REDISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY GROUP MEMBERSHIP
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/208861517841440138/Redistribution-and-group-participation-experimental-evidence-from-Africa-and-the-UK http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29318

id	okr-10986-29318
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-293182021-06-08T14:42:48Z Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK Fafchamps, Marcel Hill, Ruth Vargas REDISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY GROUP MEMBERSHIP This paper investigates whether the prospect of redistribution hinders the formation of efficiency-enhancing groups. An experiment is conducted in a Kenyan slum, Ugandan villages, and a UK university town and used to test, in an anonymous setting with no feedback, whether subjects join a group that increases their endowment but exposes them to one of three redistributive actions: stealing, giving, or burning. Exposure to redistributive options among group members operates as a disincentive to join a group. This finding obtains under all three treatments -- including when the pressure to redistribute is intrinsic. However, the nature of the redistribution affects the magnitude of the impact. Giving has the least impact on the decision to join a group, whilst forced redistribution through stealing or burning acts as a much larger deterrent to group membership. These findings are common across all three subject pools, but African subjects are particularly reluctant to join a group in the burning treatment, indicating strong reluctance to expose themselves to destruction by others. 2018-02-05T20:33:01Z 2018-02-05T20:33:01Z 2018-02 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/208861517841440138/Redistribution-and-group-participation-experimental-evidence-from-Africa-and-the-UK http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29318 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8330 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Kenya Uganda United Kingdom
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	REDISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY GROUP MEMBERSHIP
spellingShingle	REDISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY GROUP MEMBERSHIP Fafchamps, Marcel Hill, Ruth Vargas Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK
geographic_facet	Africa Kenya Uganda United Kingdom
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8330
description	This paper investigates whether the prospect of redistribution hinders the formation of efficiency-enhancing groups. An experiment is conducted in a Kenyan slum, Ugandan villages, and a UK university town and used to test, in an anonymous setting with no feedback, whether subjects join a group that increases their endowment but exposes them to one of three redistributive actions: stealing, giving, or burning. Exposure to redistributive options among group members operates as a disincentive to join a group. This finding obtains under all three treatments -- including when the pressure to redistribute is intrinsic. However, the nature of the redistribution affects the magnitude of the impact. Giving has the least impact on the decision to join a group, whilst forced redistribution through stealing or burning acts as a much larger deterrent to group membership. These findings are common across all three subject pools, but African subjects are particularly reluctant to join a group in the burning treatment, indicating strong reluctance to expose themselves to destruction by others.
format	Working Paper
author	Fafchamps, Marcel Hill, Ruth Vargas
author_facet	Fafchamps, Marcel Hill, Ruth Vargas
author_sort	Fafchamps, Marcel
title	Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK
title_short	Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK
title_full	Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK
title_fullStr	Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK
title_full_unstemmed	Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK
title_sort	redistribution and group participation : experimental evidence from africa and the uk
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2018
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/208861517841440138/Redistribution-and-group-participation-experimental-evidence-from-Africa-and-the-UK http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29318
_version_	1764469042251300864

Redistribution and Group Participation : Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK

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