Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools

This paper tests for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants are allocated to one private school or all private schools in a village. Enrollment increases i...

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Main Authors:	Andrabi, Tahir, Das, Jishnu, Khwaja, Asim I., Ozyurt, Selcuk, Singh, Niharika
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:	PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489361534875600698/Upping-the-ante-the-equilibrium-effects-of-unconditional-grants-to-private-schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30290

id	okr-10986-30290
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-302902021-11-29T12:20:57Z Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS This paper tests for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants are allocated to one private school or all private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in the setting of all private schools along with higher teacher wages. This differential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. The findings of higher social surplus in the setting of all private schools, but greater private returns in the setting of one private school underscore the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies. 2018-08-23T17:19:28Z 2018-08-23T17:19:28Z 2018-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489361534875600698/Upping-the-ante-the-equilibrium-effects-of-unconditional-grants-to-private-schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30290 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8563 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia Pakistan
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
spellingShingle	PRIVATE EDUCATION FINANCIAL INNOVATION STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EDUCATION MARKETS RETURN TO CAPITAL SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES SMEs UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
geographic_facet	South Asia Pakistan
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8563
description	This paper tests for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grants are allocated to one private school or all private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in the setting of all private schools along with higher teacher wages. This differential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. The findings of higher social surplus in the setting of all private schools, but greater private returns in the setting of one private school underscore the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies.
format	Working Paper
author	Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika
author_facet	Andrabi, Tahir Das, Jishnu Khwaja, Asim I. Ozyurt, Selcuk Singh, Niharika
author_sort	Andrabi, Tahir
title	Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
title_short	Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
title_full	Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
title_fullStr	Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
title_full_unstemmed	Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
title_sort	upping the ante : the equilibrium effects of unconditional grants to private schools
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2018
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489361534875600698/Upping-the-ante-the-equilibrium-effects-of-unconditional-grants-to-private-schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30290
_version_	1764471662855585792

Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools

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