Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications

Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications

This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of th...

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Main Authors: Bachas, Pierre, Fattal Jaef, Roberto N., Jensen, Anders
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:
TAX ADMINISTRATION
TAX EVASION
COMPLIANCE
TAX ENFORCEMENT
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/768971520865898064/Size-dependent-tax-enforcement-and-compliance-global-evidence-and-aggregate-implications
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29457
id okr-10986-29457
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-294572021-06-08T14:42:45Z Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications Bachas, Pierre Fattal Jaef, Roberto N. Jensen, Anders TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX EVASION COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent. 2018-03-15T15:19:22Z 2018-03-15T15:19:22Z 2018-03 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/768971520865898064/Size-dependent-tax-enforcement-and-compliance-global-evidence-and-aggregate-implications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29457 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8363 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic TAX ADMINISTRATION
TAX EVASION
COMPLIANCE
TAX ENFORCEMENT
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
spellingShingle TAX ADMINISTRATION
TAX EVASION
COMPLIANCE
TAX ENFORCEMENT
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Bachas, Pierre
Fattal Jaef, Roberto N.
Jensen, Anders
Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8363
description This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent.
format Working Paper
author Bachas, Pierre
Fattal Jaef, Roberto N.
Jensen, Anders
author_facet Bachas, Pierre
Fattal Jaef, Roberto N.
Jensen, Anders
author_sort Bachas, Pierre
title Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
title_short Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
title_full Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
title_fullStr Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
title_full_unstemmed Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance : Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
title_sort size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance : global evidence and aggregate implications
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2018
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/768971520865898064/Size-dependent-tax-enforcement-and-compliance-global-evidence-and-aggregate-implications
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29457
_version_ 1764469398436839424

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