Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance
Monitoring technologies and pay for performance (PFP) contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where agents’ motivations vary and so the effectivene...
Main Authors: | Cordella, Antonio, Cordella, Tito |
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Format: | Journal Article |
Published: |
Elsevier
2018
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29339 |
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