Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?

Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling setting for theoretical a...

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Main Authors:	Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio, Leslie, Heather M., Mack-Crane, Austen, Nagavarapu, Sriniketh, Reddy, Sheila M.W., Sievanen, Leila
Format:	Journal Article
Published:	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2018
Subjects:	POPULATION GROWTH INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY ECOSYSTEM FISHERIES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MARKETS CORPORATE ENTITIES COOPERATIVES PROPERTY RIGHTS
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30954

id	okr-10986-30954
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-309542021-05-25T10:54:35Z Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila POPULATION GROWTH INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY ECOSYSTEM FISHERIES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MARKETS CORPORATE ENTITIES COOPERATIVES PROPERTY RIGHTS Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling setting for theoretical and empirical analysis. A dynamic theoretical model demonstrates how fishing cooperatives’ management choices are shaped by the presence of property rights, the mobility of resources, and predictable environmental fluctuations. More aggressive management comes in the form of the cooperative leadership paying lower prices to cooperative members for their catch, as lower prices disincentivize fishing effort. The model's implications are empirically tested using three years of daily logbook data on prices and catches for three cooperatives from the Gulf of California. One cooperative enjoys property rights while the other two do not. There is empirical evidence in support of the model: compared to the other cooperatives, the cooperative with strong property rights pays members a lower price, pays especially lower prices for less mobile species, and decreases prices when environmental fluctuations cause population growth rates to fall. The results from this case study demonstrate the viability of cooperative management of resources but also point toward quantitatively important limitations created by the mismatch between the scale of a property right and the scale of a resource. 2018-12-06T17:07:54Z 2018-12-06T17:07:54Z 2017-06-01 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30954 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Mexico
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
topic	POPULATION GROWTH INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY ECOSYSTEM FISHERIES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MARKETS CORPORATE ENTITIES COOPERATIVES PROPERTY RIGHTS
spellingShingle	POPULATION GROWTH INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY ECOSYSTEM FISHERIES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MARKETS CORPORATE ENTITIES COOPERATIVES PROPERTY RIGHTS Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Mexico
description	Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling setting for theoretical and empirical analysis. A dynamic theoretical model demonstrates how fishing cooperatives’ management choices are shaped by the presence of property rights, the mobility of resources, and predictable environmental fluctuations. More aggressive management comes in the form of the cooperative leadership paying lower prices to cooperative members for their catch, as lower prices disincentivize fishing effort. The model's implications are empirically tested using three years of daily logbook data on prices and catches for three cooperatives from the Gulf of California. One cooperative enjoys property rights while the other two do not. There is empirical evidence in support of the model: compared to the other cooperatives, the cooperative with strong property rights pays members a lower price, pays especially lower prices for less mobile species, and decreases prices when environmental fluctuations cause population growth rates to fall. The results from this case study demonstrate the viability of cooperative management of resources but also point toward quantitatively important limitations created by the mismatch between the scale of a property right and the scale of a resource.
format	Journal Article
author	Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila
author_facet	Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio Leslie, Heather M. Mack-Crane, Austen Nagavarapu, Sriniketh Reddy, Sheila M.W. Sievanen, Leila
author_sort	Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio
title	Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
title_short	Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
title_full	Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
title_fullStr	Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
title_full_unstemmed	Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?
title_sort	property rights for fishing cooperatives : how (and how well) do they work?
publisher	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
publishDate	2018
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30954
_version_	1764473260745949184

Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?

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