Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors

International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper pr...

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Main Authors: Cordella, Tito, Powell, Andrew
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/578451563797490303/Preferred-and-Non-Preferred-Creditors
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32125
id okr-10986-32125
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-321252022-08-16T00:24:00Z Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors Cordella, Tito Powell, Andrew PREFERRED CREDITOR TREATMENT PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULTS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EMERGENCY FINANCING DEBT RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an IFI, that can commit to lend limited amounts at the risk-free rate and can refrain from lending into arrears is always repaid and adds value. The analysis suggests that IFIs should not mimic commercial lenders, but exploit their complementarity, even if banning commercial borrowing can sometimes be optimal. IFIs should also focus on countries with limited market access and should not be forced into debt restructurings. 2019-07-29T17:29:46Z 2019-07-29T17:29:46Z 2019-07 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/578451563797490303/Preferred-and-Non-Preferred-Creditors http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32125 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8941 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic PREFERRED CREDITOR TREATMENT
PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS
SOVEREIGN DEBT
DEFAULTS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
EMERGENCY FINANCING
DEBT RESTRUCTURING
FINANCIAL MARKETS
spellingShingle PREFERRED CREDITOR TREATMENT
PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS
SOVEREIGN DEBT
DEFAULTS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
EMERGENCY FINANCING
DEBT RESTRUCTURING
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Cordella, Tito
Powell, Andrew
Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8941
description International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an IFI, that can commit to lend limited amounts at the risk-free rate and can refrain from lending into arrears is always repaid and adds value. The analysis suggests that IFIs should not mimic commercial lenders, but exploit their complementarity, even if banning commercial borrowing can sometimes be optimal. IFIs should also focus on countries with limited market access and should not be forced into debt restructurings.
format Working Paper
author Cordella, Tito
Powell, Andrew
author_facet Cordella, Tito
Powell, Andrew
author_sort Cordella, Tito
title Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors
title_short Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors
title_full Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors
title_fullStr Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors
title_full_unstemmed Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors
title_sort preferred and non-preferred creditors
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2019
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/578451563797490303/Preferred-and-Non-Preferred-Creditors
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32125
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