Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania

Input subsidy programs carry support as instruments to increase agricultural productivity, provided they are market-smart. This requires especially proper targeting to contain the fiscal pressure, with decentralized targeting of input vouchers cur...

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Main Authors:	Pan, Lei, Christiaensen, Luc
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	2012
Subjects:	ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AGGREGATE SUPPLY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AGRICULTURAL SEASON AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY INTERVENTIONS COFFEE GROWING REGION COMMUNITY COMMITTEES CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA CROP INCOME CROP PRODUCTION CROWDING OUT DECENTRALIZATION DESCRIPTION DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRICTS ECOLOGICAL ZONES ECONOMIC CRITERIA ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY EXTENSION AGENTS FARM ACTIVITIES FARMER FARMERS FARMING SEASON FEMALE FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS FEMALE PARTICIPATION FOOD POLICY FOOD PRICES FOOD PRODUCTION FOOD SECURITY FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION GENDER HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD HEAD AGE HOUSEHOLD HEADS HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES ILLITERACY INCOME INCOME GROWTH INDICATORS FOR POVERTY INEQUALITY INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS IRRIGATION LABOR MARKETS LAND INEQUALITY LAND QUALITY LAND SIZE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARKET FAILURES MARKET PLACE MULTIPLIER EFFECTS NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OCCUPATION OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL TARGETING POOR POOR FARMERS POOR HOUSEHOLD POOR SMALLHOLDERS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY LINE POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS REGIONAL MEDIAN REGRESSION ANALYSIS REMOTE COMMUNITIES REMOTE VILLAGES RURAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE RURAL TOWNS SAFETY SAFETY NET SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SOCIAL COHESION TARGETED TRANSFERS TARGETING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY VILLAGE ASSEMBLY VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL YOUTH
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110505084157 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3414

