Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of th...
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okr-10986-294572021-06-08T14:42:45Z Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications Bachas, Pierre Fattal Jaef, Roberto N. Jensen, Anders TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX EVASION COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent. 2018-03-15T15:19:22Z 2018-03-15T15:19:22Z 2018-03 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/768971520865898064/Size-dependent-tax-enforcement-and-compliance-global-evidence-and-aggregate-implications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29457 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8363 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
institution |
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building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX EVASION COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY |
spellingShingle |
TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX EVASION COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY Bachas, Pierre Fattal Jaef, Roberto N. Jensen, Anders Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8363 |
description |
This paper studies the prevalence and
consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and
compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of
industries' average firm size in the United States as
an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in
developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries
show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size.
Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries,
and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When
quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size
dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor
Productivity of up to 0.8 percent. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Bachas, Pierre Fattal Jaef, Roberto N. Jensen, Anders |
author_facet |
Bachas, Pierre Fattal Jaef, Roberto N. Jensen, Anders |
author_sort |
Bachas, Pierre |
title |
Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
title_short |
Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
title_full |
Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
title_fullStr |
Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
title_full_unstemmed |
Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications |
title_sort |
size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance : global evidence and aggregate implications |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/768971520865898064/Size-dependent-tax-enforcement-and-compliance-global-evidence-and-aggregate-implications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29457 |
_version_ |
1764469398436839424 |