Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government
How does a locally-managed conditional cash transfer program impact trust in government? On the one hand, delivering monetary benefits and increasing interactions with government officials (elected and appointed) may increase trust. On the other ha...
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okr-10986-293672021-06-14T10:10:21Z Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government Evans, David K. Holtemeyer, Brian Kosec, Katrina CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS SERVICE DELIVERY DECENTRALIZATION INFORMATION COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION TRUST GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT How does a locally-managed conditional cash transfer program impact trust in government? On the one hand, delivering monetary benefits and increasing interactions with government officials (elected and appointed) may increase trust. On the other hand, imposing paternalistic conditions, leading some to experience feelings of social stigma or guilt, and potentially permitting capture by local elites could reduce trust. This paper answers this question by exploiting the randomized introduction of a locally-managed transfer program in Tanzania in 2010, which included popular election of community management committees to run the program. The analysis reveals that cash transfers can significantly increase trust in leaders. This effect is driven by large increases in trust in elected leaders as opposed to appointed bureaucrats. Perceptions of government responsiveness to citizens' concerns and honesty of leaders also rise; these improvements are largest where there are more village meetings at baseline. One of the central roles of village meetings is to receive and share information with village residents. One indicator that governance may have improved is that records from school and health committees are more readily available in treatment villages. Notably, while the stated willingness of citizens to participate in community development projects rises, actual participation in projects and the likelihood of voting does not. Concerns that local management of a cash transfer program will destroy trust in government or reduce the quality of governance appear unfounded—especially in high-information contexts. 2018-02-16T21:14:10Z 2018-02-16T21:14:10Z 2018-02 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655591518448688065/Cash-transfers-increase-trust-in-local-government http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29367 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8333 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Tanzania |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS SERVICE DELIVERY DECENTRALIZATION INFORMATION COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION TRUST GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT |
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS SERVICE DELIVERY DECENTRALIZATION INFORMATION COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION TRUST GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT Evans, David K. Holtemeyer, Brian Kosec, Katrina Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government |
geographic_facet |
Africa Tanzania |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8333 |
description |
How does a locally-managed conditional
cash transfer program impact trust in government? On the one
hand, delivering monetary benefits and increasing
interactions with government officials (elected and
appointed) may increase trust. On the other hand, imposing
paternalistic conditions, leading some to experience
feelings of social stigma or guilt, and potentially
permitting capture by local elites could reduce trust. This
paper answers this question by exploiting the randomized
introduction of a locally-managed transfer program in
Tanzania in 2010, which included popular election of
community management committees to run the program. The
analysis reveals that cash transfers can significantly
increase trust in leaders. This effect is driven by large
increases in trust in elected leaders as opposed to
appointed bureaucrats. Perceptions of government
responsiveness to citizens' concerns and honesty of
leaders also rise; these improvements are largest where
there are more village meetings at baseline. One of the
central roles of village meetings is to receive and share
information with village residents. One indicator that
governance may have improved is that records from school and
health committees are more readily available in treatment
villages. Notably, while the stated willingness of citizens
to participate in community development projects rises,
actual participation in projects and the likelihood of
voting does not. Concerns that local management of a cash
transfer program will destroy trust in government or reduce
the quality of governance appear unfounded—especially in
high-information contexts. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Evans, David K. Holtemeyer, Brian Kosec, Katrina |
author_facet |
Evans, David K. Holtemeyer, Brian Kosec, Katrina |
author_sort |
Evans, David K. |
title |
Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government |
title_short |
Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government |
title_full |
Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government |
title_fullStr |
Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government |
title_sort |
cash transfers increase trust in local government |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655591518448688065/Cash-transfers-increase-trust-in-local-government http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29367 |
_version_ |
1764469168328933376 |