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spelling	okr-10986-34142021-04-23T14:02:09Z Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania Pan, Lei Christiaensen, Luc ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AGGREGATE SUPPLY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AGRICULTURAL SEASON AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY INTERVENTIONS COFFEE GROWING REGION COMMUNITY COMMITTEES CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA CROP INCOME CROP PRODUCTION CROWDING OUT DECENTRALIZATION DESCRIPTION DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRICTS ECOLOGICAL ZONES ECONOMIC CRITERIA ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY EXTENSION AGENTS FARM ACTIVITIES FARMER FARMERS FARMING SEASON FEMALE FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS FEMALE PARTICIPATION FOOD POLICY FOOD PRICES FOOD PRODUCTION FOOD SECURITY FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION GENDER HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD HEAD AGE HOUSEHOLD HEADS HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES ILLITERACY INCOME INCOME GROWTH INDICATORS FOR POVERTY INEQUALITY INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS IRRIGATION LABOR MARKETS LAND INEQUALITY LAND QUALITY LAND SIZE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARKET FAILURES MARKET PLACE MULTIPLIER EFFECTS NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OCCUPATION OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL TARGETING POOR POOR FARMERS POOR HOUSEHOLD POOR SMALLHOLDERS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY LINE POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS REGIONAL MEDIAN REGRESSION ANALYSIS REMOTE COMMUNITIES REMOTE VILLAGES RURAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE RURAL TOWNS SAFETY SAFETY NET SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SOCIAL COHESION TARGETED TRANSFERS TARGETING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY VILLAGE ASSEMBLY VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL YOUTH Input subsidy programs carry support as instruments to increase agricultural productivity, provided they are market-smart. This requires especially proper targeting to contain the fiscal pressure, with decentralized targeting of input vouchers currently the instrument of choice. Nonetheless, despite clear advantages in administrative costs, the fear of elite capture persists. These fears are borne out in the experience from the 2008 input voucher pilot program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, examined here. Elected village officials received about 60 percent of the distributed vouchers, a factor that significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in more unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and a focus on high trust settings helped mitigate these concerns. The findings highlight the continuing need for scrutiny when relying on decentralized targeting. A clearer sense of purpose (increasing productivity among poorer farmers versus increasing aggregate output) could also enhance the targeting performance. 2012-03-19T18:02:02Z 2012-03-19T18:02:02Z 2011-05-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110505084157 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3414 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5651 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Africa Sub-Saharan Africa East Africa Tanzania
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AGGREGATE SUPPLY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AGRICULTURAL SEASON AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY INTERVENTIONS COFFEE GROWING REGION COMMUNITY COMMITTEES CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA CROP INCOME CROP PRODUCTION CROWDING OUT DECENTRALIZATION DESCRIPTION DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRICTS ECOLOGICAL ZONES ECONOMIC CRITERIA ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY EXTENSION AGENTS FARM ACTIVITIES FARMER FARMERS FARMING SEASON FEMALE FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS FEMALE PARTICIPATION FOOD POLICY FOOD PRICES FOOD PRODUCTION FOOD SECURITY FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION GENDER HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD HEAD AGE HOUSEHOLD HEADS HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES ILLITERACY INCOME INCOME GROWTH INDICATORS FOR POVERTY INEQUALITY INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS IRRIGATION LABOR MARKETS LAND INEQUALITY LAND QUALITY LAND SIZE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARKET FAILURES MARKET PLACE MULTIPLIER EFFECTS NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OCCUPATION OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL TARGETING POOR POOR FARMERS POOR HOUSEHOLD POOR SMALLHOLDERS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY LINE POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS REGIONAL MEDIAN REGRESSION ANALYSIS REMOTE COMMUNITIES REMOTE VILLAGES RURAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE RURAL TOWNS SAFETY SAFETY NET SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SOCIAL COHESION TARGETED TRANSFERS TARGETING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY VILLAGE ASSEMBLY VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL YOUTH
spellingShingle	ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AGGREGATE SUPPLY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AGRICULTURAL SEASON AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY INTERVENTIONS COFFEE GROWING REGION COMMUNITY COMMITTEES CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA CROP INCOME CROP PRODUCTION CROWDING OUT DECENTRALIZATION DESCRIPTION DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRICTS ECOLOGICAL ZONES ECONOMIC CRITERIA ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY EXTENSION AGENTS FARM ACTIVITIES FARMER FARMERS FARMING SEASON FEMALE FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS FEMALE PARTICIPATION FOOD POLICY FOOD PRICES FOOD PRODUCTION FOOD SECURITY FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION GENDER HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD HEAD AGE HOUSEHOLD HEADS HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES ILLITERACY INCOME INCOME GROWTH INDICATORS FOR POVERTY INEQUALITY INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS IRRIGATION LABOR MARKETS LAND INEQUALITY LAND QUALITY LAND SIZE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARKET FAILURES MARKET PLACE MULTIPLIER EFFECTS NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OCCUPATION OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL TARGETING POOR POOR FARMERS POOR HOUSEHOLD POOR SMALLHOLDERS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY LINE POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS REGIONAL MEDIAN REGRESSION ANALYSIS REMOTE COMMUNITIES REMOTE VILLAGES RURAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE RURAL TOWNS SAFETY SAFETY NET SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SOCIAL COHESION TARGETED TRANSFERS TARGETING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY VILLAGE ASSEMBLY VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL YOUTH Pan, Lei Christiaensen, Luc Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
geographic_facet	Africa Africa Sub-Saharan Africa East Africa Tanzania
relation	Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5651
description	Input subsidy programs carry support as instruments to increase agricultural productivity, provided they are market-smart. This requires especially proper targeting to contain the fiscal pressure, with decentralized targeting of input vouchers currently the instrument of choice. Nonetheless, despite clear advantages in administrative costs, the fear of elite capture persists. These fears are borne out in the experience from the 2008 input voucher pilot program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, examined here. Elected village officials received about 60 percent of the distributed vouchers, a factor that significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in more unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and a focus on high trust settings helped mitigate these concerns. The findings highlight the continuing need for scrutiny when relying on decentralized targeting. A clearer sense of purpose (increasing productivity among poorer farmers versus increasing aggregate output) could also enhance the targeting performance.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Pan, Lei Christiaensen, Luc
author_facet	Pan, Lei Christiaensen, Luc
author_sort	Pan, Lei
title	Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
title_short	Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
title_full	Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
title_fullStr	Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
title_full_unstemmed	Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
title_sort	who is vouching for the input voucher? decentralized targeting and elite capture in tanzania
publishDate	2012
url	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110505084157 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3414
_version_	1764386958316929024

Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania

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