Targeting Inputs : Experimental Evidence from Tanzania
Input subsidy programs (ISP) often have two conflicting targeting goals: selecting individuals with the highest marginal return to inputs on efficiency grounds, or the poorest individuals on equity grounds, allowing for a secondary market to restor...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/497951568641575819/Targeting-Inputs-Experimental-Evidence-from-Tanzania http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32421 |
| Summary: | Input subsidy programs (ISP) often have
two conflicting targeting goals: selecting individuals with
the highest marginal return to inputs on efficiency grounds,
or the poorest individuals on equity grounds, allowing for a
secondary market to restore efficiency gains. To study this
targeting dilemma, this paper implements a field experiment
where beneficiaries of an ISP were selected via a lottery or
a local committee. In lottery villages, the study finds
evidence of a secondary market as beneficiaries are more
likely to sell inputs to non-beneficiaries. In contrast, in
non-lottery villages, the study finds evidence of
displacement of private fertilizer sales yet no elite
capture. The impacts of the ISP on agricultural productivity
and welfare are limited, suggesting that resources should be
directed at complementary investments, such as improving
soil quality and irrigation. |
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